‘Universal and peaceful adherence' defence of Francis unavailable to traditionalists
Is it possible to oppose the Conciliar-Synodal Church's religious revolution, and still have the standing to say that 'universal and peaceful acceptance' proves that Francis is Pope?
Francis being ‘universally and peacefully accepted’ is incompatible with rejecting post-conciliar canonisations, liturgy and laws
Following the excommunication of Archbishop Carlo Maria Viganò, there has been much debate over the doctrine of “universal and peaceful adherence,” (UPA) and how it pertains to Francis and his claim to the papacy.
In addition, in the article defending Francis’ legitimacy (to which we responded) Prof. Roberto de Mattei also claimed that:
“If the one who speaks them is a pontiff, as long as this realisation is lacking and the pope is tolerated and accepted by the universal Church, the heretic will remain a true pope and, in principle, his acts will be valid.”1
De Mattei is not alone in such claims: many others, such as Bishop Athanasius Schneider have made similar arguments in their efforts to defend the legitimacy of Francis’ claim to the papacy.2
In this piece, we shall see the wider context to the UPA doctrine, and show why no “traditionalist” (or even “conservative”) can have recourse to it to defend Francis’ claim to the papacy without engaging themselves in significant contradiction.
What is ‘universal and peaceful adherence’?
Louis Cardinal Billot expressed the UPA doctrine as follows:
“… for the Church to adhere to a false pontiff would be the same thing as if she were to adhere to a false rule of faith, since the Pope is the living rule which the Church must follow in belief and always follows in fact, as will be still more clearly apparent in what is to be said later.
“By all means God can permit that at some time or other the vacancy of the see be extended for a considerable time. He can also allow a doubt to arise about the legitimacy of one or another man elected. But He cannot permit the entire Church to receive someone as pontiff who is not a true and legitimate [pope].
“Therefore, from the time he has been accepted and joined to the Church as the head to the body, we cannot further consider the question of a possible mistake in the election or of a [possible] deficiency of any condition whatsoever necessary for legitimacy, because the aforementioned adherence of the Church radically heals the mistake in the election and infallibly indicates the existence of all requisite conditions.”3
Matthew McCusker summarised the application of the UPA doctrine to Francis and his recent predecessors as follows:
“[It is argued that] ‘If a man is universally and peacefully adhered to as pope, it is established beyond doubt that such a man is pope. Francis is peacefully and universally adhered to as pope, therefore it is established beyond doubt that he is the pope.’
“The proponents of this argument would assert that Francis has been universally and peacefully adhered to as pope because all the bishops who head the local churches and exercise ordinary jurisdiction in the Church, and all the members of the College of Cardinals, would publicly state that he is the pope; and all, as far as we know, name him in the canon of the Mass.”4
It is a “dogmatic fact,” and therefore infallibly true, that the claim of a man to whom the entire Church peacefully and universally adheres is legitimate: he really is the pope. But here, problems arise for many of those who wish to defend Francis’ claim with the UPA doctrine —not because the principles or arguments are untrue, but because they cut in more than one direction.
To demonstrate this, I shall mainly follow Mgr. Gerard Van Noort’s treatment of the subject in the 1957 version of his work Christ’s Church. This work is clear, and typically follows Louis Cardinal Billot’s more detailed treatment of its subject matter.
Most importantly, Van Noort’s treatment of this subject is very standard, being largely the same as many other theologians of greater and lesser weight. However, there are a few points of difference, and an important clarification and distinction, which we will discuss towards the end of this piece.
The largely standard nature of Van Noort’s arguments is important because it shows that we are not dealing with the private opinions of an individual theologian, but rather common theses and arguments of Catholic theology itself. Readers are encouraged to verify this for themselves.
