'Resisting the pope?'—Bellarmine on doubtful and tyrannical popes
The 'best' arguments for resisting the pope always miss important context.
The 'best' arguments for resisting the pope always miss important context.
Editor’s Notes
This series of translations
Bellarmine’s clear statement…
“Therefore, the true opinion is the fifth, according to which the Pope who is manifestly a heretic ceases by himself to be Pope and head, in the same way as he ceases to be a Christian and a member of the body of the Church; and for this reason he can be judged and punished by the Church.”
… is often misrepresented or conflated with other opinions. The “fourth opinion” holds that a manifestly heretical pope is not ipso facto deposed but must be deposed by the Church.
Meanwhile, a “sixth opinion,” masquerading as the fifth, introduces the requirement of an “official” declaration or similar intervention for a heretical pope’s loss of office to take effect. Advocates of the sixth opinion often rely on out-of-context quotes to argue their position, but it is ultimately a hybrid of the fourth and fifth opinions, misrepresenting Bellarmine’s true teaching.
This series aims to clarify Bellarmine’s true teaching on the question of a heretical pope by presenting his words in their full and proper context.
In order to address these misrepresentations, and to refute these arguments, we previously provided a new translation of Chapter 9-11 from Book I of Bellarmine’s Fourth General Controversy—On Councils.
This text, which deals with the reasons why councils should be called, features several texts which are variously mistranslated or presented out of context, as a means of denying (or “nuancing”) what the Doctor of the Church had taught elsewhere:
We also presented Chapters XIII and XIV of Book II of the same work, in which Bellarmine sets out the various opinions and objections regarding the comparative status of the pope and the council.
We also presented Chapters XVII and XVIII, in which Bellarmine explains that the pope is absolutely above the council, and why. In so doing, he makes absolutely clear that it is impossible that the pope submit himself to the coercive or legal judgment of a council.
The reason for publishing these texts is that Chapter XIX—presented in this part—contains comments which have been taken out of context and marshalled in favour of the fourth or sixth opinions.
In addition, we have also published Bellarmine’s ex professo treatment of the heretic pope question, along with some comments on a proper methodology and hermeneutic.
It is vital that we get all the key texts on the table and in their full context if we can hope to arrive—together—at the true teaching of Bellarmine, and the truth of the matter itself.
In this section of St Robert Bellarmine’s work On Councils, the saint confronts the arguments of those who challenge the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff.
He refutes arguments councils possess authority over the pope—whose power is directly instituted by God.
Historical Cases: Bellarmine examines examples such as Marcellinus and Liberius, revealing that these incidents confirm, rather than contradict, the unique authority of the papacy.
Theological Arguments: He refutes the claim that the pope, as a member of the Church, is subject to its judgment, asserting that the Church cannot act above its divinely appointed head.
Conciliar Misinterpretations: He exposes the errors of the Councils of Constance and Basel, showing that their claims of authority over the pope were either illegitimate or misunderstood.
He shows us that the Church’s unity and indefectibility rest entirely upon the divine authority of the papacy, which cannot be subordinated to any human institution or collective.
Before we start, let’s consider a few points of particular interest.
Doubtful pope
It is a common maxim that “a doubtful pope is no pope.” Wernz-Vidal address that issue in terms of why it is that a doubtful pope is not a true pope; but in this piece, Bellarmine explains why it is that this maxim means that a doubtful pope can be subject to the judgment of a council.
First, Bellarmine addresses objections related to the Council of Constance, clarifying that its decisions were legitimate in the specific context of a papal schism and doubtful claims to the papacy, but did not define a general superiority of councils over popes:
First, the Council of Constance was legitimate and approved, but it does not contradict what we have stated. For it did not define absolutely that general councils have power from Christ over the popes, but only in a specific case, that is, in the time of a schism, when it is not known who the true pope is.
For a doubtful pope is held as not a pope; and thus to have power over him is not to have power over a pope. This is the view of Torquemada, Campegius, and Sander as noted in their respective works. […]
Nor does it follow, if the council erred in this, that it also erred in deposing Gregory XII, John XXIII, and Benedict XIII. For although a council without the pope cannot define new dogmas of faith, it can, in a time of schism, judge who the true pope is, and provide the Church with a true shepherd when there is none or when there is doubt. And this is what the Council of Constance rightly did.
The situation of a doubtful pope is similar, although not the same, to that of a pope who is suspect of heresy or who is accused of favouring heresy. However, this is outside the scope of these notes.1
Wicked popes vs. heretical popes
There is an important distinction between a wicked, tyrannical, or destructive pope and a heretical pope.
The former may act sinfully or harm the Church through personal misconduct or poor governance, but retains his office.
A heretical pope, by contrast, ceases to be pope ipso facto if his heresy becomes manifest, as he ceases to be a member of the Church.
It is critical not to conflate these two cases, and indeed Bellarmine treats them separately. Unfortunately, it is common for texts referring to the former to be applied to the latter, leading to great confusion.
One reason for this is that many persons believe that no-one is a manifest heretic until they have received two warnings. Although the pope has no canonical superior, they argue that some sort of official intervention by the Church is necessary in a restrictive sense.
The following text from this chapter is proposed in support of this theory:
[I]t is lawful to admonish him with due reverence, and to correct him modestly, and even to oppose him with force and arms if he seeks to destroy the Church.
