'Ipso facto': Bellarmine's 'five opinions' on the heretic pope question

One of the most infamous—and contemporary—topics in St Robert Bellarmine's 'Controversies' is that of the five opinions on the 'heretic pope.'

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One of the most infamous—and contemporary—topics in St Robert Bellarmine's 'Controversies' is that of the five opinions on the 'heretic pope.'

Editors’ Notes

What follows is the full Chapter XXX of Book II of On the Roman Pontiff, in which Bellarmine deals with this question.

• The first part—his treatment of the first three opinions—is a new translation.

• His treatment of the fourth and fifth opinions—which make up the bulk of the chapter—were translated by James Larrabee many years ago. This translation has been salvaged from the old Aquinas Site and Bellarmine Forums, with the permission of their owner.

This is Bellarmine’s ex professo treatment of the question. It is in light of this chapter that all other passing or less clear comments elsewhere should be understood—and not the other way around.

It is hermeneutically unsound to insist that this chapter’s ex professo teaching be understood in light of those passing or less clear comments elsewhere.

Why is this important? The ‘sixth’ opinion

There are a variety of inventive ways proposed to take Bellarmine’s clear statement…

“Therefore, the true opinion is the fifth, according to which the Pope who is manifestly a heretic ceases by himself to be Pope and head, in the same way as he ceases to be a Christian and a member of the body of the Church; and for this reason he can be judged and punished by the Church.”

… and transform this clear statement either into the “fourth opinion” against which it was defended—which holds that…

“… the manifestly heretical Pope is not ‘ipso facto’ deposed, but can and must be deposed by the Church.”

… or into what we have called a “sixth opinion,” whose advocates claim to hold the fifth opinion, but actually hold that while the manifestly heretical pope does indeed fall from office once his heresy is manifest, some sort of “official” declaration simply and absolutely necessary for the heresy to be sufficiently manifest.¹

It is precisely the claim to be holding the fifth opinion, whilst conflating it with aspects of the fourth opinion, that makes this sixth opinion distinct from both.

This sixth opinion is similar (or identical to) the opinion of Suarez, who has been characterised as holding the fifth opinion. In fact, it is either the fourth opinion, or a hybrid between the fourth and fifth opinions.

In his enlightening essay getting to the bottom of Bellarmine’s teaching and position, Arnaldo da Silveira writes:

“According to Suarez, once formal heresy has been externalized, ipso facto Our Lord deposes the Pontiff, and then an imperfect Council declares this deposition before the visible Church. According to St. Robert Bellarmine, however, no one deposes him, not even Our Lord: it is the Pope himself who quits his office by positing an act incompatible with the papacy. Both analyses maintain that office is lost ipso facto, by the unequivocal exteriorization of formal heresy. Each position has the ipso facto element in common, but in what follows they differ.

“For St. Robert Bellarmine, as I have said, the loss of office is effected by the externalization of heresy. For Suarez, on the other hand, after the externalization of the heresy comes an intervention on the part of Our Lord, followed in turn by deprivation by the Council. Hence Suarez speaks improperly in employing the expression ‘ipso facto’.

“That is why I classify Suarez as holding the Fourth Opinion presented by St. Robert Bellarmine, not the Fifth. According to Suarez, Our Lord deposes the Pope by an act of His own, not manifested to men. Now, the visibility of the Church would require such a deposition to be manifested to the Church militant. And Suarez, in his eclecticism to which Fr. Gleize rightly draws attention, imagines a conciliar act, which in turn would violate the principle that the Pope is subject to no ecclesiastical organ.”

The importance of the full context

In order to address ways in which the advocates of the fourth and “sixth” opinion have confused the issue, and to refute these arguments, we have been providing new translations of extracts which appear to suggest that some sort of ecclesiastical intervention is necessary in order for the fifth opinion to “come into effect.” For example:

• Bellarmine does not teach councils are necessary for ipso facto loss of office (Fourth General Controversy—On Councils, Book I—On the Nature and Causes of a Council, Chapters IX-XI)

• What's superior, Pope or Council? Bellarmine sets out the objections (Fourth General Controversy—On Councils, Book I—On the Authority of Councils, Chapters XIII-XIV)

This is aside from the fact that Chapter XXX says what it says, and that as Bellarmine’s ex professo treatment of the issue, it ought to have the hermeneutical primacy over less clear or passing comments elsewhere.

