Could an ‘heretic pope’ impose errors upon the Church? Gregory of Valencia SJ
If a putative pope tries to impose a manifest error in faith on the Church, he shows himself to be a manifest heretic and therefore not pope. The Church is expected to recognise and act accordingly.
Summary: The text discusses the seventeenth-century Spanish theologian Gregory of Valencia explores the possibility of a pope imposing errors in matters of faith on the Church, and what the implications would be for both the putative pope and the Church.
Editors’ Notes
“[T]hough we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema.
“As we said before, so now I say again: If any one preach to you a gospel, besides that which you have received, let him be anathema.” (Gal. 1.8-9)
In Casti Conubii, Pius XI taught:
“[I]t is quite foreign to everyone bearing the name of a Christian to trust his own mental powers with such pride as to agree only with those things which he can examine from their inner nature.” (n. 104)
In this text, Pius XI is discussing the tendency of those who refuse assent to the Church’s teaching by faith, until their private judgment has been satisfied as to the intrinsic truth of the proposition.
However, from texts such as that of Pius XI, some defenders of Vatican II are led to believe that it is illegitimate and even impossible to conclude that there is a contradiction between a prior definitive teaching and a more recent teaching with all the hallmarks of infallibility.
This is quite different to the issue addressed by Pius XI. It involves the most basic foundation of thought itself, namely the law of non-contradiction, and our duty to avoid the third sin against the Holy Ghost, “Opposing the known truth.”
But how, in the epistemology of Catholics, can it be legitimate to consider or notice (let alone conclude or discuss) that Vatican II taught something erroneous, new, or contrary to prior definitive teaching?
Further, when the Roman Pontiff, or an Ecumenical Council confirmed by the Roman Pontiff, proclaims a definitive judgment concerning faith or morals to the whole Church, this judgment is infallible.
There is no set form of words which a pope or council must be in order to make such a judgment, and the presence of a judgment may be known by its nature as a definitive and categorical statement, imposing a doctrine on the whole Church and ending all dispute.
Leaving aside the wholesale change in religion following Vatican II, this indeed appears to be how Vatican II’s decree Dignitatis Humanae presented its teaching on religious liberty. Would such a teaching, presented as a definitive judgment and therefore assisted with the charism of infallibility, preclude us from noticing that it contradicts the pre-conciliar magisterium?
This is a conundrum.
Below is the commentary of Gregory of Valencia, a seventeenth century Jesuit theologian (whom Pope Clement VIII called the Doctor doctorum, “doctor of doctors”), discussing this very issue and giving his solution. He provides some distinctions which are necessary for a robust epistemology of the post-Vatican II period.
The conclusions of Gregory of Valencia’s text are:
We are able to recognise errors which contradict the Church’s teaching
If a putative pope tried to impose an error manifestly against the established faith of the Church, then this error would be recognisable, and the putative pope would show himself to be a manifest heretic and therefore to have no authority (i.e., he is not the pope)
If a putative pope tried to impose an error about a controverted or obscured matter, and which was not manifestly against the established faith of the Church, then the error would not be recognisable; and the Church would be compelled to fall into error, which is impossible.
In other words: it is legitimate to recognise a contradiction between the established faith and an apparently “current” teaching. Gregory of Valencia teaches that a man who attempts to impose such a contradiction on the Church is evidently a manifest heretic, and therefore (he says) not the pope.
Gregory of Valencia
Commentarii Theologici
Comm. in IIam IIae
Disputatio 1, Quaestio I, Punctum VII
1591-7
Translated by a friend of The WM Review from the exact German translation by J. Rothkranz. Headings in square brackets added by The WM Review
Column 305 (heading):
That which may be objected against the infallible authority of the pope is rejected
§40.
Column 310-311 (Third Objection):
THIRDLY, it may perhaps be considered that some Catholic writers have denied that whatever the pope decides must be infallibly true. So far, then, what we assert about the infallibility of papal authority is not certain.
I ANSWER: What the authors in question wanted to [say] they have not (it seems to me) made sufficiently clear. Therefore it is not surprising, though it is not sufficiently certain, that they erred against the faith.
[Imposing heresy on the Church against the established faith shows the “pope” to be a heretic and to have lost office:]
For if they merely wanted to [say] that the pope could err as a private person, or even impose some manifest error in faith cherished by him in a perverse manner on the Church itself, against the faith already established in the same Church, then they mean something not entirely impossible.
For, as we have seen above, many admit that the pope can privately fall into a heresy (e.g., Melchior Cano[1]); and that, moreover, he can also – in vain – impose [i.e. try to impose] his manifest private heresy on the others, is admitted even by weighty authors. As [for example] Turrecremata on the [17th] way to convict someone of heresy[2], and Sylvester says the same in the “Summa”.[3]
In fact, this would not involve any danger for the Church; for she would be obliged, since she recognizes that such a pope has lost his authority through manifest heresy and teaches against the established faith in the Church, not to listen to him as a shepherd, but to flee him as a manifest wolf.
Editors’ Note: In other words, if a putative pope attempts to impose a manifest error in faith on the whole Church, he shows himself to be a manifest heretic and therefore not the pope. The rest of the Church is expected to be able to recognise this contradiction and ensuing result with sufficient clarity, and conclude accordingly.
