Bellarmine does not teach councils are necessary for ipso facto loss of office
It is alleged that Bellarmine taught that a council is necessary to effect the loss of office (or 'non-papacy') of a manifestly heretical 'pope.' Is this true?
It is alleged that Bellarmine taught that a Council is necessary to effect the loss of office (or 'non-papacy') of a manifestly heretical 'pope.' Is this true?
Editors’ Notes
There are a variety of inventive ways proposed to take Bellarmine’s clear statement…
“Therefore, the true opinion is the fifth, according to which the Pope who is manifestly a heretic ceases by himself to be Pope and head, in the same way as he ceases to be a Christian and a member of the body of the Church; and for this reason he can be judged and punished by the Church.”
… and transform this clear statement either into the “fourth opinion” against which it was defended—which holds that…
“… the manifestly heretical Pope is not ‘ipso facto’ deposed, but can and must be deposed by the Church.”
… or into a “sixth opinion,” which gives lip-service to the idea of ipso facto loss of office, while making some sort of “official” declaration simply and absolutely necessary for the heresy to be sufficiently manifest.
We have already presented the explanation of Arnaldo da Silveira explaining why all this is a grave distortion of both Bellarmine’s thought and of sound doctrine:
However, in order to address these distortions, and to refute these arguments, we are also providing a new translation of Chapter 9-11 from Book I of Bellarmine’s Fourth General Controversy—On Councils. This section features several texts which are variously mistranslated or presented out of context, such as the following section from Chapter 9:
“The fourth reason is suspicion of heresy in the Roman pontiff, if such a thing should happen, or perhaps even incorrigible tyranny; for then a general council ought to be convened, either to depose the pontiff, if he were found to be a heretic, or certainly to admonish him, if he were seen to be incorrigible in his conduct: for, as is stated in the eighth council (Constantinople IV), can 21, general councils ought to investigate controversies arising concerning the Roman pontiff, though they ought not presumptuously pronounce judgment upon him.”
But did you know…
That some have tried to interpret this text as meaning that the Councils should pronounce judgment on a pope, so long as it is not done “presumptuously”?
That the text from Constantinople IV makes very clear that the common misinterpretation completely untenable? (See the main text for more.)
That interpreting “suspicion of heresy in a Roman Pontiff” as meaning that “a Roman Pontiff can only ever be suspect of heresy unless judged by a Council” is utterly begging the question?
That in the very next chapter, he specifically denies that a Council is necessary to pronounce judgment on a pope? In which he states:
“For as long as he is truly pontiff, he cannot be judged by any council, unless he himself grants the council the authority to examine his case and pronounce a declarative (discretivam), though not coercive, judgment. This authority, however, the pope can equally grant to a particular council as to a universal one.”
That at no point does Bellarmine say or even imply that any kind of council is needed in order to effect the ipso facto loss of office by a former Roman Pontiff, nor that a putative Roman Pontiff's heresy is necessarily occult until rendered manifest by a council.
Further—as is crucial for understanding the situation—in Chapter 10, Bellarmine refutes the idea that councils are absolutely, simply (simpliciter) and always necessary for any of the reasons given in Chapter 9; and he shows that the Pope alone can do everything that a council can do.
And this is the very point of Bellarmine’s treatment: that it is not a Council (nor Christ himself, as he is sometimes represented as teaching) who deposes a manifestly heretical pope, but rather the former/non-Pope himself. He, like all heretics, renders himself a non-pope in the same way that he renders himself a non-Christian—by his own act and and judgment.1
None of these points exclude what Bellarmine writes in Chapter 11—that Councils can often be a better means of achieving certain ends than others. In addition, they may be effective at making the recognition of certain facts (such as the non-papacy of an antipope) clear and obligatory on all.
We are inclined to agree—although not in any sense that involves a council judging a true pope—that declarations and an imperfect gathering of bishops may well be an effective means of clarifying a situation such as the one under discussion. But it should be obvious that these being effective means does not mean that they are the only means.