It is vital that we get all the key texts on the table and in their full context if we can hope to arrive—together—at the true teaching of Bellarmine, and the truth of the matter itself.

Some other points to note

1. Length of treatment: Bellarmine’s treatment of the “fifth” opinion (the manifestly heretical pope falls from office ipso facto) might appear to be relatively short, but this is because much of the argumentation for it is presented in considerable depth his refutation of the “fourth” opinion (the manifestly heretical pope must be deposed by a council).

2. Cajetan’s views: While Bellarmine ascribes the fourth opinion to Cajetan, it appears that the latter changed his view later in life, and adopted either the second or fifth opinion.

3. Not deposed by God, but by himself: Bellarmine’s fifth opinion is sometimes presented as holding that the manifestly heretical pope is deposed by God. But Bellarmine is clear that the manifestly heretical pope judges and deposes himself by the very fact of his manifest heresy. These ideas remain present in the 1917 Code of Canon Law under the auspices of tacit renunciation of office. Da Silveira argues conclusively that this is the true understanding of Bellarmine’s fifth opinion, and that “it is the only one of those dealing with how the heretical Pope would lose his office which does not place any ecclesiastical organ above him”—which would, of course, be untenable.

4. Misnomer of “opinions”: These “opinions” are sometimes presented as being merely such; but this is very misleading. This is because “opinion,” in reference to the fifth, is a misnomer. Bellarmine makes completely clear that, conditional on falsity of the first opinion (a pope cannot become a manifest heretic), the fifth opinion is true, and certain (“most certain,” certissima, in fact).

   1. Da Silveira calls this his “conditional [alternative-successive] opinion,” in the sense that “assuming it to be possible for the Pope to fall into heresy, [Bellarmine] declares that between the Second, Fourth and Fifth opinions, the last is “true”. Hence in calm objectivity it can and should be said that that the Fifth Opinion is that adopted by St. Robert Bellarmine, from a conditional point of view.”

5. Certainty of the fifth opinion, and as Bellarmine’s own view: Bellarmine does not himself grant the falsity of the first opinion except for the sake of argument, but this is not relevant to the “conditional certainty” of the fifth opinion. That is because the two opinions operate on different levels:

   1. If the first opinion is true, it is true because of God’s providence;

   2. If the first opinion is not true, then the fifth opinion is certainly true because of principles of divine law and ecclesiology—principles which would remain true, even if God’s providence might prevent them from ever being applicable in the case of a pope; and principles which definitely exclude the possibility of the third or fourth opinions being true.

   This is why da Silveira qualifies Bellarmine’s fifth opinion as theologically certain.

What St Robert Bellarmine really taught about a heretic pope losing office 'ipso facto'

Points of agreement

As mentioned, previously, we fully agree that Councils can often be a better means than others of achieving certain ends. In addition, they may be effective at making the recognition of certain facts (such as the non-papacy of an antipope) clear and obligatory on all.

We are also inclined to agree—although not in any sense that involves a council judging a true pope—that declarations and an imperfect gathering of bishops may well be an effective means of clarifying such situations.

But it is obviously a non sequitur to say that a Council being an effective means of achieving an end means that it is the only means.

S.D. Wright

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Third General Controversy—On the Roman Pontiff

Chapter XXX: Whether a heretical pope can be deposed

St Robert Bellarmine: Book II—On the Succession of the Roman Pontiff in the Primacy in the Church Militant

Available from Google Books.

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Part I—The First, Second and Third Opinions

Translated by The WM Review.

Base text of translation by AI; scrutinised and edited line by line by humans.
Headings and line breaks added by The WM Review.

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Tenth Argument. A pontiff can be judged and deposed by the Church in the case of heresy, as is clear in Dist. 40, can. Si papa; therefore the pontiff is subject to human judgment, at least in at least one case.

I respond: there are five opinions on this matter.

The first opinion: The pope cannot be a heretic

The first is that of Albert Pighius, in Book 4, Chapter 8 of Hierarchia Ecclesiastica, where he asserts that the pope cannot be a heretic; hence, he cannot be deposed in any circumstance. This opinion is probable and can easily be defended, as we shall later demonstrate in its proper place. However, since it is not certain, and the common opinion is to the contrary, it will be worthwhile to consider what should be answered if the pope could be a heretic.