However, as with many other such quotes, this text has been taken out of context.
The context of Bellarmine’s texts—a wicked pope
First, the general context is a series of chapters in which Bellarmine is discussing the absolute superiority of the pope over the council, along with his supreme injudicability, extending to him being unable even willingly to submit himself to the coercive judgment of a council.
Next, the immediate context makes clear that Bellarmine is answering an objection about a wicked, tyrannical or destructive pope:
But they say, therefore the Church remains without remedy if it has a wicked pope, and the pope could oppress and destroy all with impunity, and no one could resist him.
I reply, it is no wonder if the Church remains without an effective human remedy, since its salvation does not principally rely on human effort but on divine protection, for its king is God. Therefore, even if the Church cannot depose a pope, it can and must supplicate the Lord to provide a remedy. And it is certain that God will care for its salvation, who will either convert such a pope or remove him from the midst before he destroys the Church.
Nor does it follow that it is not lawful to resist a pope destroying the Church; for it is lawful to admonish him with due reverence, and to correct him modestly, and even to oppose him with force and arms if he seeks to destroy the Church. For to resist and repel force with force requires no authority. See John of Torquemada on this matter, Book II, Chapter 106.
As such, the warnings (or admonitions) in this passage are not directly referring to the admonitions that might result in occult heresy becoming manifest.2
There is a parallel text in On the Roman Pontiff, which adds a citation from Cajetan to that of Torquemada—the importance of which we shall see shortly. This parallel text is very commonly cited in defence of the idea that a true pope may attempt to destroy the Church through doctrinal or legislative means, and that he should be resisted in so doing.
As is typical at this stage, this passage is cited without the context, or the objection which it is intended to answer. The general context of this text is a refutation of arguments against the Roman Pontiff’s injudicability. The immediate context is a chapter on whether or not any civil rulers (specifically, the emperor) are superior to the pope and are able to depose him.
As with the text above, its common use is quite misleading and has led to many misunderstandings of the divine protection given to the Church.3
Heresy as a special class of wickedness
As noted earlier, Bellarmine’s discussion of wicked popes must not be conflated with his treatment of heretical popes.
In these passages, Bellarmine is talking of wickedness in general. We can accept this teaching from Bellarmine in reference to wicked and tyrannical popes, whilst noting that heretical popes, or those who attempt to impose their heresy or a new religion on the Church, are in a distinct category from those who are “merely” wicked.
Heresy is also a form of wickedness, but there is a special quality to heresy—along with schism and apostasy—which makes it sever a man from the Church, as Pope Pius XII later taught:
For not every sin, however grave it may be, is such as of its own nature to sever a man from the Body of the Church, as does schism or heresy or apostasy.4
When Bellarmine has dedicated several pages to an ex professo treatment of the heretic pope question, it is methodologically unsound to take three short paragraphs about a wicked, tyrannical or destructive pope and insist that the latter are the lens through which we should understand the former.
Popes cannot seek to ‘destroy the Church’ through teaching heresy
The previous conclusion is reinforced by Bellarmine’s citation of Cajetan and Torquemada in the famous “resistance quotes.”
There are many ways in which pope may seek to destroy the Church without imposing heresy or a new religion. These could include examples such as the below—drawn from the Cajetan text cited by Bellarmine:
Tyrannical rule—Acting violently against the Church.
Simony—Selling ecclesiastical offices and benefices.
Squandering Church resources—Using the wealth of the Church for personal or familial gain, even demolishing sacred buildings for private projects.
Dismantling the hierarchical order—Deposing all bishops or undertaking other acts that would cause disorder in the Church.
General corruption and scandal—Acting in a morally reprehensible or scandalous way.
Ignoring correction—Refusing to amend his actions despite all human efforts.
Exceeding his authority—Acting as though the Church exists for him rather than he for the Church.5
The same sorts of ideas appear in Torquemada’s text, to which Cajetan himself also refers.
These examples—none of which involve teaching or universal laws—appear in a chapter specifically dealing with crimes other than heresy. All such acts, as well as certain commands (as opposed to laws) can be legitimately resisted under the right circumstances.6
However, while a true pope may indeed engage in such destructive behaviour (and thus be open to resistance and opposition), Bellarmine makes clear that a true pope trying to destroy the Church will not involve the imposition of heresy or a new religion.
Why is a pope unable to destroy the Church with false teaching and evil laws?
Bellarmine builds his argument for the opinion that a pope cannot fall into heresy, even as a private person, on the following foundation:
For, the Pontiff not only should not, but cannot preach heresy, but also should always teach the truth, and doubtless he will do that, since the Lord commanded him to strengthen his brethren, and therefore he added, I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail, that is, that at least the preaching of the true faith on your throne will not fail.7
He says that the conclusion (the pope cannot be a heretic) is merely “probable, and can piously be believed.”8 But the foundation above—which deals with all the matters under discussion—is presented as certain.
As a further argument, Bellarmine presents the absurd consequences that would occur, if a true pope could indeed try to destroy the Church through imposing heresy or a new religion:
[T]he Pontiff is the shepherd and teacher of the whole Church; therefore, the whole Church is bound to hear him and to follow him; therefore, if he errs, the whole Church will err. [Therefore, he cannot err, at least as a public teacher.]
