What kind of assent is owed to the different papal statements? Fr Anton Straub SJ
“The solemn and the daily magisterium of the Church can be exercised in four distinct ways.”
Editors’ Notes:
In these four extracts, the German theologian Fr Anton Straub SJ explains the different modes in which the Church’s magisterium may be exercised, and the importance of what he calls “peremptoriness” for infallibility.
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Straub’s treatment is especially important given current debates over the matter of “infallible safety” of the non-infallible, non-definitive and merely authentic (authoritative) magisterium. He also considers the different kinds of assent which must be rendered to each form of teaching.
The sections are as follows:
Straub asserts that papal teaching is infallible when it is definitive (and not necessarily solemn). He thus distinguishes it from non-definitive teaching, and makes definitiveness the key for recognising a teaching infallibly proposed. (From Zeitschrift für katholisheche Theologie)
He discusses the meaning of the term ex cathedra, explaining that the Pope cannot be said to be a acting as a private teacher when he chooses to teach in a non-definitive way. (De Ecclesia Christi n. 971)
He discusses the four different ways in the Church exercises her magisterium, which are of varying degrees of peremptoriness and authority. (Ibid. n. 832)
He discusses the type of assent to be given to the Roman congregations, and by analogy (as mentioned in n. 971) non-definitive papal teaching. (Ibid. nn. 968-9)
Translations variously made by a friend of The WM Review and/or with his assistance. Headings and some line-breaks added by The WM Review.
1. Definitive Papal Teaching
‘Gibt es zwei unabhängige Träger der kirchlichen Unfehlbarkeit?’ (Are there two independent subjects of ecclesiastical infallibility?) Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 1918, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1918
pp. 254-300
Infallibility promised without distinction
It must be noted that the Church’s magisterium is not promised a twofold infallibility, one for its solemn decisions, another for its ordinary, everyday activity.
Such a distinction is not to be found in Revelation; rather, infallibility is simply promised for “all days until the end of the world” (Matthew 28:20). And indeed, infallible teaching is essential to the Church, a certain solemnity of teaching is not essential to her; the councils from which the solemn doctrinal decrees of the entire episcopate derive are not at all necessary to the Church, let alone essential, and other teaching is also in no way bound to a solemn form.
All that is required for infallible teaching is the self-evident fact that something is proposed as to be believed, i.e. that it is not presented as a provisional and conditional, but as an irrevocable and unconditional truth.
“By divine and Catholic faith is to be believed all that is contained in the written or handed down word of God and is presented by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed.”1
But no solemn decision of the ecclesiastical magisterium has the divine guarantee of infallibility without the guiding participation of the pope; as we have seen, any solemn doctrinal judgment, no matter how great a council of bishops, can be appealed to the pope for the purpose of a definitive correction emanating from him alone.
The Roman Pontiff and the ordinary magisterium
Consequently, the ecclesiastical magisterium is not infallible in its ordinary activity either without the decisive influence of the pope. The pope is precisely the infallible rock of the Church, the one who infallibly confirms all the brethren, the infallible shepherd of the whole flock of Christ not only on extraordinary occasions, but in the ordinary course of Church life.
This is why Irenaeus, for example, long before the first general council, celebrates the Roman Church as the one to which all others must necessarily conform in doctrine.
It is in the nature of things that the decisive influence of the pope emerges with less clarity in the ordinary workings of the magisterium. Nevertheless, it can also be sufficiently demonstrated here.
A distinction is made between a twofold class of laws of belief.
One refers to those truths which have always been expressly believed from the beginning in the whole Church by virtue of the apostolic proclamation. Their infallible truthfulness is undoubtedly guaranteed by the normative infallibility of Peter as the first pope and all his successors who adhered to the same laws, even though in the apostolic age there was a further guarantee in the form of the infallibility of the individual apostles.
The other class has as its object such revealed truths or truths closely connected with them, which in the course of time require an infallible determination. If this is not brought about by a formal doctrinal law issued by the pope alone or at least decisively influenced by him, it takes place in the manner of a general ecclesiastical customary law. But even the general customary law of the Church only becomes valid if the pope recognizes it as binding on the Church, at least by tacit consent that is recognizable from the circumstances.
Therefore, the law of belief gradually introduced through the common effectiveness of the ordinary ecclesiastical magisterium is definitively binding on the whole Church and thus infallible only through the decisive influence of the pope.2
Objections
The objections raised against this can be easily overcome.