Dogmatic facts
Van Noort defines a dogmatic fact in standard terms:
“A dogmatic fact is a fact not contained in the sources of revelation, on the admission of which depends the knowledge or certainty of a dogma or of a revealed truth.”5
He also states what is the common opinion of theologians, namely that “the Church’s infallibility extends to dogmatic facts” and adds that this is “theologically certain.” The examples which Van Noort gives of dogmatic facts are themselves very standard:
That Vatican I was a legitimate ecumenical council
That the Latin Vulgate is a substantially faithful translation of the original books of the Bible
That Pius XII was legitimately elected pope.
Van Noort summarises the wider issue as to why the Church’s proposition of these dogmatic facts must be infallible. He says that it is because other matters depend on the certainty of such facts:
“One can readily see that on these facts hang the questions of whether the decrees of the [First] Vatican Council are infallible, whether the Vulgate is truly Sacred Scripture, whether Pius XII is to be recognized as supreme ruler of the universal Church.”6
One way of expressing this is that Church's universal and peaceful adherence to a man as pope constitutes an definitive implicit or tacit proposition/judgment that he really is so, and that the Church is infallible in all such propositions/judgments.
While there are a few differences in how individual theologians present the matter of dogmatic facts, or UPA doctrine as an example of a dogmatic fact, there is no need to list those that teach it. They make up the majority of such authorities.
However—prescinding for now from the question of whether Francis is peacefully and universally accepted as pope—it is extremely incongruous for anyone but the most enthusiastic supporters of Francis and the Vatican II reforms to have recourse to this argument.
The incongruity arises from the reason why it is certain that a claimant with the Church’s universal and peaceful adherence is the legitimate Roman Pontiff. We can see this in the proofs given for the UPA doctrine by the theologians. These proofs refer to infallibility itself.
The secondary object of infallibility
The idea that we can be infallibly certain about the legitimacy of a papal claimant with the Church’s universal and peaceful adherence may seem strange to some. This is because many today believe that infallibility is limited to papal ex cathedra definitions and to the anathemas of councils, or those things believed “everywhere, by everyone, and at all times”, or revealed before the death of St John.
In fact, it is at least theologically certain that the Church’s infallibility extends to those “other truths which are required necessarily in order to guard the whole deposit of revelation.”7
These “other truths” are referred to as the secondary object of infallibility. Van Noort defines such truths as being so “closely connected with the revealed deposit that revelation itself would be imperiled unless an absolutely certain decision could be made about them.”8
He explains further:
“The charism of infallibility was bestowed upon the Church so that the latter could piously safeguard and confidently explain the deposit of Christian revelation, and thus could be in all ages the teacher of Christian truth and of the Christian way of life.
“But if the Church is to fulfill this purpose, it must be infallible in its judgment of doctrines and facts which, even though not revealed, are so intimately connected with revelation that any error or doubt about them would constitute a peril to the faith.
“Furthermore, the Church must be infallible not only when it issues a formal decree, but also when it performs some action which, for all practical purposes, is the equivalent of a doctrinal definition.”9
He explains that it is called the secondary object in order to distinguish it from the primary object—which includes “only the truths contained in the actual deposit of revelation.”10 He states that the “allied matters” which “contribute to its safeguarding and security, come within the purview of infallibility not by their very nature, but rather by reason of the revealed truth to which they are annexed.”11
What is important here is that if the Church were not infallible in matters pertaining to the secondary object of infallibility, including the legitimacy of a particular Roman Pontiff, then the faithful could not rely on her regarding truths “required necessarily” to guard the Faith. No Catholic can admit such a possibility for the Church.
When he gets to his defense of the UPA doctrine in particular, Van Noort refers back to these more general points:
“Proof 1: From the purpose of infallibility. The Church is infallible in those related matters in which an error would constitute a danger to the faith. But dogmatic facts are matters of this kind.
“The reason should be obvious from the examples alleged above. What good would it do to proclaim in theory the infallible authority of ecumenical councils if one could licitly doubt the legitimacy of a specific council?