They will respond that the Church must hear him, if he teaches rightly, otherwise God should be listened to more than men.
But I object to that; for, who will judge whether the Pontiff is teaching correctly or not? For it is not the part of the sheep to judge whether the shepherd errs or not, especially in matters truly doubtful. And Christian sheep do not have another major judge or teacher to whom they can appeal. For, as we showed above in book 2, chapters 13 and 14, from the whole Church one can appeal to the Pontiff, but there is no appeal from him. Necessarily, therefore, the whole Church will err, if the Pontiff errs.9
Even if it were to be objected that this above text is primarily dealing with ex cathedra definitions (albeit understood in a much broader sense than is common today), the reasoning clearly runs counter to the ideas discussed.
In addition to doctrinal matters, Bellarmine held that this principle also applied to decrees of morals—by which he appears to include laws and disciplines (although not commands or possibly local laws, as mentioned above):
Not only can the Sovereign Pontiff not err in decrees of faith, but also he cannot err in precepts of morals, which are prescribed for the whole Church, and which are concerned with things necessary for salvation, or with things which are per se good or evil.10
In short, it is gratuitous, and contradicted by Bellarmine’s wider corpus and references, to assume that these texts shows that the means by which a pope might try to destroy the Church include imposing heresy or a new religion.
It is thus thoroughly unsound to interpret Bellarmine’s comments about a wicked, tyrannical or destructive pope as referring to a heretic pope acting in such a way. As a result, these comments cannot be marshalled in favour of the fourth11 or sixth opinions on a heretic pope; nor can they be marshalled in favour of a programme of recognising a heretic pope’s legitimacy whilst resisting those doctrinal or legislative acts which are contrary to the good of the Church.12
This is simply not what the texts are discussing.
Leave the heretic pope to God?
Bellarmine emphasises that while the Church cannot judge or depose a wicked pope, it must trust in prayer and divine Providence to remedy the situation, whether through conversion or removal.
Elsewhere in the same text below, he also writes:
But if the supreme pontiff himself sins, then he [or his case] is to be reserved to the judgment of God, for there is no Church to which he [or his case] can be referred, since without him, the Church with its head cannot be found.
These comments are to be explained in the same way as above.
We may also add that all parties to this debate agree that the case of a wicked pope is to be left to the judgment of God, because he cannot be judged by any tribunal on earth. They also broadly agree, for similar reasons, that “the Church cannot depose a pope”—whether for heresy, or any other crime—but that “it can and must supplicate the Lord to provide a remedy.”
But we should note again that there is no mention of the pope sinning through heresy, or to suggest that he is clarifying his treatment of the heretic pope question. The ex professo treatment of Bellarmine’s work forbids us from interpreting it in such ways.
Conclusions
There is much that could be said about the specific concept of the warnings or admonitions, but we will leave this for another day.
In this section, Bellarmine explains why it is a doubtful pope can be subject to a council, and clearly distinguishes between the cases of a wicked or tyrannical pope, who retains office despite sin or misgovernance, and a heretical pope, who ceases to be pope by virtue of severing himself from the Church.
Misinterpretations often arise from taking his comments on wicked popes out of context and applying them to heretical popes—as well as from the tendency to insist on warnings in a restrictive sense.
Finally, we have already presented Arnaldo da Silveira’s explanation and refutation of what he held to be a misrepresentation of both Bellarmine’s thought and of sound doctrine:
S.D. Wright
The Full Series
Bellarmine does not teach councils are necessary for ipso facto loss of office
What's superior, Pope or Council? Bellarmine sets out the objections
The Pope is absolutely above Councils, can't submit to their coercive judgment—Bellarmine explains
'Resisting the pope'—Bellarmine on doubtful and tyrannical popes
Adjuncts:
How an evil pope could 'destroy the Church'—Cajetan's objections
Final nail in the Bellarmine 'resistance quote' coffin?—Cajetan’s context
Fourth General Controversy—On Councils
St Robert Bellarmine
Book II—On the Authority of Councils
Chapter XIX: The arguments of the opponents are refuted
Available from Google Books. Headings and line breaks added by The WM Review.
Chapter XIX: The arguments of the opponents are refuted
It remains to refute the arguments.
First, Hermann, in Book III, Chapter 12 of the Prolegomena, raises several examples from antiquity.
Second, certain arguments are taken from Gerson.
Third, another argument is drawn from the Council of Basel.
Historical arguments
Marcellinus
The first example is of Marcellinus, who was condemned and deposed by bishops in the Council of Sinuessa.
I respond: First, that Marcellinus was accused of an act of infidelity, in which case a council can examine the cause of the Pontiff; and if it finds him truly to be an infidel, it can declare him to be outside the Church and thus condemn him.
Second, I say that the bishops indeed condemned Marcellinus, but only after he first condemned himself, that is, abdicated the pontificate. For previously, they often proclaimed, “The first see is judged by no one; you are guilty, you are judge; do not seek to be judged by us,” etc. See Nicholas I in his letter to Michael.
Pope Marcellinus—Editors’ Note:
The history of Pope Marcellinus is contested. St. Robert Bellarmine’s treatment of this case here, and elsewhere, exemplifies his method of addressing objections from multiple angles to demonstrate their insufficiency.