To speak ex cathedra is in itself nothing other than to speak by virtue of the authority conferred by the cathedra. But since even the highest ecclesiastical teacher, the pope, is free to express himself in various ways, for example merely provisionally and therefore not infallibly, it is customary to use the expression “decision ex cathedra”, as it were per excellentiam, to designate only one that is definitive or final.3
This final papal judgment may be solemn and formal; but it may also appear in a less conspicuous form; the only essential thing is that the pope sufficiently indicates his approval of a doctrine as one to be believed or accepted unconditionally.
Vatican I
The Vatican Council either understands a “decision ex cathedra” to mean every definitive doctrinal decision, or only a solemn one.
In the first case, the final doctrinal decision of the pope, which is expressed in simple approval or non-objection, is also to be regarded as infallible.
In the second, the Council has directly declared only the solemn and formally definitive doctrinal decision to be infallible, but the infallibility also of the non-solemn one, as essentially equivalent or equivalent to the solemn and formal one, then arises ex paritate rationis. It arises precisely in the same way that the duty of obedience would also arise for a general customary law valid by papal authorization, if it had pleased the Council to define that every law formally issued by the pope for the whole Church is to be obeyed.
Thus, it is not the expression “decision ex cathedra” that is important, but whether or not a papal doctrinal pronouncement can be regarded as unconditional and definitive.
Definitiveness is key
Moreover, it is not required that the definitive doctrinal pronouncement be addressed directly to the whole Church; it is sufficient that it is certain from the words or the circumstances that the pope intends to impose the acceptance of a doctrine unconditionally or forever.
This is because, in matters of faith, as opposed to in matters of discipline, no diversity is permitted, it is self-evident that every doctrinal decree of the pope, even if in its external form addressed only to parts of the Church, concerns the whole Church; to this belongs the famous letter of Pope Innocent I to the Africans, Celestine to Cyril, Leo to Flavian and so many other documents.4
Thus, if the pope presents a doctrine only “as bishop in his diocese of Rome”, i.e. not making full use of his authority and therefore not yet definitively, then this doctrinal presentation is not an infallible decision, even if all other bishops in their dioceses teach the same as he does; not every doctrine generally proclaimed in the Church is infallible, but only that which is proclaimed as definitive or absolute.
If, on the other hand, the pope wants to impose the definitive assent to a doctrine on the faithful, initially only on his Roman diocese, we have an infallible decision; however, this does not depend on the agreement of the bishops; On the contrary, it necessarily leads to the consent of the bishops as a consequence who until then may have still had doubts, otherwise they would be separated from the Church.
Papal and Conciliar Infallibility
Incidentally, the pope certainly makes a real and formal “decision ex cathedra” when he “casts his vote” together with other bishops at a council for a doctrine to be believed or to be held unconditionally.
Thus he definitively, as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, presents a doctrine to be held by the whole Church on faith or morals and thus fulfils all the requirements that Vatican I places on a “decision ex cathedra”.5
The fact that this papal decision is made with the approval of the Council does not strip it of its status as a definitive and infallible “decision ex cathedra”: it does not give it its finality and infallibility, however much it increases its solemnity. Pius IX, for example, gave such a solemn doctrinal decision when he declared in the third session of the Vatican Council:
“The decrees and canons contained in the Constitution just read have met with the approval of all the Fathers without exception, and We, with the approval of the holy Council, define them as they are read and confirm them with apostolic authority.”6
2. The meaning of the term ex cathedra and non-definitive papal teaching
De Ecclesia Christi, n. 971
Indeed, in this Vatican definition, besides the subject of infallibility, which is the Roman Pontiff, it is carefully declared that the first condition or formal reason under which the same pontiff is infallible is when he speaks from the chair, simply or per excellentiam.
Specifically, since the chair of the Roman Pontiff is nothing other than the supreme authority of the shepherd and teacher of all Christ’s faithful, various expressions from the chair will exist in various forms for the use of this authority.
Thus, the Pontiff can speak as a teacher, demonstrating revealed truths, explaining their nature, mutual connection, and consequences, defending it against adversaries (cf. nn. 663, 664). It follows that the Pontiff can incorporate or at least faithfully refer to certain teachings established elsewhere in his own decrees (n. 832).
In these methods of teaching, he does not prescribe assent per se, but it must be given to the knowledge and truthfulness of such a sacred teacher, supported by the force of arguments or authority. It is less fitting to say that the Pontiff here behaves like a private teacher, considering that he exercises both the right and the public duty of teaching, demanding the authority to speak and be heard. Therefore, he speaks ex cathedra in this way to some extent.