S.D. Wright
Bellarmine does not teach councils are necessary for ipso facto loss of office
Fourth General Controversy—On Councils
Book I—On the Nature and Causes of a Council
Available from Google Books
Chapter IX—On the Utility or Even Necessity of Holding Councils
With these preliminaries established, we must explain those principles upon which legitimate councils depend. These principles can be reduced to four causes: the end, the efficient cause, the matter, and the form of councils. Beginning with the end, which is the first of causes, we shall first briefly explain the reasons for which councils are typically convened; from these, we shall judge whether the convocation of councils is necessary, or merely useful. The principal reasons for which councils are convened are generally numbered as six.
The first reason is a new heresy, that is, one never previously adjudicated, on account of which the first seven general councils were convened. The Church has always esteemed the danger of new heresies so gravely that it judged they could not be resisted effectively unless all, or at least very many, leaders of the Church combined their forces and, as it were, formed a line of battle against the enemies of the faith.
The second reason is schism between [apparent] Roman Pontiffs. For this reason, a council was convened in the time of Cornelius, another in the time of Damasus, and others again during the times of Symmachus, Innocent II, Alexander III, the Pisan Council, and the Council of Constance during the periods of Gregory XII and Benedict XIII. No remedy is more potent than a council, as has been proven most frequently.
The third reason is resistance to a common enemy of the whole Church. Councils were convened for this purpose by Urban II, Callistus II, Eugene III, and other pontiffs to wage war against the Saracens. Similarly, councils were convened to depose emperors, as by Gregory III against Leo III the Iconoclast; Gregory VII against Henry IV; and Innocent IV against Frederick II.
The fourth reason is suspicion of heresy in the Roman pontiff, if such a thing should happen, or perhaps even incorrigible tyranny; for then a general council ought to be convened, either to depose the pontiff, if he were found to be a heretic, or certainly to admonish him, if he were seen to be incorrigible in his conduct: for, as is stated in the eighth council (Constantinople IV), can 21, general councils ought to investigate controversies arising concerning the Roman pontiff, though they ought not presumptuously pronounce judgment upon him.
Editor: Here is Canon 21 from Constantinople IV:
LATIN: But if an ecumenical council is assembled and there appears some doubt or controversy even with regard to the holy Church of the Romans, it is necessary, with great respect and proper reverence, to investigate the point of controversy and procure a solution, either by helping or by obtaining help, yet not by audaciously pronouncing a judgment against the supreme pontiffs of elder Rome.
GREEK: But if an ecumenical council is assembled and there appears some doubt with regard to the Church of the Romans, one can, with prudence and the proper reverence, investigate the point of controversy and find a solution, either by obtaining help or by helping, yet not by having the audacity to cast an accusation against the bishops of elder Rome.2
It seems clear that this canon is treating the very act of judging (or even accusing!) the Roman Pontiff as audacious, rather than permitting such judgments as long as they are not “non-audacious.”
For this reason, we read of the Council of Sinuessa being convened for the case of St Marcellinus, and Roman councils in the cases of Damasus, Sixtus III, and Leo III and IV, none of whom were condemned by the council. Marcellinus imposed penance upon himself before the council, while the others cleared themselves. See Platina and the tomes of the councils.
The fifth reason is doubt concerning the election of the Roman Pontiff. If the cardinals were unable or unwilling to elect a pontiff, or if all of them were to perish simultaneously, or if true doubt arose concerning who had the authority to conduct such an election, it would pertain to a general council to decide the election of the future pontiff, although such an event is scarcely probable.
The sixth reason is the general reformation of abuses and vices that creep into the Church. For although the pontiff alone has the authority to prescribe laws for the whole Church, the matter proceeds much more smoothly when the supreme pontiff prescribes such laws with the approval of a general council. Hence we see that nearly all general councils have issued canons concerning reformation. See John of Turrecremata, Book III, chapters 9 and 10.
Chapter X—That General Councils are useful and, in a certain way, necessary; yet not absolutely and simply (simpliciter) necessary
From the reasons for which we have said councils are convened, it will be easy to judge whether councils are merely useful or even plainly necessary for the preservation of the Church. Indeed, concerning general councils, I hold that their convocations are most useful and in a certain way necessary, but not absolutely and simply (simpliciter) necessary. This I easily persuade myself of, firstly, because for the first 300 years the Church lacked general councils and yet did not perish. Just as in those 300 years the Church remained intact without general councils, so too, without doubt, could it have remained for another 300 years, and again for 600, or even a thousand years. For during that time, there was no lack of many heresies, schisms, vices, and abuses, all of which, however, could not suppress the Catholic Church even though it lacked the assistance of general councils.