For example, he distinguishes between coerced external acts and internal heretical assent, arguing that Marcellinus’s actions under duress would not have compromised his papal authority. He anticipates objections by addressing both possibilities: that Marcellinus retained the papacy or voluntarily abdicated, and resolves the issue with his martyrdom. He also highlights the unreliability of historical accusations, relying on credible sources like St. Augustine to disprove claims of apostasy.
We should also note that Bellarmine states above:
Marcellinus was accused of an act of infidelity…
Being accused of an act of infidelity is different in kind from a putative pope or popes openly parading their infidelity for decades. The requirements of one situation will not necessarily be the same as for the other.
Further, Bellarmine’s layered approach, which does not shrink from proposing counter-arguments that may contradict each other, ensures that the central objection against papal authority collapses, regardless of the resolution. Here, for example, is his treatment of Marcellinus from the Third Controversy (On the Roman Pontiff), Book IV, Chapter VIII:
“The tenth Pontiff is Marcellinus, who sacrificed to idols, as is certain from the Pontiff Damasus from the council of Sinuessa and from the letter of Nicholas I to Michael. But Marcellinus neither taught something against the faith, nor was a heretic, or infidel, except by an external act because of his fear of death. But whether because of that external act he lost the pontificate, or not, makes little difference; since he immediately abdicated from the pontificate, and shortly thereafter he was crowned with martyrdom. I believe, however, that he did not ipso facto lose the pontificate, because it is sufficiently certain to all that he sacrificed to idols only out of fear. You can add to this what St. Augustine in his book on baptism in chapter 16 against Petilian says, namely, that Marcellinus was innocent, and none of the ancient historians mention this moral fault.”
It should be clear that this case does not clearly involve Marcellinus being a manifest heretic in the relevant sense, nor with teaching and imposing a false religion on the Church. As such, Bellarmine’s comments have no bearing on the question of the “fifth” opinion.
Melchiades
The second example is of Pope Melchiades, after whose judgment the same cause was judged by the Bishop of Arles, as Augustine testifies in Epistle 162 to Glorius and Eleusius, where Augustine also adds:
“Behold, let us suppose those bishops who judged at Rome were not good judges. There still remained a plenary council of the whole Church, where even with those judges the case could be argued, so that if they were proven to have judged badly, their decisions would be annulled.”
I respond to what is said about the Bishop of Arles, as follows. According to the same Augustine, in that place, the case was judged again; not because it was necessary, but because the Emperor wished to appease the Donatists, who demanded another judgment, hoping they might be healed after being condemned in two judgments.
Regarding the general council, I say that Augustine does not compare the Pope without a council to a council without the Pope, as we now do; but rather, he compares a particular council, presided over by the Pope, to a general council, also presided over by the Pope. Undoubtedly, a cause judged by the Pontiff in a particular council can again be judged by him in a general council, especially in a question of fact, which depends on information and in which the Church can err, as was the case in the matter then under discussion.
Indeed, ordinarily, when a general council was convened, particular councils were first held in individual provinces, and even in Rome, and the matters decided in those particular councils were then debated again in the general council, where the final and definitive sentence was pronounced by the Pontiff, with the council’s agreement.
Liberius
The third example is of Liberius, whom the Emperor deposed and later restored to his see, ordering him to govern the Church of Rome jointly with Felix. The Council of Sirmium commanded the same in letters sent to Felix, as Sozomen reports in Book IV, Chapter 14.
I respond that the Emperor, being Arian, acted unjustly and tyrannically, as Nero also killed Peter and Paul. The Council of Sirmium, however, did not command but only sent exhortatory letters to Felix, asking him to permit Liberius to sit with him. Moreover, that council was chiefly composed of Arians and is of no significance.
St Leo the Great
The fourth example is of St Leo, whose letter many bishops examined in the Council of Chalcedon, as Evagrius recounts in Book II, Chapter 18, and Leo himself boasts in Epistle 63 that his letter was approved by the council.
I respond that this does not imply the council is above the Pope. For Leo sent his letter to the council, not as containing the final and definitive sentence, but merely as an instruction by which the bishops might better judge. After all had agreed with Leo’s letter, the final definition was issued in the name of the Pontiff and the council. These are the examples.
Gerson’s arguments
Second, Gerson’s arguments are proposed.
Tell it to the Church
The first is as follows:
In Matthew XVIII it is said, “If thy brother shall sin against thee... tell it to the Church” (Matthew 18.17). But the Pope is also our brother, since he is a Christian and must say, “Our Father, who art in heaven.” Therefore, the Pope can be summoned to the judgment of the Church and accordingly judged and punished by the Church. But the Church does nothing except through its prelates; therefore, the Pope can be judged by a council of prelates.
I respond: by the name Church:
Either the bishop is understood, as Chrysostom and Innocent III explain (in the decree Novit, extra, De Judiciis), and as the Church’s practice demonstrates; for daily those of whom the Lord said, “Tell it to the Church” are brought before bishops
Or certainly the assembly of the faithful is meant—with its head. For, as Cyprian says in his letter to Florentius, which is the ninth of Book IV: “The Church is a people united to the priest and a flock adhering to its shepherd.”
Wherefore, in any diocese, sinners must be referred to the Church and to the bishop of that place; but if that bishop sins, he cannot be referred to that same Church unless he must refer himself, since he is the head of that [local] Church. Rather, he must be referred to the higher Church, presided over by an archbishop or patriarch.