Much more, the Pontiff speaks in a way ex cathedra when he demands a congruent assent to his doctrine, even if it is not yet ultimate (n. 967-969).
However, simply and per excellentiam, according to the declaration of the Vatican Council, he speaks ex cathedra when, acting in the role of the supreme shepherd and teacher of all Christians, and by his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the entire Church (cf. n. 832). When this occurs, the Pontiff, in his highest teaching authority – not in any way, but in the complete fullness or utmost intensity, utilising his supreme apostolic authority obliges the whole Church with the definitive or peremptory decision itself.
The Vatican Council proclaims him immune from the danger of error under this condition; although it does not affirm him infallible under this condition alone, it is evident that only a definitive or irrevocable sentence, not yet pronounced, can be inaccessible to the danger of error.
3. The four different ways in which the Church exercises her magisterium, of varying degrees of peremptoriness and authority.
De Ecclesia Christi n. 832
Peremptoriness
For universal magisterial teaching to be infallible, it must be peremptory.
Both the solemn and the daily magisterium of the Church can be exercised in four distinct ways.
1. That which is taught ‘incidentally’
The first mode is when a teaching is presented not as primarily intended, but incidentally and as if really treating a different matter or when it is only mentioned to confirm or illustrate the principal teaching in question, not intending that it be equally accepted […]
For these we do not claim infallibility, even though they should not be despised in accordance with the more or less weight that is given to them by the sense of the Church. […]
2. That which does not intend to compel assent in itself
Then, there are statements by which the Church’s magisterium presents a truth directly, but by merely transmitting a doctrine established somewhere else and not intending that, if the force to compel assent were still lacking, it would be induced here and now.
Statements of this kind, even though they may be properly and authoritatively attested as infallible at a prior point, we do not recognize as infallible in themselves.
[Note by the translator: Straub explains further on in his treatise (n. 971) that “in this mode of teaching assent is not prescribed per se, but one must adhere to it in the measure required by the force of the arguments or the authority derived from the knowledge and truthfulness of such a sacred teacher”].
3. That which compels assent, but not absolutely
Furthermore, there are expressions by which the sacred teachers, while obliging the mind to a more or less controversial doctrine, do not yet present a final, firm, or absolute assent; we will discuss this matter shortly.
Nor do we attribute infallibility to these statements.
[Note by the translator: these are the kinds of teachings Straub ascribes an obligation of what is commonly known as religious assent, which he explains as a firm internal assent comparable to the assent given by children to their parents’ claim to truly be their parents or to the presumption of validity in regard to the sacraments.
He adds that this assent:
“… may be said to be implicitly or interpretatively conditioned, insofar as a son of the Church, knowing that the teaching is not definitive, disposed in such a way that (while here and now rejecting doubt) he would not want to retain the firm assent to the matter held as true if the Church were ever to judge otherwise by a final and infallible sentence, or if he were to discover that the matter contradicted the truth.” (n. 968 – see below).
Straub also adds that one should not suspend assent lightly through an inordinate love for one’s own opinions as that would be an act of grave disobedience, and that one should never in any way dissent publicly.]
4. That which is taught with definitive statements
Therefore, in our thesis we assert such a dignity for those sentences of the sacred magisterium, which, as definitive, ultimate, and decisive, impose a completely firm assent upon the faithful.
Such statements can be distinguished from incidental remarks by the tenor of the words themselves or by accompanying circumstances, such as the occasion for writing on a particular matter or the proposed question.
Peremptory statements can also be distinguished from other statements that do not fully bind by themselves or are not yet firmly binding based on the manner of expression, such as when something is simply commanded to be believed or when anathema is pronounced against dissenters, or when the true faith is indicated in such a way that the obligation for everyone to adhere to it forever at least appears from the preceding, accompanying, or subsequent circumstances. Certainly, the magisterium of the Church is not limited to fixed formulas for the purpose of defining matters of faith.
4. The types of assent to be given to the Roman congregations, and by analogy (as mentioned in n. 971) non-definitive papal teaching mentioned in the third category of n. 832 above
De Ecclesia Christi nn. 968-9
968. Nor is there lacking a reason for giving assent to the intellect itself; for the authority of the Roman congregations decreeing that a doctrine is to be held by the intellect is found to be much weightier than the authority of particular bishops, both on account of a) the exceptional knowledge and integrity of the members, and b) the customary mature deliberation, and especially c) on account of the singular conjunction with the supreme pontiff and the suitable assistance of divine grace given for the exercise of their office.