Therefore, a putative pope imposing (or defining) errors with the indications of infallibility, against prior definitive teaching, does not drive the Church into an impasse, wherein we are compelled to accept an error against the prior teaching. Rather, this situation contains within itself the indication that the man does not have authority, due to his manifest heresy.
[Imposing heresy on the Church in a controverted matter is impossible:]
But if those authors [say] that the pope can really define an error as an official person against the faith in matters that are otherwise controversial, that is, not sufficiently expressly established and decided in the Church, then they are seriously mistaken in a matter of faith.
For the whole Church could then (indeed, it would even be obliged to) recognize as its pastor the pope who teaches on a controversial matter and who is not yet known by an evident heresy, and therefore listen to him fully.
Thus, if the latter could err, the whole Church could, indeed must, err – which is an inadmissible heresy, as has [already] been sufficiently discussed above.
Editors’ Note: In other words, a putative pope imposing (defining) errors with the indications of infallibility, in matters in which the true or prior teaching is for some reason unclear, would entail the Church being unable to recognise the contradiction with sufficient clarity and certainty, and thus falling into error.
This is impossible as it would drive the Church into an impasse in which she is obliged to accept an error against the faith.
[Questions which are controversial amongst both Catholics and heretics:]
And therefore one must recognize from this that much depends on the nature of the question of faith which the pope decides.
For either a controversy exists or can exist even among the orthodox themselves; or it is controversial only among the heretics, of course, but is certain among the orthodox themselves.
If a question is or can be controversial among all, including the orthodox, it cannot be the case that the pope wants one of the two [opposing] views to be accepted by the whole Church and yet is mistaken in this matter.
For logically the whole Church could then (indeed would have to) err, since it could not already rely on a certain prior judgment to accept the doctrine already [previously] presented by its pastor on this question.
[Questions which are already defined by the Church, but controversial among heretics:]
But if a question is controversial only with regard to the heretics, and is otherwise already defined in the Church, a further distinction must be made.
For either a particular controversy about that is stirred up again by the heretics, so that a particular annoyance arises in the Church and it is appropriate that it be met by a clearer definition from the pope for the strengthening of the faithful in the faith; or finally no particular controversy is raised about the matter in question.
If such a controversy is not raised again, then, however, what some (as we have said above) admit to be not improbable could happen, namely, that it could happen that a pope who has fallen into a heresy condemned by the Church as a private person would also want to impose it unsuccessfully on the Church, something that would not involve any danger for the Church itself, as has been explained above.
But if a new controversy were to arise over the matter of faith in question, then it could in no way happen that the pope would want a heretical view on this question to be accepted by the whole Church: on the contrary, he would simply and absolutely decide this controversy of faith infallibly and could present nothing but the true view, already previously defined in the Church, to the faithful as to be believed.
For this is entirely the force and purpose of those promises which Christ gave either to St. Peter and his successors or to the Church itself, that in controversies which would arise the supreme shepherd of the Church would always infallibly confirm the faithful in the faith, even if there were [already] prior judgments in the Church [for the] truth in question.
Fifth objection
Column 312-313
FIFTHLY, it might be objected, that as the pope can (at least in the opinion of many) adhere himself, as a private person, to any manifest error against the faith, so also an error indeed against the faith, but one not manifest.
And again, just as he (as Turrecremata and Sylvester admit in the passages quoted a little above) can freely impose his private manifest error on the Church, so he also seems to be able to impose some non-manifest error on her with the same freedom. It can therefore happen in some case that he defines an error in a matter that is still controversial and not sufficiently established among Catholics.
And this in turn is confirmed by this matter [i.e. by the following]. For it may happen that at the time when the pope would be filled with an undisclosed error, it would at the same time be necessary to decide a controversy in the Church concerning the matter of this error. In this case, the pope would, it seems, define his erroneous opinion.
I ANSWER to this argument that the faithfulness of God, by which he is bound by promise to prevent a general error of the Church, is opposed to a pope, holding to an error which is not manifest, wishing to oblige the Church to accept it.
For the Church would be obliged to accept such an error if the matter were obviously controversial; and so she would be obliged to err, which is completely absurd.
But this faithfulness of God is not opposed in the same way to a pope who is already openly heretical and therefore, in fact or in the judgment of the faithful, no longer [is the pope] wishes to impose an obvious error on the Church.
For, as we have said above, such an attempt by the pope would not threaten the whole Church with error, since she would immediately recognize that he is no longer really the pope and her shepherd, whom she must listen to, but an obvious wolf who must be kept away from the sheepfold.
Some further questions to consider:
This text is discussing the imposition of errors in faith on the Church through a definitive judgment.
Does it apply to the proposition of errors, even in a non-definitive way?
Does it apply to errors imposed which are not heresies, viz. errors of some lower degree, that are not directly against a matter of faith?
Further Reading:
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[1] Read Melchior Cano “De locis theologicis” Book 6, last chapter, on the 11th argument.
[2] “De Ecclesia”, book 2, chapter 112 on the 7th argument and book 4, part 2, chapter 16
[3] At the word “Opinio” at the end.