But if the patriarch sins, he cannot be brought before his own Church, but must be brought before a higher Church, that is, the Roman Church or a general council, over which the supreme Pontiff presides.
But if the supreme pontiff himself sins, then he [or his case] is to be reserved to the judgment of God, for there is no Church to which he [or his case] can be referred, since without him, the Church with its head cannot be found.
But they object again: These words, “Tell it to the Church,” were spoken to Peter; therefore, Peter and his successors must also sometimes bring sinners before the Church and thus acknowledge a tribunal of the Church greater than themselves.
I respond: When these words were spoken to Peter, he was not yet Pontiff but a private man; hence, they were spoken to him in a sense applicable to those who recognise a superior.
Moreover, I add that the Pontiff can fulfil this precept in a certain manner:
First, he must privately correct the one who has sinned
Then, summon witnesses
Finally, “tell it to the Church,” that is, to himself as its head and to the Church over which he presides, publicly excommunicating the sinner.
This is how Blessed Gregory understood this passage in Book IV, Epistle 38 to John, Bishop of Constantinople.
Parts vs. the whole
The second argument is this:
The pope is a member of the Church; therefore he is less than the whole, which is the Church; and if he infects the Church, he can and must be cut off; because, according to the law of nature, members that infect the whole body ought to be removed.
When it is concluded: “therefore, the pope, as a member, is lesser than the Church, which is the whole,” one must consider the Church as either [the Church] with the pope or [the Church] without the pope.
If the Church without the pope is considered, it is false to say that it is the whole, for it is not the whole but a part—and indeed, a greater part than the head in terms of bulk [extensive], but lesser in terms of power or authority, as is evident in any body. That which the adversaries claim—that the authority of the head remains in the Church by way of supply—has already been refuted earlier.
If, however, the Church with the pope is considered, then, as we have said elsewhere, the authority of the Church is greater extensively than that of the pope alone, but intensively it is equal. In the same way:
Being (ens), which includes God and creatures, is not intensively a greater good than God alone—but because it comprises more goods, it is greater extensively
So also Christ, as man, is the homogeneous [belonging to the same species] head of the Church and therefore a part of it, and yet the whole Church is not greater than Christ alone.
But they object: Power to act is always more principally in the whole than in the parts, which are instruments of the whole; for instance, it is more proper to say that a man sees than that an eye sees. Therefore, since the Church, even including the pope, is a kind of whole, and the pope is a certain part and instrument of this whole, it follows that supreme ecclesiastical power belongs more principally to the Church itself than to the pope.
I reply that the judgement concerning the body of the Church differs from that concerning natural bodies. For in natural bodies, power proceeds from the essence to the faculties; hence it is more proper to say that the whole acts, rather than any single part or faculty. But in the body of the Church, power does not proceed from the essence to the faculties or parts; rather, it originates from an external source. For the pope, who is the head of the Church, does not derive his authority from the Church but from God; therefore, the principal agent is not the Church but God. Secondly, it can be said that in any body, the principal agent is always the suppositum itself, which sustains and moves all the members.
Now, the suppositum of the body of the Church is Christ. For just as when we say, “This is the body of Peter or Paul,” of Peter or Paul signifies the suppositum; so also when we say, “The Church is the body of Christ,” of Christ signifies the suppositum. Nor does it matter that Christ is also the head of the Church; for Christ, as one who influences all the members, is called the head, but as one who sustains and moves all, he may be called the suppositum. In this way, we concede that the pope is an instrument of the body of the Church, and something less than the whole, provided that in “the whole” we are including Christ himself as the suppositum.
To the second inference, it can be said first: that it is according to the law of nature that rotten members are cut off, but with the exception of the head. For it is better to have a rotten head than none at all. But this solution has little value; for in natural bodies, the head must be excepted because, if it is cut off, the whole body dies. But the body of the Church does not die when the pope dies; hence, we see also in temporal states that if a king degenerates into a tyrant, although he is the head of the kingdom, he may nonetheless be deposed by the people, and another chosen.
I say, therefore, secondly: that in the natural body and temporal states, it is possible to cut off members that infect the whole body because they depend upon the body itself and derive their power from it. But the same reasoning does not apply to the body of the Church, whose head receives authority not from the body but from God. In the same way, it is not permitted for a household to depose its chief steward (œconomus), even if he is most wicked, because he was appointed not by the household but by the master.
But they say, therefore the Church remains without remedy if it has a wicked pope, and the pope could oppress and destroy all with impunity, and no one could resist him.
I reply, it is no wonder if the Church remains without an effective human remedy, since its salvation does not principally rely on human effort but on divine protection, for its king is God. Therefore, even if the Church cannot depose a pope, it can and must supplicate the Lord to provide a remedy. And it is certain that God will care for its salvation, who will either convert such a pope or remove him from the midst before he destroys the Church.
Nor does it follow that it is not lawful to resist a pope destroying the Church; for it is lawful to admonish him with due reverence, and to correct him modestly, and even to oppose him with force and arms if he seeks to destroy the Church. For to resist and repel force with force requires no authority. See John of Torquemada on this matter, Book II, Chapter 106.
