'Anathematise those who teach new doctrines' – St Robert Bellarmine
St Robert Bellarmine, Doctor of the Church, taught that laymen can discern true pastors from false by their contradiction of previous teaching, and that they should anathematise them.
Editors’ Notes
Now for all readers:
The following is an exclusive translation taken from St Robert Bellarmine’s Fifth Controversy (On the Clergy). The thesis of the wider section is as follows:
“The right to elect the Pope and other ministers of the Church does not belong to the people by divine law.”
This particular text is about what “the people” are to do in the face of heretical or erroneous preaching. It comes some way into the chapter, but stands apart from the other matters discussed.
Some key points:
Even the simple and unlearned are able to recognise a contradiction between a) what they are being taught at any given moment, and b) what they had previously been taught, and what the rest of the Church is being taught at that given moment.
In the event of such a contradiction, they are to adhere to what they had previously received.
While formalised “recognise and resist” systems are flawed and severely problematic, this text does justify a practical “adhere to tradition and leave questions for the future” approach, especially (but not solely) on the part of “the people.”
However, St Robert says that “the people” still “should anathematise those who teach new doctrines that are contrary to what has been preached before.”
He states that “the people” cannot “depose a false pastor if he is a bishop or substitute another in his place,” and that “the custom of the Church has always been that heretical bishops are deposed by councils of bishops or by the supreme pontiffs.” As discussed in the commentary and application below, sedevacantists do not depose anybody. As Wernz-Vidal say, we accept that “a declaratory sentence of the crime, which as merely declaratory, should not be rejected.”
Parts of this text may appear to support certain systems or theories about the current crisis at one point, and other systems at another point. For this reason, after presenting the text, we will then present comments and application for each section.
St Robert Bellarmine
Fifth Controversy: The Members of the Church – On the Clergy
Book I, Chapter VII
Available from Google Books.
Objection:
The second argument is as follows:
The Lord commands (John 10) that we do not listen to the voice of strangers. Again, he instructs (Matthew 7) to flee from false prophets, and the Apostle (Galatians 1) orders that those who teach anything beyond the Gospel should be accursed.
Therefore, the Christian people have a divine mandate by which they are bound to seek out and call upon good pastors, and to reject harmful ones.
The Answer
I respond that the people indeed ought to discern the true prophet from the false, but by no other rule than by carefully attending to whether the one who preaches says things contrary to those taught by his predecessors, or to those taught by other lawful pastors, and especially by the Apostolic See and the principal Church; for the people are commanded to listen to their own pastors: Luke 10: “He that heareth you, heareth me.” And Matthew 23: “What they say, do” (Luke 10:16, Matthew 23:3).
Therefore, the people should not judge their pastor unless they hear something new and contrary to the doctrine of other pastors.
Furthermore, this is what Paul advises in Galatians 1: that we should anathematise those who teach new doctrines that are contrary to what has been preached before.
Moreover, since the people are unlearned, they cannot otherwise judge the doctrine of their pastor.
For if they could judge by themselves, they would have no need of preachers: from which it follows that the doctrines of Luther, Calvin, and others like them who came of their own accord and preached new things that conflicted with the doctrine of all the pastors of the Church, ought to have been regarded with suspicion by the people of that time.
For when the ordinary pastor and another, who has not been called, teach contrary doctrines, the people must certainly follow their own pastor rather than the other, who is not a pastor, even if it should happen that the pastor errs. For since the people themselves cannot judge the matter, why should they not rather believe the one whom they are commanded to obey?
However, it is not credible that God would allow an ordinary pastor to err so gravely as to deceive the simple people; for it is easy to see whether he teaches things contrary to the other pastors.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the people can indeed, by the rule we have laid down, discern a true prophet from a false one, but for that reason cannot depose a false pastor if he is a bishop, nor substitute another in his place.
For the Lord and the Apostle only command that false prophets are not to be listened to by the people; they do not command that the people should depose them.
And indeed, the custom of the Church has always been that heretical bishops are deposed by councils of bishops or by the supreme pontiffs. From this, the second argument stands resolved.
This is the end of St Robert Bellarmine’s text. What follows is an extensive commentary and application to the current crisis in the Church. It was first available as an advanced preview post for members who choose to support us with a monthly or annual subscription.