“What good would it do to acknowledge the inspiration of the Sacred Books in their original forms—forms long ago extinct—if one could not definitively establish the substantial fidelity of copies of the original, and of the translations which the Church has to use?
“Could Christians be effectively protected against errors in their faith if the Church could not warn them against poisonous fare, such as are books which contain heresy or errors in religious matters?”12
Are we to conclude that Francis must infallibly be the pope, because otherwise there would be “a danger to the faith” for Christians? This seems nonsensical. The most common complaint of traditionalists and conservatives is that Francis himself—and his recent predecessors—is endangering the faith.
Now, the theologians who address this topic typically treat the same four to six “allied matters” under the heading of the secondary object—including also theological conclusions, the approval of religious orders, the canonisation of saints, and universal disciplinary laws.13
And here we arrive at a clear view of the incongruity of those who criticise Francis and the reforms of Vatican II having recourse to the argument of UPA: the same theologians who teach the UPA doctrine also insist, for the same reasons, that the secondary object of infallibility extends to “allied matters,” the infallibility of which many Francis-defending traditionalists emphatically deny.
The Canonisation of Saints
As is well-known, many have raised concerns about some of Francis’ canonisations, as well as others following Vatican II.
Some have cast doubt on particular saints canonised since Vatican II, claiming that some such canonisations have been more about political motives than anything else.
Others justify their doubts on the basis that some of the candidates were “invalid matter” for canonisation, or that canonisations now are:
Based on a less rigorous process
Based on a new concept of sainthood
Backed no longer by the infallible authority of the pope, but by some other collegial authority
Not ordered towards canonisation as a teaching act, and therefore (they say) not subject to the assistance of the charism of infallibility.
Others still try to minimise the problem, by suggesting that canonisation means nothing more than that the person canonised is in heaven.
Bishop Athanasius Schneider—who, as we mentioned, also argues that the UPA doctrine proves Francis’ legitimacy—takes an alternative route.14
While Schneider does not seem to have doubted or denied any particular canonisation from Francis, he does provides a very particular (and erroneously reductive) definition of the canonisation of saints, in his recent catechism book Credo:
“Acts of canonization guarantee that devotion to a saint is not contrary to the Faith and can be for the spiritual good of the believer.”15 (Emphasis added)
He also claims that “the Church has not infallibly proclaimed or formally taught that canonizations of saints are infallible acts.”16 This seems to be false. Aside from the intrinsic argument based on the nature of the act of canonisation, it is axiomatic in the discussion of the secondary object of infallibility as a whole, that the Church's infallibility extends as far as she claims it, and that she cannot be mistaken in this matter.17
But it is clear that several popes have claimed infallibility for their acts of canonization, and with no indication that this claim was limited to this or that particular canonisation.18 Therefore, it seems that the Church really is infallible in such acts, notwithstanding any delay in theologians taking cognisance of this reality, as argued by Anton M. Holzer.19
However, even if we conceded both the point (that the Church has not infallibly taught that canonisations are infallible) and its supposed significance, this objection would cut both ways. If we can say this of canonisations, it is difficult to see why we could not say the same about the UPA doctrine, which (by Schneider's criteria) stands on less secure magisterial ground20
But in fact, aside from any explicit teaching on the matter, the Church makes clear by her actions, and other implicit and tacit teaching acts, that canonisations, declarations of dogmatic facts and the Church’s universal and peaceful acceptance of a man as pope are all infallible, and for the same reasons, which stand or fall together.
In any case, these criticisms are refuted in advance by the teaching of the theologians, such as Van Noort. They hold that canonisations are included under the secondary object of infallibility for the following sorts of reasons:
“Assertion 5: The Church's infallibility extends to the canonization of saints. This is the common opinion today.
“Canonization (formal) is the final and definitive decree by which the sovereign pontiff declares that someone has been admitted to heaven and is to be venerated by everyone, at least in the sense that all the faithful are held to consider the person a saint worthy of public veneration.