Argument from the Council of Constance
The third argument from Gerson, cited by Hermann, is taken from the Council of Constance. [He argues as follows.]
The Council of Constance, in session IV, defined that a general council has immediate authority from Christ, to which all, even if of the papal dignity, are bound to submit.
Either this council is approved, or it is not.
If it is approved, then what it defined is true and must be received.
If not, then it acted wrongly in deposing John XXIII, Gregory XII, and Benedict XIII, and in electing Martin V, whom all subsequent pontiffs succeeded.
Furthermore, Martin V, as pope in the final session, confirmed all decrees concerning faith of this Council of Constance; and this decree seems to pertain to faith.
I answer in two ways.
First, the Council of Constance was legitimate and approved, but it does not contradict what we have stated. For it did not define absolutely that general councils have power from Christ over the popes, but only in a specific case, that is, in the time of a schism, when it is not known who the true pope is. For a doubtful pope is held as not a pope; and thus to have power over him is not to have power over a pope. This is the view of Torquemada, Campegius, and Sander as noted in their respective works.
Secondly, it can be replied that the Council of Constance, when it made this assertion, was not of such a nature that it could define questions of faith. For, in the first place, it was not at that time a general council, since only a third part of the Church was present, that is, only those prelates who were obedient to John. Those who were obedient to Gregory and Benedict were opposed to what was being done by the Synod. Furthermore, at that time, there was no certain pope in the Church, without whom doubtful matters of faith cannot be defined; indeed, there was no pope at the council. For John XXIII, who had convened the council, had already withdrawn when the fourth session was held.
Nor is it true that Martin V confirmed this decree. For he explicitly stated that he confirmed only those decrees concerning faith that had been made in a conciliar manner, that is, in the manner of other councils, after careful examination. But it is evident that this decree was made without any such examination by the Council of Constance. Therefore, when Martin confirmed the decrees concerning faith concluded in a conciliar manner, he referred only to the condemnation of the heresies of Wycliffe and Hus.
Nor does it follow, if the council erred in this, that it also erred in deposing Gregory XII, John XXIII, and Benedict XIII. For although a council without the pope cannot define new dogmas of faith, it can, in a time of schism, judge who the true pope is, and provide the Church with a true shepherd when there is none or when there is doubt. And this is what the Council of Constance rightly did.
Moreover, both John and Gregory were not deposed against their will; for they voluntarily renounced the papacy, as is evident from the acts of the Council of Constance in Sessions XII and XIV. As for Benedict, he did not yield, but after his death, his successor Clement VIII renounced in favour of Martin V, whom the entire Church venerated as the true pope. This suffices for Martin to have been the true pope.
Hermann’s argument regarding the Council of Basel
Finally, Hermann appeals to the Council of Basel, which in Session XXXIII defined that it is to be believed by Catholic faith that a council is above the pope.
This council was indeed convened by Martin V, as noted in Session I, and subsequently declared by Eugene in Session XVI to have been legitimately continued from its inception. Finally, it was confirmed with its acts by Nicholas V.
I respond that the Council of Basel was legitimately convened but illegitimately concluded. Hermann’s claim that it was confirmed with its acts by Nicholas V is an outright falsehood. For, as appears from the bull of Nicholas appended to the council, he only confirmed those acts that concerned benefices and ecclesiastical censures.
As for what the Council of Basel defined regarding its authority over the pope, no pope approved it; rather, it was expressly repudiated, first by Pope Eugene (as is evident from Session XXXVIII of the Council of Basel) and later by Leo X in Session XI of the Lateran Council. Furthermore, the entire Church, which always regarded Eugene as the true pope despite his deposition by the Basilians, rejected it.
Finally, even the Basilians themselves and Pope Felix, whom they had created, ultimately submitted to Nicholas, Eugene’s successor, as is attested in the bull of Nicholas.
Many other arguments could be proposed and refuted, but these have been addressed in the books On the Roman Pontiff. See also what we will say concerning the Council of Basel in the next book, chapter 16.
The Full Series
Bellarmine does not teach councils are necessary for ipso facto loss of office
What's superior, Pope or Council? Bellarmine sets out the objections
The Pope is absolutely above Councils, can't submit to their coercive judgment—Bellarmine explains
'Resisting the pope'—Bellarmine on doubtful and tyrannical popes
Adjuncts:
How an evil pope could 'destroy the Church'—Cajetan's objections
Final nail in the Bellarmine 'resistance quote' coffin?—Cajetan’s context
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Available from Google Books. Headings and line breaks added by The WM Review. Base text of translation by AI; scrutinised and edited line by line by humans.
Fr Noël Barbara offers an explanation of how these categories might interact, and how a pope who is suspect of heresy may come to be a doubtful pope by virtue of his inaction. He proposes the situation of a pope who secretly falls into heresy, and begins “to impose his new ideas and take appropriate measures within his power in order to prepare people's minds to accept his point of view”:
The Church, which is to say the simple faithful along with the clergy, always has the right to interrogate the Pope in order to clearly understand the nature of his dubious teaching. Even though there is no higher authority capable of judging the Pope, any member of the Church is fully within his rights in interrogating him. Christ established the Pope in his function in order to “confirm the faith of his brothers.”