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Commentary & Application
We will repeat the text, commenting on and applying each section in turn.
The objection which St Robert Bellarmine is discussing
The second argument is as follows:
The Lord commands (John 10) that we do not listen to the voice of strangers. Again, he instructs (Matthew 7) to flee from false prophets, and the Apostle (Galatians 1) orders that those who teach anything beyond the Gospel should be accursed.
Therefore, the Christian people have a divine mandate by which they are bound to seek out and call upon good pastors, and to reject harmful ones.
The Answer
I respond that the people indeed ought to discern the true prophet from the false, but by no other rule than by carefully attending to whether the one who preaches says things contrary to those taught by his predecessors, or to those taught by other lawful pastors, and especially by the Apostolic See and the principal Church; for the people are commanded to listen to their own pastors. Luke 10: “He that heareth you, heareth me.” And Matthew 23: “What they say, do” (Luke 10:16, Matthew 23:3).
Therefore, the people should not judge their pastor unless they hear something new and contrary to the doctrine of other pastors.
Editors’ Comments
The first point we should note is that, while this extract does not remove the problems with the “recognise and resist” system – by which we understand that which insists on recognising the certain validity and legitimacy of the putative authorities of the post-conciliar hierarchy, whilst also resisting the doctrine, discipline and liturgy of the post-conciliar religious system – it does refute the idea that Catholics are unable to recognise contradiction and act accordingly.
This is also discussed, in part, below:
First, let’s address his reference to St Paul’s letter to the Galatians. In reference to the “Judaizers,” St Paul wrote:
“[T]hough we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema.
“As we said before, so now I say again: If any one preach to you a gospel, besides that which you have received, let him be anathema.” (Gal. 1.8-9)
In the face of such a contradiction between what is proposed to us and what we have already received, our first response must be, as St Paul commands, to “stand fast, and hold the traditions which you have learned.” (2 Thess. 2.14)
But in fact, no-one would admit that “an angel from heaven” could do such a thing. This statement is hypothetical, and if an angel did attempt to do such a thing, it would be a sure sign that he was not an angel from heaven.
Angels from heaven do not and cannot preach new gospels. But can the Church’s magisterium depart from tradition? In the context of an apparent “angel from heaven” revealing himself to be a devil, we cannot help recalling that when St Paul elsewhere warns that Satan transforms himself into “an angel of light,” he specifically links this to false apostles posing as ministers of Christ (2 Cor 11.4-15).
Further, St Paul did not command the Galatians to search through this angel’s preaching, accepting what aligns with tradition and what you have received, resisting what is new, putting a “charitable interpretation on things” and otherwise honouring him as an angel of heaven. He said “Let him be anathema.”
Bellarmine’s (and St Paul’s) emphasis on our obligation to adhere to what we have received is crucial. John Lane expressed the issue as follows:
“Catholics are taught by their teachers - their pastors, bishops, and the pope. To learn requires holding open one's mind to receive what is being presented. It is essentially a passive activity. To teach is to present with the expectation of being listened to in this way - it is essentially active.
“Now the reason why Catholics can be certain, when listening to a heretic who appears to possess authority, that what they are hearing is not truth, is because of contradiction. That is, the contradiction between what has been taught before, and what is being taught now. For while it is the role of the student to accept what is taught, it is impossible for a man to hold two contradictory propositions at the same time.”1
Catholics are required to render an intellectual assent to the teaching of the magisterium. This is a receptive and passive attitude towards the active authority, and it does not just result in an assent of the will, but also of an adoption of taught propositions into the intellect.
While the taught are required to keep their minds ready and receptive for this teaching, the intellect is neither able nor permitted to assent to contradiction. This is what Bellarmine is emphasising here: the ability (and duty) of the faithful to notice that one who appears to possess authority is teaching them something that contradicts what they had previously received.
Today, many people on all sides try to insist that Catholics are obliged to accept whatever is said to them by those who appear to be in authority, without regard for:
The form in which propositions are proposed to them
Whether these propositions contradict the Catholic faith and that which they had previously received
The possibility that those who appear to be in authority are actually usurpers, having lost or never attained office.
Such persons speak as if the assent which is owed to the authentic magisterium is merely one of the will. Bellarmine’s text emphasises the fact that we are to give an intellectual assent to what we are taught, and that our intellects cannot assent to contradiction.