The second opinion: The pope who is a heretic loses office, even if his heresy is merely internal or secret

Thus, the second opinion is that the pope, by that very fact (eo ipso) that he falls into heresy (even if only interiorly) is outside the Church and deposed by God; therefore, he can be judged by the Church, that is, declared to have been deposed by divine law, and deposed in fact (de facto) if he still refuses to yield.

This is the position of John of Turrecremata in Book 4, Part 2, Chapter 20; but it does not convince me. For although jurisdiction is indeed given to the pontiff by God, it is granted with the cooperation of men, as is evident—because he who previously was not pope receives it from men, such that he begins to be pope; thus, it is not taken away by God except through man.² Yet a hidden heretic cannot be judged by man, nor does he voluntarily wish to relinquish that power. Moreover, the foundation of this opinion is that hidden heretics are outside the Church, which we have amply demonstrated to be false in Book 1 of de Ecclesia.

The third opinion: The pope who is a heretic cannot be deposed, whether his heresy be manifest or occult

A third opinion stands at the other extreme: namely, that the pope cannot be deposed by reason of occult heresy or even manifest heresy.

Turrecremata also recounts and refutes this opinion in the cited passage, and indeed it seems utterly improbable.

First, because it is clearly stated in the canon Si papa Dist. 40, as well as in Innocent’s Second Sermon on the Consecration of the Pontiff, that a heretical pope can be judged.³

And further, in the acts of the Eighth Synod, Act 7, the proceedings of the Roman Council under Hadrian are recorded; in them it is stated that Pope Honorius was rightly deemed anathematised because he had been convicted of heresy, for which reason alone one of lesser rank may judge a superior. Here it must be noted that, although it may be probable that Honorius was not a heretic, and that Pope Hadrian II was deceived by corrupted copies of the Sixth Synod—mistakenly thinking Honorius to have been a heretic—we cannot deny that Hadrian, together with the Roman Council, and indeed even the entire Eighth General Synod, held the view that in a case of heresy the Roman Pontiff could be judged.

Moreover, it would be a most miserable condition for the Church, if she were forced to acknowledge a wolf openly ravaging the flock as her shepherd.

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Part II—The Fourth and Fifth Opinions

Translated by James Larrabee

Originally published at the Aquinas Site.
Headings and some line breaks and italics added for clarity.

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The fourth opinion: The pope who is even manifestly a heretic does not lose office, but must be deposed by the Church

The fourth opinion is that of Cajetan, for whom (de auctor. papae et con., cap. 20 et 21) the manifestly heretical Pope is not “ipso facto” deposed, but can and must be deposed by the Church. To my judgment, this opinion cannot be defended. For, in the first place, it is proven with arguments from authority and from reason that the manifest heretic is “ipso facto” deposed. The argument from authority is based on St. Paul (Titus, c. 3), who orders that the heretic be avoided after two warnings, that is, after showing himself to be manifestly obstinate—which means before any excommunication or judicial sentence. And this is what St. Jerome writes, adding that the other sinners are excluded from the Church by sentence of excommunication, but the heretics exile themselves and separate themselves by their own act from the body of Christ. Now, a Pope who remains Pope cannot be avoided, for how could we be required to avoid our own head? How can we separate ourselves from a member united to us?

This principle is most certain. The non-Christian cannot in any way be Pope, as Cajetan himself admits (ib. c. 26). The reason for this is that he cannot be head of what he is not a member; now he who is not a Christian is not a member of the Church, and a manifest heretic is not a Christian, as is clearly taught by St. Cyprian (lib. 4, epist. 2), St. Athanasius (Scr. 2 cont. Arian.), St. Augustine (lib. de great. Christ. cap. 20), St. Jerome (contra Lucifer.) and others; therefore the manifest heretic cannot be Pope.

To this Cajetan responds (in Apol. pro tract. praedicto cap. 25 et in ipso tract. cap. 22) that the heretic is not a Christian “simpliciter” [i.e. without qualification, or absolutely], but is one “secundum quid” [i.e. in a qualified or relative sense]. For, granted that two things constitute the Christian—the faith and the [baptismal] character—the heretic, having lost the faith, is still in some way united to the Church and is capable of jurisdiction; therefore, he is also Pope, but ought to be removed, since he is disposed, with ultimate disposition, to cease to be Pope: as the man who is still not dead but is “in extremis” [at the point of death].