And when asked, the Pope is obliged to respond. He must clearly profess true doctrine and frankly condemn errors opposed to it. If the Pope refuses to respond and if some of the faithful in the Church begin to ask themselves questions about his orthodoxy, he is at least suspect of heresy and becomes, because of his culpable silence, a dubious pope.
The believing Church, which has no power over the pope, once it becomes certain about a dubious pope, can go so far as to judge and depose him. It is obvious that in the believing Church, it is the function of the faithful hierarchy, the cardinals, patriarchs and titular bishops, to interrogate the Pope and to initiate a procedure for judging a dubious pope.
Fr Noël Barbara, ‘An Open Letter of Father Barbara to the Society of St. Pius X’, Fortes in Fide n. 12, 1993.
If there are strong, well-founded reasons to doubt a man’s claim to the papacy, the prudent course is to refuse recognition. The principle papa dubius, papa nullus—a doubtful pope is no pope—applies in such a case because jurisdiction requires moral certainty. The canonists Wernz and Vidal affirm that obedience is owed only to a legitimately elected pope; and when doubts exist, no duty of obedience arises. Such doubts are often discussed in relation to the validity of an election which has been peacefully and universally accepted (including by the elect himself), but they may equally apply to the loss of office due to resignation, insanity or death, as well as heresy, schism, or apostasy.
It seems obvious that a situation may arise in which a once-legitimate pope’s current legitimacy falls into doubt due to legitimate disputes about his sanity and/or legitimacy of his resignation (without regard to the allegations around Ratzinger’s resignation). The only reason to exclude this possibility in the cases of public heresy, schism and apostasy appears to be an a priori commitment to the idea that a pope cannot lose office for such crimes/sins; but this is simply begging the question.
The gravity of the papal office demands certainty, lest souls be misled by false teachings or harmful disciplines.
Elsewhere, Bellarmine writes the following of the probable anti-pope John XXIII (from the Great Western Schism) who was accused of heresy, on the basis of his evil life. While dismissing the relevance of any objections based on an anti-pope, and simultaneously exonerating him from the charge of heresy, Bellarmine sets out some useful principles:
But who cannot see that one cannot rightly deduce a heresy from evil actions? For, how many people can be named who believe correctly, but live badly? […] Then in session 12 a definitive sentence of the Council is declared against Pope John, and the reasons for his condemnation and deposition are recounted briefly; but there was no mention of error or heresy. This certainly is an evident argument that it could not be proved that Pope John was accused of heresy; for if that could be proved, it would have to be mentioned in the first place among the reasons for his condemnation, since no reason is more just for judging a Pontiff than the taint of heresy; indeed there is no other reason because of which he can be rightly judged.
St Robert Bellarmine, Controversies of the Christian Religion, trans. Fr Kenneth Baker SJ, Keep the Faith Press, USA, 2016, 1014. On the Roman Pontiff, Book IV, XIV.
The general context of this text is a refutation of arguments against the Roman Pontiff’s injudicability. The immediate context is a chapter on whether or not any civil rulers (specifically, the emperor) are superior to the pope and is able to depose him.
Here is the usually-omitted objection, along with the reply:
The seventh argument [the objection]. It is allowed for each person to kill the pontiff, if he is unjustly attacked by him. Therefore, much more will it be allowed for kings or a council to depose a pontiff, if he upsets the republic, or he tends to kill souls by his bad example.
I respond by denying the consequence, because in order to resist an attacker and to defend oneself no authority is needed. And it is not necessary that the one who is attacked is the judge or superior of the one attacking him; but authority is required in order to judge and punish.
Therefore, just as it is permitted to resist a pontiff attacking the body, so it is permitted to resist anyone attacking souls, or upsetting the republic, or much more if he is trying to destroy the Church.
It is permitted, I say, to resist him by not doing what he commands, or by hindering the accomplishment of his will. However, but it is not permitted to judge, or punish, or depose him, which can be done only by his superior. On this matter see Cajetan in the treatise on the authority of pope and council in chapter 27. And John de Turrecremata in book 2, chapter 106.
St Robert Bellarmine, Controversies of the Christian Religion, trans. Fr Kenneth Baker SJ, Keep the Faith Press, USA, 2016, 838. On the Roman Pontiff, Book II, XIX.
This particular passage has been dealt with previously by men such as Fr Anthony Cekada. Cekada helpfully provides the text from Cajetan cited by Bellarmine, which I have slightly reformatted for ease of reading:
First, in his title for chapter 27 Cajetan says he is going to discuss a type of papal offense “other than heresy.” (ex alio crimine quam haeresis.) Heresy, he says, completely alters a pope’s status as a Christian (mutavit christianitatis statum). It is the “greater crime” (majus crimen). The others are “lesser crimes” (criminibus minoribus) that are “not equal to it” (cetera non sunt paria, [ed. Rome: Angelicum 1936] 409).
Neither Bellarmine nor Cajetan, therefore, are referring to “resisting” a pope’s doctrinal errors while continuing still to consider him a true pope.
Second, throughout De Comparatione, Cajetan provides specific examples of the papal misdeeds that do justify this resistance on the part of subjects: justify this resistance on the part of subjects: “promoting the wicked, oppressing the good, behaving as a tyrant, encouraging vices, blasphemies, avarices, etc.” (356), “if he oppresses the Church, if he slays souls [by bad example]” (357), “dissipating [the Church’s] goods” (359), “if he manifestly acts against the common good of charity towards the Church Militant” (360), tyranny, oppression, unjust aggression (411), “publicly destroying the Church,” selling ecclesiastical benefices, and bartering offices (412).