“It differs from beatification, which is a provisional rather than a definitive decree, by which veneration is only permitted, or at least is not universally prescribed. Infallibility is claimed for canonization only; a decree of beatification, which in the eyes of the Church is not definitive but may still be rescinded, is to be considered morally certain indeed, but not infallible. Still, there are some theologians who take a different view of the matter.”21
In other words, the infallibility of canonisations is based on the definitive nature of the act, rather than the process that led up to it. This is very evident in the decrees of canonisation used—with Francis’ decrees of canonisation being substantially the same as those used by pre-conciliar popes, whom these theologians had in view.22
Van Noort says that this is merely the “common opinion” rather than “theologically certain” (as with dogmatic facts), although Salaverri states that this matter is in fact theologically certain and even implicitly defined.23 Some other theologians give it an even higher theological note still, and they appear to have magisterial arguments on their side of the greater weight.24
In any case, Van Noort’s arguments—which are very typical—are substantially the same as his arguments for the infallibility of dogmatic facts.
“Proof 2: From the purpose of infallibility. The Church is infallible so that it may be a trustworthy teacher of the Christian religion and of the Christian way of life. But it would not be such if it could err in the canonisation of saints.
“Would not religion be sullied if a person in hell were, by a definitive decree, offered to everyone as an object of religious veneration? Would not the moral law be at least weakened to some extent, if a protege of the devil could be irrevocably set up as a model of virtue for all to imitate and for all to invoke?”25
We are not entering into the question of the eternal destiny of any particular person canonized by Francis—some of whom (for example, Padre Pio, Fr Maximilian Kolbe, as well as John-Henry Cardinal Newman and the parents of St Thérèse of Lisieux) have compelling cases for sainthood.
Instead, we are merely considering the unquestionable fact that the same sorts of arguments and reasoning which justify the infallibility of the UPA doctrine are used to justify the infallibility of canonisations as well.
For these reasons, it is highly incongruous for anyone who has cast doubt on the infallibility of canonisations in general, or of any post-conciliar canonisation in particular (such as those who put “Saint” in scare-quotes), to have recourse to the UPA doctrine in defence of Francis.
Even if Francis is the true pope, or is so accepted, such persons have already denied the grounds for making this argument in advance.
The matter of canonisations is discussed further elsewhere:
Universal Disciplinary Laws
Another matter which the same theological authorities propose with the same arguments and for the same reasons is the infallibility of universal disciplinary laws.
What is meant by “infallibility” in this context? Van Noort explains:
“Assertion 3: The Church’s infallibility extends to the general discipline of the Church. This proposition is theologically certain.
“By the term "general discipline of the Church” are meant those ecclesiastical laws passed for the universal Church for the direction of Christian worship and Christian living. Note the italicized words: ecclesiastical laws, passed for the universal Church.
“The imposing of commands belongs not directly to the teaching office but to the ruling office; disciplinary laws are only indirectly an object of infallibility, i.e., only by reason of the doctrinal decision implicit in them. When the Church's rulers sanction a law, they implicitly make a twofold judgment:
“1. ‘This law squares with the Church's doctrine of faith and morals’; that is, it imposes nothing that is at odds with sound belief and good morals. This amounts to a doctrinal decree.
“2. ‘This law, considering all the circumstances, is most opportune.’ This is a decree of practical judgment.”26
For these reasons, we could understand “the infallibility of universal disciplinary laws” has the infallible goodness or morality of such laws; and this is indeed how some theologians explain this matter.
As with the canonisation of saints, the arguments in favour of disciplinary infallibility are precisely the same as those around dogmatic facts and in favour of the UPA doctrine. Consider Van Noort’s explanation:
“Proof: 1. From the purpose of infallibility. The Church was endowed with infallibility that it might safeguard the whole of Christ's doctrine and be for all men a trustworthy teacher of the Christian way of life.