Against this: in the first place, if the heretic remained, “in actu” [actually], united to the Church in virtue of the character, he would never be able to be cut or separated from her “in actu”, for the character is indelible. But there is no one who denies that some people may be separated “in actu” from the Church. Therefore, the character does not make the heretic be “in actu” in the Church, but is only a sign that he was in the Church and that he must return to her. Analogously, when a sheep wanders lost in the mountains, the mark impressed on it does not make it be in the fold, but indicates from which fold it had fled and to which fold it ought to be brought back. This truth has a confirmation in St. Thomas who says (Summ. Theol. III, q. 8, a. 3) that those who do not have the faith are not united “in actu” to Christ, but only potentially—and St. Thomas here refers to the internal union, and not to the external which is produced by the confession of faith and visible signs. Therefore, as the character is something internal, and not external, according to St. Thomas the character alone does not unite a man, “in actu,” to Christ.

Further against the argument of Cajetan: either faith is a disposition necessary “simpliciter” for someone to be Pope, or it is only necessary for someone to be a good Pope [“ad bene esse,” to exist well, to be good, as opposed to simply existing]. In the first hypothesis, in case this disposition be eliminated by the contrary disposition, which is heresy, the Pope immediately ceases to be Pope: for the form cannot maintain itself without the necessary dispositions. In the second hypothesis, the Pope cannot be deposed by reason of heresy, for otherwise he would also have to be deposed for ignorance, immorality, and other similar causes, which impede the knowledge, the morality, and the other dispositions necessary for him to be a good Pope (“ad bene esse papae”). In addition to this, Cajetan recognises (tract. praed., ca. 26) that the Pope cannot be deposed for the lack of dispositions necessary, not “simpliciter”, but only “ad bene esse.”

To this, Cajetan responds that faith is a disposition necessary “simpliciter”, but partial, and not total; and that, therefore, even if his faith disappears he can still continue being Pope, by reason of the other part of the disposition, the character, which still endures.

Against this argument: either the total disposition, constituted by the character and by faith, is necessary “simpliciter,” or it is not, the partial disposition then being sufficient. In the first hypothesis, the faith disappearing there no longer remains the disposition “simpliciter” necessary, for the disposition “simpliciter” necessary was the total, and the total no longer exists. In the second hypothesis, the faith is only necessary “ad bene esse”, and therefore its absence does not justify the deposition of the Pope. In addition to this, what finds itself in the ultimate disposition to death, immediately thereafter ceases to exist, without the intervention of any other external force, as is obvious; therefore, also the Pope heretic ceases to be Pope by himself, without any deposition.

Finally, the Holy Fathers teach unanimously not only that heretics are outside of the Church, but also that they are “ipso facto” deprived of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction and dignity. St. Cyprian (lib. 2, epist. 6) says: “We affirm that absolutely no heretic or schismatic has any power or right”; and he also teaches (lib. 2, epist. 1) that the heretics who return to the Church must be received as laymen, even though they have been formerly priests or bishops in the Church. St. Optatus (lib. 1 cont. Parmen.) teaches that heretics and schismatics cannot have the keys of the kingdom of heaven, nor bind nor loose. St. Ambrose (lib. 1 de poenit., ca. 2), St. Augustine (in Enchir., cap 65), St. Jerome (lib. cont. Lucifer.) teach the same.

Pope St. Celestine I (epist. ad Jo. Antioch., which appears in Conc. Ephes., tom. I, cap. 19) wrote:

“It is evident that he [who has been excommunicated by Nestorius] has remained and remains in communion with us, and that we do not consider destituted [i.e. deprived of office, by judgment of Nestorius], anyone who has been excommunicated or deprived of his charge, either episcopal or clerical, by Bishop Nestorius or by the others who followed him, after they commenced preaching heresy. For he who had already shown himself as deserving to be excommunicated, could not excommunicate anyone by his sentence.”

And in a letter to the clergy of Constantinople, Pope St. Celestine I says:

“The authority of Our Apostolic See has determined that the bishop, cleric, or simple Christian who had been deposed or excommunicated by Nestorius or his followers, after the latter began to preach heresy shall not be considered deposed or excommunicated. For he who had defected from the faith with such preachings, cannot depose or remove anyone whatsoever.”

St. Nicholas I (epist. ad Michael) repeats and confirms the same. Finally, St. Thomas also teaches (S. Theol., II-II, q. 39, a. 3) that schismatics immediately lose all jurisdiction, and that anything they try to do on the basis of any jurisdiction will be null.