Response to the reasons in Chapter 9
Moreover, none of the reasons enumerated proves that a general council is absolutely necessary. For instance, reform of vices and abuses (to begin with the last reason) can be accomplished satisfactorily through the laws of the supreme pontiff or through the decrees of provincial councils; even though, as we have said, it is accomplished more smoothly through general councils.
However, the reason [for convening a Council] concerning the election of the Supreme Pontiff cannot arise (speaking morally, not metaphysically) such that it would ever come into use. For who would believe that the cardinals would be unwilling or unable to elect a pontiff? And if such a case did arise, there could scarcely be any doubt about who holds the authority for the election. For since the Roman episcopate has been raised to the supreme pontificate of the Church, it belongs without doubt to those responsible for electing the Roman bishop to elect the supreme pontiff. Whose responsibility it is to elect the Roman bishop would be no more uncertain, even in the absence of pontifical constitutions, than whose responsibility it is to elect bishops in other cities. But this matter must be treated elsewhere.
It is clear that no general council has ever been convened for such a reason.
The same can be said of the fourth reason. For due to suspicions regarding the doctrine or life of pontiffs, only provincial or national councils have ever convened. Nor does it seem that a greater council is needed. For as long as he is truly pontiff, he cannot be judged by any council, unless he himself grants the council the authority to examine his case and pronounce a declarative (discretivam), though not coercive, judgment. This authority, however, the pope can equally grant to a particular council as to a universal one.
Now, the third cause does not necessarily demand a general council for two reasons. First, it [a general council] is not absolutely necessary to resist a common enemy, such as the Turk. For if the Church could be preserved under the most savage persecutions of Nero, Domitian, Decius, and Diocletian, why could it not also endure under the persecution of the Turks? Moreover, who does not see that war may be declared against a common enemy even without a general council, as has often been done?
Finally, neither the first nor the second cause necessarily requires the convocation of a general council, as past ages testify. For while seven general councils were convened to extinguish seven heresies, more than a hundred heresies have been eradicated solely by the Apostolic See, with the cooperation of particular councils. And while one schism was resolved through the general Council of Constance, more than twenty-five schisms have been resolved without a general council.
Some Objections which seem to show general councils are necessary
But St Augustine, in On the Two Letters of the Pelagians, Book IV, Chapter 12, affirms that certain heresies were so grave that a plenary council of the East and West was necessary to overcome them. Likewise, St Leo, in his 43rd letter to the Emperor Marcian, praises Marcian for deeming the general council he had requested necessary.
St Isidore, in the preface to the councils, writes that before the time of Constantine, the Christian Church was divided by various heresies because the persecution of the emperors did not permit bishops to hold councils. Without doubt, he speaks here of general councils, for it is clear that many particular councils were held before the time of Constantine. Thus, Isidore seems to suggest that general councils are simply necessary for the extirpation of heresies.
Likewise, St Eugene, Bishop of Carthage, as Victor testifies in the second book of On the Vandal Persecution, when pressured by King Huneric to confer with the Arian bishops on the faith, responded that the cause of faith is common to the entire Catholic Church; therefore, bishops from all parts of the Church ought to be convened, and the matter especially ought to be referred to the Roman Church, which is the head of all Churches. By this response, Eugene signified that a general council is entirely necessary for addressing questions of faith.
Finally, the ancient question of whether those baptised by heretics should be rebaptised was never resolved until the judgment of a general council, even though many particular councils and decisions of the Apostolic See had preceded it. It therefore appears that a general synod is simply (simpliciter) necessary for the resolution of controversies concerning the faith. St Augustine speaks of this in On Baptism against the Donatists, Book I, Chapter 7:
“The obscurity of this question in the earlier times of the Church, prior to the schism of Donatus, compelled great men, fathers and bishops of great charity, to debate and waver among themselves, preserving peace, so that for a long time the diverse statutes of councils in their respective regions were altered until, by a plenary council of the whole world, the most salutary view was firmly established, even removing doubts.”
And in Chapter 18, he says:
“Let us piously believe this concerning baptism: what the universal Church, removed from the sacrilege of schism, maintains. Yet if, on this question, one held one opinion, and another held another, while still preserving peace, until a universal council resolved upon a purified and sincere judgment, the error of human weakness would be excused by the charity of unity.”