“But if the Church could make a mistake in the manner alleged when it legislated for the general discipline, it would no longer be either a loyal guardian of revealed doctrine or a trustworthy teacher of the Christian way of life. It would not be a guardian of revealed doctrine, for the imposition of a vicious law would be, for all practical purposes, tantamount to an erroneous definition of doctrine; everyone would naturally conclude that what the Church had commanded squared with sound doctrine. It would not be a teacher of the Christian way of life, for by its laws it would induce corruption into the practice of religious life.
“2. From the official statement of the Church, which [in Pius VI’s Auctorem fidei] stigmatized as ‘at least erroneous’ the hypothesis ‘that the Church could establish discipline which would be dangerous, harmful, and conducive to superstition and materialism.’”27
Van Noort gives a special example of what he has in mind as an infallible discipline:
“The well-known axiom. Lex orandi est lex credendi (The law of prayer is the law of belief), is a special application of the doctrine of the Church's infallibility in disciplinary matters.
“This axiom says in effect that formulae of prayer approved for public use in the universal Church cannot contain errors against faith or morals.”28
Van Noort is very far from being alone here. Cardinal Billot teaches the same doctrine as Van Noort, stating that the Church “can never institute a discipline which would be in any way opposed to the rule of faith or to evangelical holiness.”29 Sixto Cartechini writes:
“[A]lthough it is not repugnant that sometimes the Church, in things of little importance, tolerates in ancient prayers some expressions which are not entirely exact, she cannot, however, permit that forms of expression be used in the liturgy, in her name, which are contrary to her beliefs and convictions.”30
This is precisely what many advocates of UPA’s applicability to Francis claim has happened following Vatican II; only they go far beyond asserting that this pertains to “things of little importance” or of expressions in the reformed rites which “are not entirely exact,” as Cartechini put it. This situation simply cannot be explained away with reference to individual errors of faith and morals: it is much more pervasive even than that.
Many other authorities could be cited, but they are all simply explaining texts such as this:
Council of Trent: “Can. 7. If anyone says that the ceremonies, vestments, and outward signs, which the Catholic Church uses in the celebration of Masses, are incentives to impiety rather than the services of piety: let him be anathema.”31
These authorities typically also point to the definitive teaching of Pius VI in Auctorem fidei, Gregory XVI in Quo graviora and Leo XIII in Testem benevolentiae. To these, we could also add Pius XII’s comments in Mystici Corporis:
“Certainly the loving Mother is spotless in the Sacraments by which she gives birth to and nourishes her children; in the faith which she has always preserved inviolate; in her sacred laws imposed on all [...]”32
Gregory XVI taught that it is impossible for the Church to “ordain, grant, or permit what would turn to the detriment of the soul’s salvation, to the contempt and harm of a sacrament instituted by Christ.”33
In fact, it could be argued that the infallibility of such laws is even more certain than that of the UPA doctrine, given that it enjoys the additional extrinsic authority of having been taught by the magisterium on multiple occasions.
The matter of the infallibility of universal disciplinary laws is discussed elsewhere:
How do the defenders of Francis’ claim treat universal disciplinary laws?
However, many advocates of Francis’ alleged universal and peaceful adherence explicitly deny the infallibility of such laws in general, and correctly claim that Francis’ laws (and other post-conciliar laws) are “at odds with sound belief and good morals.”34
For example: in the work already mentioned, Bishop Schneider implies that “universal ecclesiastical laws” can be:
“Manifestly harmful”
"Undermin[ing] or eviently harm[ing] the clarity of integrity” of the faith, morals or liturgy.35
Elsewhere, Schneider condemns provisions of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, which he nonetheless elsewhere calls “a main compendium” of “universal ecclesiastical law.”36 Specifically, he condemns the permission of Catholic ministers to administer penance, holy communion and extreme unction to certain groups of those outside the Catholic Church.37
Elsewhere again, he states specifically that the “disciplinary norms” of an ecumenical council “beyond the scope of infallibility,” and that “the disciplinary acts of the hierarchy are not infallible.”38
One reason suggested for his rejection of this proposition, taught by the magisterium and the theologians mentioned, is that they are “subject to possible future revision.”39 But as we have already seen, this is to misunderstand what is meant by “infallibility” in this context: Van Noort explains the infallibility of universal disciplines does not mean that such disciplines are irreformable (they are indeed reformable, as he says), nor that they are necessarily always opportune or prudent.40
However, as we shall see, many advocates of the UPA doctrine’s applicability to Francis et al. go far beyond suggesting that some apparently universal disciplinary laws are “inopportune in the circumstances.”