There is no basis for that which some respond to this: that these Fathers based themselves on ancient law, while nowadays, by decree of the Council of Constance, they alone lose their jurisdiction who are excommunicated by name or who assault clerics. This argument, I say, has no value at all, for those Fathers, in affirming that heretics lose jurisdiction, did not cite any human law, which furthermore perhaps did not exist in relation to the matter, but argued on the basis of the very nature of heresy. The Council of Constance only deals with the excommunicated, that is, those who have lost jurisdiction by sentence of the Church, while heretics already before being excommunicated are outside the Church and deprived of all jurisdiction. For they have already been condemned by their own sentence, as the Apostle teaches (Tit. 3:10-11), that is, they have been cut off from the body of the Church without excommunication, as St. Jerome affirms.

Besides that, the second affirmation of Cajetan, that the Pope heretic can be truly and authoritatively deposed by the Church, is no less false than the first. For if the Church deposes the Pope against his will it is certainly above the Pope; however, Cajetan himself defends, in the same treatise, the contrary of this. Cajetan responds that the Church, in deposing the Pope, does not have authority over the Pope, but only over the link that unites the person to the pontificate. In the same way that the Church in uniting the pontificate to such a person, is not, because of this, above the Pontiff, so also the Church can separate the pontificate from such a person in case of heresy, without saying that it is above the Pope.

But contrary to this it must be observed in the first place that, from the fact that the Pope deposes bishops, it is deduced that the Pope is above all the bishops, though the Pope on deposing a bishop does not destroy the episcopal jurisdiction, but only separates it from that person. In the second place, to depose anyone from the pontificate against the will of the deposed, is without doubt punishing him; however, to punish is proper to a superior or to a judge. In the third place, given that according to Cajetan and the other Thomists, in reality the whole and the parts taken as a whole are the same thing, he who has authority over the parts taken as a whole, being able to separate them one from another, has also authority over the whole itself which is constituted by those parts.

The example of the electors, who have the power to designate a certain person for the pontificate, without however having power over the Pope, given by Cajetan, is also destitute of value. For when something is being made, the action is exercised over the matter of the future thing, and not over the composite, which does not yet exist, but when a thing is destroyed, the action is exercised over the composite, as becomes patent on consideration of the things of nature. Therefore, on creating the Pontiff, the Cardinals do not exercise their authority over the Pontiff for he does not yet exist, but over the matter, that is, over the person who by the election becomes disposed to receive the pontificate from God. But if they deposed the Pontiff, they would necessarily exercise authority over the composite, that is, over the person endowed with the pontifical power, that is, over the Pontiff.

The fifth opinion: The pope who is manifestly a heretic ceases to be pope ipso facto

Therefore, the true opinion is the fifth, according to which the Pope who is manifestly a heretic ceases by himself to be Pope and head, in the same way as he ceases to be a Christian and a member of the body of the Church; and for this reason he can be judged and punished by the Church.

This is the opinion of all the ancient Fathers, who teach that manifest heretics immediately lose all jurisdiction, and outstandingly that of St. Cyprian (lib. 4, epist. 2) who speaks as follows of Novatian, who was Pope [i.e. antipope] in the schism which occurred during the pontificate of St. Cornelius:

“He would not be able to retain the episcopate [i.e. of Rome], and, if he was made bishop before, he separated himself from the body of those who were, like him, bishops, and from the unity of the Church.”

According to what St. Cyprian affirms in this passage, even had Novatian been the true and legitimate Pope, he would have automatically fallen from the pontificate, if he separated himself from the Church.

This is the opinion of great recent doctors, as John Driedo (lib. 4 de Script. et dogmat. Eccles., cap. 2, par. 2, sent. 2), who teaches that only they separate themselves from the Church who are expelled, like the excommunicated, and those who depart by themselves from her or oppose her, as heretics and schismatics. And in his seventh affirmation, he maintains that in those who turn away from the Church, there remains absolutely no spiritual power over those who are in the Church. Melchior Cano says the same (lib. 4 de loc., cap. 2), teaching that heretics are neither parts nor members of the Church, and that it cannot even be conceived that anyone could be head and Pope, without being member and part (cap. ult. ad argument. 12). And he teaches in the same place, in plain words, that occult heretics are still of the Church, they are parts and members, and that therefore the Pope who is an occult heretic is still Pope. This is also the opinion of the other authors whom we cite in book I De Ecclesia.