And in Book II, Chapter 4, he says:
“We would not dare to assert such a matter, were we not confirmed by the most harmonious authority of the universal Church, to which even he would undoubtedly yield, if by that time the truth of this question had been resolved and confirmed by a plenary council.”
These are the words of Augustine.
Answer to the objection regarding St Augustine
But it is not difficult to respond to Augustine’s first testimony. For Augustine does not teach that general councils were ever simply (simpliciter) necessary at any time, but only necessary in a certain sense; that is, so that peace might be restored to the Churches more sweetly and maturely. Indeed, Augustine, who wrote that a general council was necessary to suppress a certain heresy (Arianism) also wrote that the Pelagian heresy and many others could be suppressed without a general council.
If one were to ask why a general council was more necessary for the case of the Arians than for that of the Pelagians, Augustine would not answer that the question introduced into the Church by the Arians was more obscure than that of the Pelagians; for that does not seem true, since there are far more and clearer scriptural testimonies for the divinity of Christ against the Arians than for original sin against the Pelagians.
Rather, it is because the heresy of the Pelagians, as God willed and arranged, was swiftly condemned by the universal Church; with the greatest peace and consensus this same decree was made by the Apostolic See of Rome, the Councils of the Eastern Church in Palestine, and the Councils of the Western Church in Africa. However, from its inception, the Arian heresy began to gain many episcopal patrons who did not seem likely to yield easily unless overwhelmed by the supreme authority of the whole Church.
Thus, a general council was not necessary to extinguish the Pelagian heresy, but it was necessary to extinguish the Arian heresy; because the former was easily and conveniently suppressed by the Apostolic See with the cooperation of provincial councils from various regions; while the latter, though it could eventually have been suppressed by the same Apostolic See and provincial councils, could not have been done so as conveniently or easily.
The same response can be given to the testimony of St Leo. For St Leo deemed the general council of Chalcedon necessary, so that its authority might overturn what had been erroneously enacted by the second general council of Ephesus. But that this was not an absolute necessity, but only a relative one, is evident from the nullification of the Council of Ariminum. For the Council of Ariminum was a general and very numerous council, far more celebrated than the second Council of Ephesus, yet it was nullified by Pope Damasus without the support of any general council. On this matter, see the letter of Damasus to the bishops of Illyricum and the 52nd letter of Basil to Athanasius.
Answer to the objection regarding St Isidore
We are likewise compelled to interpret the testimony of Isidore in this manner. For what he says—that before Constantine’s reign the Church was divided by various heresies because bishops were not permitted to convene councils and thus instruct their flocks—if taken absolutely, is most clearly false. For even before Constantine’s time, many heresies were entirely eradicated and extinguished by episcopal councils. Moreover, after Constantine’s time, there were no shortage of new heresies that troubled the Church for a very long time. Certainly, the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies could never be fully eradicated, and yet they arose after the time of Constantine, and general councils often laboured to uproot them. Thus, Isidore merely intended to signify that general councils began to be celebrated in Constantine’s time and that this was exceedingly useful for suppressing heresies.
Answer to the objection regarding St Eugene
Now as for what St Eugene intended, Victor of Utica explains this in the same place. He writes that Eugene mentioned the general council and the Churches overseas when he was summoned to confer on the faith with the Arians; not because there were no very learned men in Africa who could competently argue with the Arian bishops, but because he judged that the foreign theologians, if they came to Africa, would more freely advocate for the cause of the faith, since they were not subject to the king of the Vandals, to whom the African bishops were subordinate.
Yet Eugene did not lie when he said that the cause of the faith was common and that he could not take up that cause without the bishops from overseas. For although he was absolutely permitted to confer with the Arians on the faith—as Catholics had often debated with Donatists in the same region—nevertheless, it was not expedient at that time, and therefore it was not permitted without manifest danger. Thus, Eugene truly could not undertake that mission without his foreign colleagues, not because of a lack of authority, but because of a lack of opportunity. It was not injustice, but prudence, to elude the tyrant's demands with an ambiguous response.