All these involve evil commands (praecepta)—but evil commands are not the same as evil laws (leges). A command is particular and transitory; law is general and is stable. (For an explanation, see R. Naz, “Précepte,” Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique, [Paris: Letouzey 1935-65] 7:116–17.)
Bellarmine and Cajetan’s argument justifies only resisting a pope’s evil commands (to sell the pastorate of a parish to the highest bidder, say). It does not support the notion that a pope, while still retaining authority from Jesus Christ, can (for example) impose a sacrilegious, Protestantized Mass on the whole Church, whose members can then “resist” him, while continuing to recognize him as a true pope.
Fr Anthon Cekada, The Bellarmine “Resistance Quote: Another Traditionalist Myth”, 2004. Available here.
Pope Pius XII, Mystici Corporis Christi, n. 23
Bellarmine himself draws this distinction between universal laws, and those which are particular or are commands:
We are saying, first of all, that the Pontiff cannot err in those precepts which are prescribed for the whole Church, because as we said above, concerning precepts and particular judgments, it is not absurd that the Pontiff may err.
We add, secondly, which are concerned with things necessary for salvation, or with things which are per se good or evil, because it is not erroneous to say that the Pontiff in other laws can err, that is, by establishing a superfluous law, or one that is less discrete, etc.
Book IV, V. In Baker 968.
Cf. also Cekada above, as well as Fr Damien Dutertre RCI:
The particular commands, and the personal actions of the pope, are not the object of the special assistance promised by Christ to His Church through the divine institution of the papacy. They may sometimes be legitimately resisted and denounced.
What cannot be resisted, and what is always guaranteed by the assistance of the Holy Ghost are decisions on faith and morals, imposed on the universal Church, as well as universal disciplinary and liturgical laws, such as the promulgation of a new rite of the Mass. These have always been recognized as infallible by the doctors of the Church, and on that account, could never become the object of a “resistance.” For in these the faithful cannot be mislead, lest the words of Pope Leo XIII become true:
If it could in any way be false, an evident contradiction follows; for then God Himself would be the author of error in man. “Lord, if we be in error, we are being deceived by Thee.”
Fr Damien Dutertre, The Errors Of The “Recognize And Resist” System, 2022. Now included as Chapter XI on TheThesis.us, accessible at https://web.archive.org/web/20231115094847/https://thethesis.us/chapter-xi/
Book IV, VI. In Baker 970.
And how, I ask, will a heretical Pontiff confirm the brethren in the faith, and always preach the true faith? Of course God can extort the profession of the true faith from a heretical heart, as at one time he put words in the mouth of Balaam’s ass, but that is something violent, and it is not according to the usual norm of divine providence of arranging all things sweetly.
St Robert Bellarmine, Controversies of the Christian Religion, trans. Fr Kenneth Baker SJ, Keep the Faith Press, USA, 2016, 970. On the Roman Pontiff, Book IV, VI.
Ibid., Book IV, Ch. III, 963
Ibid. Book IV, Ch. V. 968
Bellarmine himself draws this distinction between universal laws, and those which are particular or are commands:
We are saying, first of all, that the Pontiff cannot err in those precepts which are prescribed for the whole Church, because as we said above, concerning precepts and particular judgments, it is not absurd that the Pontiff may err.
We add, secondly, which are concerned with things necessary for salvation, or with things which are per se good or evil, because it is not erroneous to say that the Pontiff in other laws can err, that is, by establishing a superfluous law, or one that is less discrete, etc. (968)
Interestingly, the partisans of this theory rarely seem to advocate any actual steps towards the removal of such a man, as is the essence of the fourth opinion. The consequence of denying the truth of the fifth opinion and concocting a hybrid sixth opinion is that one is driven into a de facto adoption of the third opinion—namely, that a heretic pope retains office no matter what. This is clear in the explicit revival of this idea by Bishop Athanasius Schneider.
On several occasions, Bellarmine refers to the letters of Pope St Celestine. The following text, from his explanation as to why occult heretics remain members of the Church and retain office, shows the true situation of a pope who begins to destroy the Church through the preaching of heresy.
It is certain, however, regardless of what some individuals may have thought, that a hidden heretic, if he were a bishop or even the supreme pontiff, would not lose his jurisdiction, nor his dignity, nor the title of head within the Church, until either he publicly separated himself from the Church, or was unwillingly separated upon being convicted of heresy. This is why Celestine and Nicholas, in the passages cited, state that a heretical bishop, from the moment he begins to preach heresies, can no longer bind or loose, because, before he publicly began to preach, even if he had already conceived error in his heart, he could still bind and loose. The same is confirmed by Canon Audivimus (24, Question 1), where we read: “But if he devised a new heresy in his heart, from the moment he began to preach such things, he could no longer condemn anyone.”
Needless to say, Bellarmine’s reference to Pope St Celestine as an explication of the phrase “publicly separated himself from the Church” also decisively refutes the idea that one is only deemed to have publicly separated oneself from the Church through joining a sect.
On the Church Militant, Book III (On the Nature and Properties of the Church), Chapter X—On Hidden Infidels