The foundation of this argument is that the manifest heretic is not in any way a member of the Church, that is, neither spiritually nor corporally, which signifies that he is not such by internal union nor by external union. For even bad Catholics [i.e. who are not heretics] are united and are members, spiritually by faith, corporally by confession of faith and by participation in the visible sacraments; the occult heretics are united and are members although only by external union; on the contrary, the good catechumens belong to the Church only by an internal union, not by the external; but manifest heretics do not pertain in any manner, as we have already proved.

Afterword

James Larrabee

As to the case of Liberius, which Bellarmine treats in book IV, chapter IX at considerable length, he is there concerned not to prove that Liberius was not deposed, and lawfully deposed (both of which he fully admits), but that the Liberius case does not argue against infallibility, nor was Liberius personally a heretic. This involves various distinctions which people now are failing to make, but are evident to any theologian.

[F]or now, let it be said that, while Liberius resisted heresy both before and after the period of his lapse and deposition (and that is what the quote from a later Pope undoubtedly refers to), he failed to do so for a given time. During this time the Roman clergy “deposed” him, i.e. they considered the papacy to be vacant, and accepted St. Felix as Pope.

For example (Bellarmine):

“In addition, unless we are to admit that Liberius defected for a time from constancy in defending the Faith, we are compelled to exclude Felix II, who held the pontificate while Liberius was alive, from the number of the Popes: but the Catholic Church venerates this very Felix as Pope and martyr. However this may be, Liberius neither taught heresy, nor was a heretic, but only sinned by external act [emphasis in original Latin], as did St. Marcellinus, and unless I am mistaken, sinned less than St. Marcellinus.” (lib. IV, c. 9, no. 5)

Further, after explaining that Felix was for a time an antipope, he continues (no. 15):

“Then two years later came the lapse of Liberius, of which we have spoken above. Then indeed the Roman clergy, stripping Liberius of his pontifical dignity, went over to Felix, whom they knew [then] to be a Catholic. From that time, Felix began to be the true Pontiff. For although Liberius was not a heretic, nevertheless he was considered one, on account of the peace he made with the Arians, and by that presumption the pontificate could rightly [merito] be taken from him: for men are not bound, or able to read hearts; but when they see that someone is a heretic by his external works, they judge him to be a heretic pure and simple [simpliciter], and condemn him as a heretic.”

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1. Editor’s Notes: What are “occult heretics”?

The “sixth” opinion correctly notes that only public heretics (whose heresy and pertinacity are sufficiently public) cease to be members of the Church; and that those who fall short of this remain members, even if they completely lack the virtue of faith.

However, this “sixth opinion” is premised on the idea that that all heretics are merely “occult heretics” (or perhaps “suspect of heresy”) until they are declared otherwise by a specific act of the Church. No-one is a public heretic until that point, the advocates of such ideas will say.

This would mean that a person could flagrantly expose themselves as a heretic to the world, without any plausible deniability, but that we would all be obliged to class them as an “occult heretic” or “suspect of heresy” until a declaration arrived.

On the contrary, here is how Bellarmine defines occult heretics in On the Church Militant, in his chapter on this class of persons:

“Lastly, there remain the hidden ones, that is, those who neither possess internal faith nor any Christian virtue, and yet, for some temporal benefit, outwardly profess the Catholic faith and mingle in the communion of the Sacraments with true faithful.”

Fuether, those who are suspect of heresy are, by definition, not yet public heretics; but the category suspect of heresy includes both (1) those who really do lack the virtue of faith, and as such are indeed occult heretics; and (2) those who have simply created a wrong impression through their words and actions, but still have the virtue of faith, and as such are not heretics at all.

In addition to those whose heresy is merely internal or suspected, theologians and canonists also consider the category of occult heretics to include those who have clearly externalised their heresy, but in a more or less discreet way such that it is not noticed by a sufficient number of other persons. Cf. Van Noort:

“Heretics are classified as ‘public’ or ‘occult,’ ‘formal’ or ‘material.’ A public (notorious) heretic is one whose heresy is known to a large number of people, even if he has not formally joined the ranks of a heretical church; an occult heretic is one whose errors in faith are either totally unknown, or known only to a few.”