How error is judged
Furthermore, this is what Paul advises in Galatians 1: that we should anathematise those who teach new doctrines that are contrary to what has been preached before.
Moreover, since the people are unlearned, they cannot otherwise [are unable in any other way to] judge the doctrine of their pastor.
Editors’ Comments
Before making any comment, we should note how striking it is that Bellarmine, in the context of apparently legitimate pastors deviating from orthodoxy, says that simple laymen should “anathematise those who teach new doctrines that are contrary to what has been preached before.”
There is no wrangling over pertinacity, or about or material vs. formal heresy, and so on.
In the same piece already cited, John Lane continued:
“[T]he beginning of this process of identifying heresy, of being alarmed at the possibility, is not an active thing at all. It is passive. In the passive role of being taught, the student is asked to receive two contradictory propositions. The mind fails in the attempt. The student is alarmed, becomes active, and searches for the reason for the contradiction. And after further consideration (if necessary), he decides that the contradiction is real, and rejects the novelty.
“‘Sifting’ all that is proposed, to check for possible error, is an activity. A ‘student’ who does this is not really learning - he is placing his own knowledge above that of the teacher, and waiting for the teacher to say something with which he agrees, before ‘accepting’ it. This active ‘picking and choosing’ is not what Catholics do when being taught. It is active, not passive. It is assessing, not learning.
“It is possible for a Catholic to be certain that an untruth is an untruth, precisely because the faith resides in the intellect, and the intellect cannot simultaneously hold two mutually incompatible propositions. It is also possible to be certain that a particular untruth is a heresy - by the simple fact that it is incompatible with dogma.
“That it is possible to be uncertain does not destroy the fact that certainty is also possible. It just means that particular men may be more ignorant than others, or more stupid, or less diligent.”
Bellarmine is referring to “the people” in the widest possible sense, and to what applies to them in this widest possible sense (i.e., referring to those who are not just ill-educated, but also illiterate). The process discussed above is available for all men with the virtue of faith, be they learned or unlearned. Few of these people, however, are capable of “sifting” a mixture of true and false doctrine on intrinsic grounds, and that is why they are told to “anathematise” the teacher of such doctrine and simply to cease listening to them.
However, simply ceasing listening to them is not the same thing as only ceasing listening to them – as if drawing conclusions is forbidden.
Further, it has evidently always been the case that some of “the people” have been more learned than others. Today most people are literate, and some are more engaged in higher learning than would have been typical in previous ages. Bellarmine’s point remains true and applicable even for them: the distinction made between the active role of the teacher and the passive/receptive role of the student can still exist, even when the student is himself actively studying. The question would turn on whether the student’s fundamental orientation is receptivity towards the received content of divine revelation as taught by the Church, which he is actively studying; or whether his study is a form of “sifting,” in the sense described above.
The layman who is studying what he has been given by the Church, in a truly passive or receptive way, is not in a fundamentally different position to the unlearned person in Bellarmine’s text, who is simply receiving the Church’s teaching. Both are learning from the Church, and both can and should recognise contradiction and act accordingly, regardless of how they come upon it.
Are “the people” able to judge?
For if they could judge by themselves, they would have no need of preachers: from which it follows that the doctrines of Luther, Calvin, and others like them who came of their own accord and preached new things that conflicted with the doctrine of all the pastors of the Church, ought to have been regarded with suspicion by the people of that time.
For when the ordinary pastor and another, who has not been called, teach contrary doctrines, the people must certainly follow their own pastor rather than the other, who is not a pastor, even if it should happen that the pastor errs. For since the people themselves cannot judge the matter, why should they not rather believe the one whom they are commanded to obey?
However, it is not credible that God would allow an ordinary pastor to err so gravely as to deceive the simple people; for it is easy to see whether he teaches things contrary to the other pastors.
Editors’ Notes
In the middle of the 2020s, what appears to be before us is a collection of “traditionalist clerics” operating independently of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, accusing this hierarchy of having erred in doctrine. This, naturally, is how many of the younger generation see it, and this is why they consider such clergymen as those “who came of their own accord and preached new things that conflicted with the doctrine of all the pastors of the Church.”
“Why,” Bellarmine asks, “should they not rather believe the one whom they are commanded to obey?”