Answer to the objection regarding rebaptism
The final objection, concerning the baptism of heretics, is resolved in two ways. First, it may not be true, as Augustine believed, that this question could not have been settled prior to the decree of a general council. For the first general council was that of Nicaea, convened during the reign of Constantine. However, St Jerome, in his Dialogue against the Luciferians, writes that the same bishops who had, with Cyprian, decreed that heretics must be rebaptised later issued a contrary decree. From this, it can be inferred that these bishops ultimately yielded to the judgement of Stephen, the Roman pontiff, although all of them had died before the time of the Nicene Council.
Likewise, Jerome, in his On Ecclesiastical Writers, records that Dionysius of Alexandria had agreed with Cyprian on rebaptism. Eusebius also indicates this in Ecclesiastical History, Book VII, Chapter 4. Yet it is evident that Dionysius later changed his opinion and dared not rebaptise a man who was certainly known to have been baptised by heretics, as Eusebius recounts in Ecclesiastical History, Book VII, Chapter 8. Furthermore, Augustine himself, in Epistle 48 to Vincentius, suspects that Cyprian may have recanted his opinion. Thus, it is probable that, even before the Nicene Council, this question was resolved among all Catholics by the authority of the Apostolic See.
But even if the matter had not been resolved until the determination of a plenary council, as Augustine states, it should not be inferred that it could not have been resolved earlier. For although the Apostolic See, assisted by provincial councils, possessed the authority to settle such a controversy, those holy pontiffs preferred to defer the absolute determination of the question to a more opportune time, rather than separate so many great men from the Church. Since this opportune moment did not present itself until the Council of Nicaea, Augustine repeatedly affirms that this question was finally settled at the plenary council of the whole world.
Another objection based on Pope Stephen, St Cyprian and rebaptism
But, one might object, Pope Stephen convened a certain particular council, in which he commanded that those baptised by heretics should not be rebaptised, and judged that those who rebaptised should be excommunicated, as Dionysius of Alexandria writes, with Eusebius as witness (Ecclesiastical History, Book VII, Chapter 4) and as Augustine states in de unico Baptismo, Chapter 14. Therefore, it seems that the pope, together with his particular council, intended to resolve the question but was unable to do so; hence, it appears that general councils are entirely necessary after all.
I reply, as I have already done in On the Pontiff, Book IV, Chapter 7, that Stephen did indeed command that those baptised by heretics should not be rebaptised, and judged that those who rebaptised ought to be excommunicated. However, he did not actually excommunicate them, as is clearly gathered from many ancient authorities. For Cyprian himself, in his letter to Pompeius, does not say that Stephen excommunicated anyone but rather judged that those acting contrary ought to be excommunicated. He says:
“The priests of God, upholding the truth of Christ and the unity of the Church, deem them to be avoided.”
Likewise, in his letter to Jubaianus, he states that he maintained peace with his colleagues who held contrary opinions—something he certainly would not have said had Stephen either excommunicated him or he excommunicated Stephen. He says:
“As far as it lies in us, we do not contend with our colleagues and fellow bishops on account of heretics, with whom we hold divine concord and the Lord’s peace.”
Jerome, in his Dialogue against the Luciferians, speaks of Cyprian thus:
“He remained in communion with those who opposed his opinion.”
Augustine, in On Baptism, Book I, Chapter 7, states that great men, fathers of the Church, and bishops—namely, Stephen and Cyprian—disagreed while preserving peace and charity. Pacian, in Epistle 2 to Sympronian, writes:
“Cyprian suffered in the harmony of all, in the common peace, and in the company of confessors.”
Vincent of Lérins, in his Commonitorium, remarks:
“O marvellous reversal of events: the authors of the same opinion are judged Catholics; their followers, heretics. The masters are absolved; the disciples are condemned. The authors of the books shall be sons of the kingdom, while their defenders shall be consigned to hell.
“For who among all the saints, bishops, and martyrs could doubt that the most blessed Cyprian, with his other colleagues, shall reign eternally with Christ? Or who could so sacrilegiously deny that the Donatists and other pestilent heretics, who boast of rebaptising under the authority of his council, shall burn eternally with the devil?”
Chapter XI—Certain councils of bishops are simply (simpliciter) necessary.
Although general Councils are not absolutely necessary, yet I scarcely doubt that it can be questioned that some Councils—whether general or particular—are wholly necessary for the good governance of the Church."