Dom Charles Augustine also states that “a real intrinsic distinction between a public crime and a crime notorious in fact can hardly be established,” and that “[e]very crime which is not public, says our text, is occult or secret.” He defines public as follows, with a lower threshold than some might expect:

1. A crime is public if committed under, or accompanied by, circumstances which point to a possible and likely divulgation thereof. Canonists enumerate different degrees of publicity: almost occult (pene occultum), which is known to at least two witnesses; famosum or manifestum, which not only can be proved, but is known to many; and, finally, notorium. From this it will be seen that a real intrinsic distinction between a public crime and a crime notorious in fact can hardly be established. (We shall point out one distinctive trait below.)

To fix the number of persons required for making a crime a public one is rather hazardous, though it may furnish a certain rule which will enable the judge to decide as to the secrecy or public character of a crime. Many canonists hold that at least six persons in a community, even the smallest (for instance, a religious house of 10 or 12 inmates), must know of a crime, to render it public. Nor should there be any doubt about the character of the persons who are witnesses to the crime. Furthermore, the interest they may have in the crime should be weighed.

From this, we can agree that even if it is externalised, heresy will remain occult if the publicity of the heresy and pertinacity remains below the sort of threshold discussed above by Augustine and others. But it is a gratuitous non sequitur to say that this threshold can only be met by a declaration or by joining a non-Catholic sect, and that therefore no-one can be more than a merely occult heretic or merely suspect of heresy, until such a point.

This is because the categories of occult heretics and those suspect of heresy necessarily refer to those whose heresy and pertinacity are hidden (or not sufficiently externalised), and who are thus objectively not thought to be heretics.

It is therefore inappropriate and nonsensical to assert that this applies even to those whose heresy and pertinacity are so flagrant that they are only (allegedly) held back from being public heretics by this contrived legal fiction.

Mgr. G. Van Noort, Christ’s Church, Dogmatic Theology Vol. II, trans. and revised John J. Castelot & William R. Murphy, The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland 1957, 239.

Dom Charles Augustine, A Commentary On The New Code Of Canon Law, Volume 8: Book 5., B. Herder Book Co., London 1918, pp 15-18

2. Editor’s Notes: “[I]t is not taken away by God except through man.”

This passage has sometimes been translated as “through men.” Although the Latin word is singular, this is not at all unreasonable—but place an interpretative gloss on the passage which can be misleading. Unsurprisingly, this interpretative gloss is one that finds a way to present the fifth opinion as what we have called the “sixth opinion.”

Bellarmine does not specify the precise human action he has in view here, and so those who claim to know that this means that the ipso facto loss of office does not take place without a declaration of heresy by a council (for example) are reading their prior commitments into these words. This is unsound, as such an idea runs contrary to everything else Bellarmine says in this chapter, and elsewhere.

As is clear from the context, Bellarmine is primarily discussing the matter of occult heretics—defined in the previous footnote—and why a pope who is merely an occult heretic does not lose office. In particular, he is talking about the inherent impossibility of occult heretics in general being judged by anyone, because men cannot read someone’s mind.

The man who becomes pope receives his power through the work of other men, namely through election. Bellarmine is comparing this situation to the way in which a pope loses this power and ceases to be pope. Just as a man begins to be pope by being elected by men, he cannot cease being pope without anyone knowing about it at all, as would be the case if a man lost office for merely occult or internal heresy. Therefore, he says, occult heretics do not lose office ipso facto.

In neither case is he saying that man is acting directly, or that man is giving or taking away the papal power. The man elected to the papacy receives a designation from men, but does not receive the power or primacy from them. The man who loses the papacy does so because his heresy, and thus tacit renunciation of office, must been seen and recognised by man as well.

However, there is nothing to suggest that the body of men who elect is the same who must see and recognise the situation of a manifestly heretical pope.

3. Editors’ Notes: Si Papa

We can only make sense of Bellarmine’s passing comments in light of the clear and ex professo treatment of the matter in On the Roman Pontiff. This treatment must have primacy, and not be “nuanced away” by equivocal or less clear references elsewhere. In this section, he makes clear that the very reason for the comments above is that that manifest heretics are “already […] condemned by their own sentence”; that the reason that a putative pope who is a manifest heretic “can be judged and punished by the Church” is that he is already neither a Christian nor a pope; and that these principles were “the opinion of all the ancient Fathers” […]

Situations other than that involving a manifestly heretical “pope”—e.g., a doubful pope in a time of schism, or one who is potentially an occult heretic and merely suspect of heresy—are addressed in Chapter XIX, and do not bear on our current situation at all.