The first point to note, as above, is that the “judgement” in question pertains to judging the truth of competing doctrines on intrinsic grounds. Those noticing problems with the Vatican II revolution are not necessarily doing the latter.
But what I described is also not an accurate view of the post-conciliar situation.
We must recall that in the 1960s – in living memory for many people – the received religion practised by our recent forebears, many of whom we knew personally (e.g., parents, grandparents and great-grandparents, many of whom are still alive) apparently underwent a wholesale revolution.
This process changed nearly every aspect of their religion, which was deconstructed and reconstructed with a mixture of original and new materials. This is why so many of those who experienced it said: “They changed the religion.”
What is unquestionable is that this religious revolution was spearheaded by Paul VI and other putative “ordinary pastors.” In this text St Robert Bellarmine does not say that this is impossible: on the contrary, he says:
“[I]t is not credible that God would allow an ordinary pastor to err so gravely as to deceive the simple people; for it is easy to see whether he teaches things contrary to the other pastors.”
It was indeed easy to see that Paul VI and his henchmen were teaching new things contrary “to the other pastors” (and which had already been condemned), even if these “other pastors” were only a few in number, or were those who had already gone before.
It was so easy to see this contradiction that hordes of previously faithful Catholics left the Church, having concluded that what they had been taught about her infallibility and indefectibility was all a lie; and for the same reasons, hordes of priests and religious left their vocations.
While some “simple people” were deceived and went along with Paul VI’s religious revolution, other “simple people” were able to see this contradiction, and so were not deceived. These latter “simple people” followed St Robert Bellarmine’s teaching, namely by adhering to traditional teaching and rejecting what was contrary to it, and only because of this did they attach themselves to the few remaining clergymen mentioned.
Gregory of Valencia explains further that if a putative pope tried to impose an error manifestly against the established faith of the Church, then this error would be recognisable and thus “the people” as a whole would not be deceived, even if “some” or “many people” might be.
But in fact, what happened was more than the teaching of isolated errors. As Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre said soon before he died:
“This fight between the Church and the liberals and modernism is the fight over Vatican II. It is as simple of that. And the consequences are far-reaching.
“The more one analyzes the documents of Vatican II, and the more one analyzes their interpretation by the authorities of the Church, the more one realizes that what is at stake is not merely superficial errors, a few mistakes, ecumenism, religious liberty, collegiality, a certain Liberalism, but rather a wholesale perversion of the mind, a whole new philosophy based on modern philosophy, on subjectivism.”2
In fact, the enormous rupture was and is notorious, and plain for all the world to see. All do indeed see it, except those who have an a priori commitment to the idea that it was not a rupture at all.
It is also notorious that “the old religion” never ceased being practised, in the way that these recent forebears had practised it, and that it never ceased being so practised visibly and in public. Those who have continued to practise this received religion in the same way were and are systematically exiled, marginalised and barred from worshiping in the churches which they and their parents, grandparents and forefathers built; but which are now used for a rite of worship, and for the teaching of a doctrine and practice of a religion which no Catholic before our time would have recognised as their own.
As such, the true picture is that the apparently “ordinary pastors” were the teachers of novelty; and their apparently “uncalled, unsent” opposition were those who stayed faithful in the 1960s and 1970s, by following Bellarmine’s doctrine in this extract.
The latter were in the right, and so are their heirs. The former were in the wrong, and so are their heirs.
False pastors not to be deposed by laymen
Furthermore, it should be noted that the people can indeed, by the rule we have laid down, discern a true prophet from a false one, but for that reason cannot depose a false pastor if he is a bishop, nor substitute another in his place.
For the Lord and the Apostle only command that false prophets are not to be listened to by the people; they do not command that the people should depose them.
And indeed, the custom of the Church has always been that heretical bishops are deposed by councils of bishops or by the supreme pontiffs. From this, the second argument stands resolved.
Editors’ Comments
The above text would appear to justify the so-called “recognise and resist” position, by which we mean that which insists on recognising the certain validity and legitimacy of the putative authorities of the post-conciliar hierarchy, whilst also resisting the doctrine, discipline and liturgy of the post-conciliar religious system.
On the contrary, “the people’s” inability to sift and judge the doctrine of a false pastor is the very reason why the false pastor must be rejected outright.