For if, as the Lord says in Matthew 18.7, “it is necessary that scandals come”; and if, as the Apostle states in 1 Corinthians 11.19, “there must be heresies,” then it is certainly necessary that the Church possess some definitive judgement whereby scandals may be removed and heresies condemned. Otherwise, the entire Church would soon be divided into factions and destroyed, for “every kingdom divided against itself shall be destroyed” (Matthew 12).
Although the Supreme Pontiff is the judge, in the place of Christ, of all controversies, and although the universal fraternity must obey him—as Cyprian writes in On the Unity of the Church, and as we have demonstrated in On the Pontiff with many arguments—the Pontiff ought not to rely solely on his own judgement in matters of faith nor await a divine revelation. Instead, he should employ due diligence, as the matter requires, using ordinary means, and then expect the assistance of the Holy Ghost and divine guidance.
The ordinary and thus necessary means is the convening of a council, whether great or small, as the pope himself shall judge. This can easily be demonstrated.
First, from that divine promise, Matthew 18:
“Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.” (Matthew 18:20.)
For thus the Council of Chalcedon interprets this passage in its letter to Leo, as do other councils which we shall cite in the following book.
Second, from the actions of the Apostles, who, though they could have resolved controversies individually and separately, nonetheless chose not to neglect the ordinary means appointed by Christ Himself. Thus, they resolved the controversy concerning legal matters at Antioch not without a council, as recounted in Acts 15.
Third, from the custom of the whole Church and all ages. It has always been the custom in the Church to convene councils of bishops to resolve doubtful matters. Even the Roman Pontiffs have never condemned any new heresy without a new council, as can be learned by those who study either the volumes of councils or ecclesiastical histories. And what has always and universally been done, who would dare deny that it can be called ordinary, and indeed is so?
Let a confirmation from the Fathers be added. Cyprian, in Book II, Epistle 1 to Stephen. He says:
“It was necessary to assemble a council by bringing together several bishops in one place.”
Gelasius, in his treatise On the Bond of Anathema:
“If the consent of the pontiff has preceded, let it be shown by whom and where it was celebrated according to the rule of the Church, whether it proceeded from the tradition of the Fathers, whether it was promulgated in the manner of the ancients, whether it was brought forth by competent examination, where it is undoubtedly necessary to inquire whether it was celebrated by a synodal assembly; for it is certain that in the reception of the condemned and the expulsion of the Catholic, because the cause is new, this must be done.”
Finally, the Eleventh Council of Toledo, in its very preface, demonstrates at length the necessity of councils in the Church. Its conclusion is this: if councils are lacking, it is necessary that all things be continuously filled with vices and errors.
Therefore, although God, by His absolute power, could preserve the Church without councils, yet, according to His ordinary providence, councils are necessary for the good governance of the Church.
Base text of translation by AI; scrutinised and edited line by line by a human.
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“… heretics already before being excommunicated are outside the Church and deprived of all jurisdiction. For they have already been condemned by their own sentence, as the Apostle teaches (Tit. 3:10-11), that is, they have been cut off from the body of the Church without excommunication, as St. Jerome affirms.”
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=f603npD9nfEC&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&dq=Roberti%20Bellarmini&pg=PA610#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://web.archive.org/web/20140701074020/http://strobertbellarmine.net/bellarm.htm
DH 664
Porro si Synodus universalis fuerit congregata, et facta fuerit etiam de sancta Romanorum Ecclesia quaevis ambiguitas et controversia, oportet venerabiliter et cum convenienti reverentia de proposita quaestione sciscitari et solutionem accipere aut proficere aut profectum facere, non tamen audacter sententiam dicere contra Summos senioris Romae Pontifices.
εί δε συγκροτηύείσης συνόδου οικουμενικής γένηταί τις καί περί τής έκκλησίας των 'Ρωμαίων άμφιβολία, έξεστιν εύλαβώς καί μετά τής προσηκούσης αίδοΰς δια- πυνύάνεσΟαι περί του προκειμένου ζητήματος καί δέχεσάαι τήν λύσιν καί ή ώφελεΐσΟαι, ή ώφε- λεΐν, μή μέντοι ύρασέως άποφέρεσύαι κατά των τής πρεσβυτέρας 'Ρώμης ιεραρχών.