Such reasons commend authority from a stronger source, whereby the supreme pontiff himself shines forth in propounding doctrine after the most careful consultation – albeit not in a definitive manner.
Nor does the intellect’s assent need to be rendered only firm in its own manner, because error can underlie non-infallible decrees.
Indeed, in itself and almost always, it is true that against the mere possibility of error, the truth of the sacred decree is supported by every weighty reason, and therefore every solid probability or any kind of moral certainty. As such, the opinion or suspicion of an error actually existing, and any recognition of its probability or doubt, are all nothing but imprudent and reckless, and may be excluded by an upright will.
Indeed, a simply firm assent is to be given, somewhat mitigated only by the possibility of falsehood.
But who contends that, when parents seriously affirm something (for instance, that they are the true parents) the children can decently deny to give a firm assent to this per se, and can interject as a cause for this refusal that “it could be false”.
Or is it right for a Catholic not to acknowledge Christ present in the most Blessed Sacrament with a certain and firm assent, simply because it is possible that the Host might not have been properly consecrated?
Yet, no less (indeed, much more) should the faithful adhere firmly to the doctrine proposed to be held by the sacred authority (even if not infallibly), and reject the contrary proposition, according to the due gravity of the matter.
Moreover, from the fact that a decree is not infallible, there follows one thing: that formally, it is not fitting to give a firm assent above all that could oppose it, and therefore, absolutely unconditional or to be preserved under any condition.
Rather, such an assent may be said to be implicitly or interpretatively conditioned, insofar as a son of the Church, knowing that the teaching is not definitive, disposed in such a way that (while here and now rejecting doubt) he would not want to retain the firm assent to the matter held as true if the Church were ever to judge otherwise by a final and infallible sentence, or if he were to discover that the matter contradicted the truth.
969. However, it can happen per accidens that either immediately or over time, it becomes apparent to someone that a decree is either certainly false, or contrary to a reasoning so solid, or at least unknown and not yet decided by the makers of the decree, that even the weight of sacred authority does not nullify the force of this reasoning.
Now, since it is a rational obedience which is demanded, if the former occurs, it will be permitted to dissent; but if the latter, it will be permitted either, by suspending assent, to doubt or even to consider the opinion differing from the sacred decree as probable.
Yet, out of reverence for the sacred authority (and especially to the supreme pontiff himself), it will not be right to contradict such a decree publicly, unless perhaps the sacred power itself permits this to be brought to a greater light for a question not yet definitively decided. On the contrary, silence (which some call “obediential”) must be maintained, or the difficulty must be modestly set forth before the sacred tribunal, or recourse must be had to a higher tribunal and infallible judgment.
However, such mistakes in sacred decrees are very rarely found, and the exception itself of an error committed by the Roman congregations in the case of Galileo strongly confirms the rule. Hence, let each one take care not to deceive himself freely with a preoccupation for his own opinion, knowing that he must render a strict account to the Lord, the searcher of hearts.
For he who rashly refuses the assent in question gravely violates the obedience owed to the commands of legitimate authority. At the same time, one sins against the faith to the extent that this opposition inclines a man to resist pertinaciously the sacred authority, even when it is infallibly defining a matter of divine or ecclesiastical faith. This may be so either universally, or specifically concerning the truth which had been previously proposed in a non-definitive way, or regarding some matter connected to it. Moreover, by presuming to know more than is fitting, he becomes guilty of spiritual intemperance (cf. Rom 12:3).
On the contrary, it is good for the intellect to be inclined towards assent through free will: both because it is good to obey a legitimate superior sacred authority and, by thus obeying, to avoid the danger to the faith; and also because the assent elicited by the intellect itself, on account of sacred authority, is commendable – just as the motive of the will commanding the act of divine or ecclesiastical faith is discerned in the goodness of the act itself.
Hence, finally, since the material object (i.e., doctrine pertaining to religion) and the formal object or the motive of the intellect (i.e., the authority to be religiously observed) are common to various assents, from its proper motive (which is the infallible authority of God or the Church speaking) the first and second assents assume the special name of divine or ecclesiastical faith; but a third assent, retaining the name due to the authority of the Church as something serious, is aptly called religious assent.
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First Vatican Council, Session 3, Chapter 3.
Anton Straub, De Ecclesia Christi, n. 828.
Ibid., n. 971.
Ibid., n. 1072.
First Vatican Council, Session 4, Chapter 4.
Collect. Lac. 7, 257.