Some refer to another passage from Bellarmine’s De Ecclesia Militante as evidence for the idea that “ipso facto” really mean “ipso facto and the intervention of authority”:
“Moreover it is certain, whatever one or another might think, a secret heretic, if he might be a Bishop, or even the Supreme Pontiff, does not lose jurisdiction, nor dignity, or the name of the head in the Church, until either he separates himself publicly from the Church, or being convicted of heresy is separated against his will […]”3
But this text is clearly discussing secret or occult heretics, whereas the issue here is public or manifest heretics who are teaching heresy. This text from De Ecclesia Militante could only pose a problem if one does violence to the notion of public or manifest heresy, and insists that these terms refer solely to heresy which has been declared by authority.
In fact, the text itself notes that an occult heretic can become a public heretic and thus separate himself from the Church, and thus loses his office without need for the conviction and separation mentioned. Louie Verrecchio discusses this text here.
Further, the context of this commonly-cited extract dramatically undermines the idea that declarations and legal processes are required in all cases. Here are the surrounding comments:
“Next the same thing [viz. that secret heretics remain members of the Church] is proven from the testimonies of those Fathers who teach in a common consensus that those who are outside the Church have no authority or jurisdiction in the Church. Moreover, right reason manifestly teaches the same thing: By what arrangement can it be devised or imagined that one might have jurisdiction and hence be the head of the Church, who is not a member of the Church? Whoever heard of a head which was not a member?
“Moreover it is certain, whatever one or another might think, a secret heretic, if he might be a Bishop, or even the Supreme Pontiff, does not lose jurisdiction, nor dignity, or the name of the head in the Church, until either he separates himself publicly from the Church, or being convicted of heresy is separated against his will; for this reason, Celestine and Nicholas say (loc. cit.) that a heretical Bishop, to the extent that he began to preach heresy, could bind and loose no one although without a doubt if he had already conceived the error, were it before he began to preach publicly, he could still bind and loose.
“The fact is likewise confirmed from the canon Audivimus, 24, quaest. 1, where we read: ‘But if he will have devised a new heresy in their heart, to the extent that he begins to preach such things, he can condemn no man.’ Besides, what if secret heretics could have no jurisdiction, every act that depends upon jurisdiction would be rendered uncertain, which would disturb the universal Church in no small measure.
“Therefore, now if he who is not in the Church cannot have authority in the Church and a secret heretic can have it, and at some point really has authority in the Church, certainly a secret heretic can be in the Church.”4
The whole tenor of the text is very different from how the defenders of the post-conciliar claimants portray it. As mentioned above, we do not find here the typical wrangling over pertinacity, or about or material vs. formal heresy, judgments from authority, and so on. The matter is treated very differently to how many might expect.
So what would the text from De Clericis (“the custom of the Church has always been that heretical bishops are deposed by councils of bishops or by the supreme pontiffs”) mean in practice? Should we assume that Bellarmine is contradicting what he wrote elsewhere, namely that a public heretic leaves the Church and is ipso facto deposed from office? Or perhaps we should conclude “ipso facto” to mean “not ipso facto but following the intervention of authority”?
The answer to these two latter questions is in the negative.
Those who draw a different conclusion about the current crisis, and hold these putative authorities to be invalid and illegitimate, do not pretend to depose them, or to replace them. On the contrary, the conclusion is this: In many clear cases, putative members of the hierarchy have themselves renounced their offices along with their membership of the Church. Da Silveira has conclusively shown that this – rather than the idea that Christ or the Church deprives such persons of their offices – is how a manifestly heretic ceases to be pope. There is no room in our discussion for laymen (or anyone else) deposing popes: it is an irrelevancy.
A “deposition” of these men – in the sense of a declaration of the fact of a vacancy – is recognised as necessary in order to make this reality a grounds for further action (e.g., new appointments and elections).
As mentioned, we should not assume Bellarmine was contradicting himself – and often, when we see fuller texts, it is clear that he is not doing so.
Dealing with the topic of heretics, membership and offices elsewhere, Bellarmine wrote that the duty to avoid heretics was actually proof of their loss of office:
“The argument from authority is based on St. Paul (Titus, c. 3), who orders that the heretic be avoided after two warnings, that is, after showing himself to be manifestly obstinate – which means before any excommunication or judicial sentence. And this is what St. Jerome writes, adding that the other sinners are excluded from the Church by sentence of excommunication, but the heretics exile themselves and separate themselves by their own act from the body of Christ.
“Now, a Pope who remains Pope cannot be avoided, for how could we be required to avoid our own head? How can we separate ourselves from a member united to us?
“This principle is most certain. The non-Christian cannot in any way be Pope, as Cajetan himself admits (ib. c. 26). The reason for this is that he cannot be head of what he is not a member; now he who is not a Christian is not a member of the Church, and a manifest heretic is not a Christian, as is clearly taught by St. Cyprian (lib. 4, epist. 2), St. Athanasius (Scr. 2 cont. Arian.), St. Augustine (lib. de great. Christ. cap. 20), St. Jerome (contra Lucifer.) and others; therefore the manifest heretic cannot be Pope.”5
Could it be argued that those who teach heresy are not necessarily heretics, but might be just mistaken?
Without conceding this idea, those taking this line of argument should recognise that by doing so, they are conceding that Bellarmine's apparently more cautious language here does not apply to heretics. In which case, it seems clear that the other texts which presented (about public heretics losing office ipso facto) win the day when we are dealing with heretics. They cannot have it both ways: they cannot say that this extract is not dealing with heretics, and then insist that we apply what it says to those who are heretics.
However, we should also consider that Bellarmine said the following:
“For although Liberius was not a heretic, still he was considered to be a heretic, because of the peace he made with the Arians; and because of that presumption the pontificate could rightly be taken from him.
“For men are not bound to, or cannot scrutinize hearts; but when they see someone acting in a heretical way, they simply judge that he is a heretic, and they condemn him as a heretic.”6
The Doctor also taught that putative authorities who teach heresies have no power to excommunicate Catholics who refuse to accept their errors, whether the reason is that these putative authorities are heretics themselves, or have already lost office or not.
This was taught directly by Pope St Celestine, in reference to those who were deposed or excommunicated for failing to accept the errors of Nestorius. St Robert Bellarmine cites these letters (whilst indicating that this is indeed because they lost office ipso facto):
“It is evident that he [who has been excommunicated by Nestorius] has remained and remains in communion with us, and that we do not consider destituted [i.e. deprived of office, by judgment of Nestorius], anyone who has been excommunicated or deprived of his charge, either episcopal or clerical, by Bishop Nestorius or by the others who followed him, after they commenced preaching heresy. For he who had already shown himself as deserving to be excommunicated, could not excommunicate anyone by his sentence.”
And:
“The authority of Our Apostolic See has determined that the bishop, cleric, or simple Christian who had been deposed or excommunicated by Nestorius or his followers, after the latter began to preach heresy, shall not be considered deposed or excommunicated. For he who had defected from the faith with such preachings, cannot depose or remove anyone whatsoever.”7
As such, even if one thinks (most implausibly) that a false pastor has somehow have retained his office, the errors which he has preached should indicate the value of the excommunication declared against men such as Archbishop Lefebvre or Archbishop Viganò.
Elsewhere, Bellarmine also states, as an argument against the idea that a heretic pope retains office, that:
“[I[t would be a miserable situation for the Church, if she were forced to acknowledge as her shepherd a manifestly raging wolf.”8
And yet this is precisely what some say Bellarmine tells us to do.
Now, even outside of the topic of “deposition” which we have already addressed, it still would normally be best for higher authorities in the Church to deal with pastors teaching errors and heresy. It is not conducive for good order (at least, under ordinary circumstances) for anyone or everyone to be taking matters in their own hands.
However, as James Larrabee wrote:
“De Nantes further argues that disorders would arise if every ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ were able to challenge the Pope for heresy. This seems a frivolous objection. First of all, only in the rarest of instances has a Pope ever been accused of heresy, and even more rarely has one given reasonable grounds for such an accusation. (For example, Liberius, Honorius, and John XXII.)
“And it seems unthinkable that a particularly large number of people could ever be brought to do so; far more likely that, as at present, a manifestly heretical Pope could draw the bishops and many of the people over to his heresy. This is an incomparably worse situation than any conceivable alternative, and it is exactly the reality now.”
We should also note that a) the current crisis is completely extraordinary, and b) the very essence of our crisis, in which our putative authorities are teaching errors and heresy and imposing a new religion, is that there are no higher authorities to deal with the problem.
But despite this, “the people” still have to live, and save their souls. Some such persons perhaps can and should be content with being able to “discern a true prophet from a false one” and with the fact that “the Lord and the Apostle only command that false prophets are not to be listened to by the people.”
However, the Lord and the Apostle did not forbid the use of the intellect, even by “the people.” Those of us who are able to understand the truth of the situation are not forbidden to do so.
Joachim Salaverri refers to the assent of divine faith as a “sacrifice” of the intellect, not because the intellect is destroyed or humiliated in such assent, but because it is subjected to God in a way that is right and proper, and in keeping with reason itself.9 It is in faith, in this sacrifice of the intellect, that human reason is elevated and perfected.
Even if the loss of office due to manifest heresy is not a matter of faith, the point stands. We do not bring glory to God by extinguishing the light of our intellect and timorously refusing to draw conclusions.
As Don de Sarda y Salvany wrote in his famous work Liberalism is a Sin, which was specifically approved by the Holy Office:
“[H]uman reason, to speak after the manner of theologians, has a theological place in matters of religion. Faith dominates reason, which ought to be subordinated to faith in everything. But it is altogether false to pretend that reason can do nothing, that it has no function at all in matters of faith; it is false to pretend that the inferior light, illumined by God in the human understanding, cannot shine at all because it does not shine as powerfully or as clearly as the superior light.
“Yes, the faithful are permitted and even commanded to give a reason for their faith, to draw out its consequences, to make applications of it, to deduce parallels and analogies from it. It is thus by use of their reason that the faithful are enabled to suspect and measure the orthodoxy of any new doctrine presented to them, by comparing it with a doctrine already defined. If it be not in accord, they can combat it as bad, and justly stigmatize as bad the book or journal which sustains it.
“They cannot of course define it ex cathedra, but they can lawfully hold it as perverse and declare it such, warn others against it, raise the cry of alarm and strike the first blow against it. The faithful layman can do all this, and has done it at all times with the applause of the Church. Nor in so doing does he make himself the pastor of the flock, nor even its humblest attendant; he simply serves it as a watchdog who gives the alarm. Oportet allatrare canes—"It behooves watchdogs to bark," very opportunely said a great Spanish Bishop in reference to such occasions. […]
“Of what use would be the rule of faith and morals if in every particular case the faithful could not of themselves make the immediate application, or if they were constantly obliged to consult the Pope or the diocesan pastor? […]
“It would be rendering the superior rule of faith useless, absurd and impossible to require the supreme authority of the Church to make its special and immediate application in every case and upon every occasion which calls it forth.”10
We are able to recognise a false gospel when it is preached; and we are able to draw the conclusions that follow.
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John Lane, Thoughtless Anti-Sedevacantism
https://web.archive.org/web/20240228183416/https://sspx.org/en/two-years-after-consecrations
St Robert Bellarmine, from De Controversiis: Tomus II, On the Church Vol. I, Book III (On the Church Militant), Ch. X, Secret Infidels. Trans. Ryan Grant, Mediatrix Press, Post Falls ID, 2017, p 295.
Ibid., 294-5.
St Robert Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, lib. II, cap. 30. Trans. James Larrabee.
St Robert Bellarmine, Controversies of the Christian Religion, trans. Fr Kenneth Baker SJ, Keep the Faith Press, USA, 2016, 983.
St. Robert Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, lib. II, cap. 30, trans. James Larrabee. Quoting Pope St Celestine epist. ad Jo. Antioch., which appears in Conc. Ephes., tom. I, cap. 19; St Nicholas I epist. ad Michael, and St Thomas Aquinas S. Theol., II-II, q. 39, a. 3.
Latin and Greek of St Celestine available here.
Bellarmine (Baker), 836.
Joaquín Salaverri, Value of the Encyclicals in the light of the “Humani Generis”, 1951, published in: Miscelánea Comillas XVII.
Don Felix Sarda Y Salvany, Liberalism is a Sin (1899), Ch. 32. Trans. Conde B. Pallen, TAN Charlotte, North Carolina, 2012.
As a practical consideration what are Catholics supposed to do publicly when anathematising false shepherds?