In fact, many such advocates either reject the post-conciliar liturgical reforms outright, or consider them to be dangerous, harmful and representative of a departure from Catholic doctrine. Some state forcefully that nobody should attend the Novus Ordo liturgy, even if they have no other options on a day of precept. Even some who do not go so far in the practical sphere may still think these reforms are basically dangerous, harmful and non-Catholic.
Even many conservatives condemn or criticise officially approved “options” in the Novus Ordo liturgy, as well as other apparent examples of universal disciplinary laws.41
The nature of the criticisms
To understand these reactions, we must recall that those involved with the liturgical reforms (such as Fr Joseph Gélineau) were open that they had brought about the suppression of the received and traditional rites, and their replacement with new constructions, and that they were proud of this achievement.42
As a result of this, and of the significant changes in the content of the liturgical rites, Cardinals Ottaviani and Bacci both signed an intervention which stated:
“[The new rite] represents, overall and in its details, a striking departure from the Catholic theology of the Mass as it was elaborated [at] the Council of Trent which, by permanently fixing the “canons” of the rite, erected an insurmountable barrier against any heresy which could undermine the integrity of the Mystery.
“[The new rite] renounces actually being an expression of the doctrine that the Council of Trent defined as being of divine and Catholic faith. Yet the Catholic conscience remains forever bound to this doctrine. As a result, the promulgation of the Novus Ordo Mass puts every Catholic in the tragic need to choose.”43 (Emphasis added)
Because of considerations such as this (as well as other doctrinal matters), Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre called the reforms of Vatican II a “Reformation, born of Liberalism and Modernism,” and said that:
“[It] is poisoned through and through; it derives from heresy and ends in heresy, even if all its acts are not formally heretical.
“It is therefore impossible for any conscientious and faithful Catholic to espouse this Reformation or to submit to it in any way whatsoever.”44
Lefebvre also stated that the Novus Ordo Mass was “impregnated with the spirit of Protestantism. It bears within it a poison harmful to the faith.”45
We have already seen that Bishop Schneider specifically denies the infallibility of disciplinary acts/norms, implies that universal ecclesiastical laws can be “manifestly harmful” and can “harm or undermine the integrity of the Catholic Faith or the sacredness of the liturgy,”46 and that he condemns one such universal law, as found in the 1983 Code of Canon Law.47
It is noteworthy that in the same work mentioned, Schneider has also offered the following criticisms of the Novus Ordo liturgy:
It contains “doctrinally ambiguous prayers”
Its prayers “emphasize the aspect of a meal while seriously obscuring the propitiatory nature of the sacrifice” and thus “are very close to a Protestant understanding.”48
Further, in light of Schneider’s references to meals, ambiguity and Protestant worship, his discussion of superstition and liturgical innovation (from the same book) appears to be a further condemnation of the Novus Ordo liturgy on his part:
“372. What kinds of superstition involve undue worship of the true God? False worship, which contains something contrary to natural truth or divine revelation, as when false revelations are maintained; impious worship, as when a man-centered worship is established in violation of the Church’s constant liturgical tradition.
“375. Why do man-centered forms of worship violate the Church’s constant liturgical tradition? Because only ‘the received and approved rites of the Church’ offer to God the worship that He has prescribed, and only her constant liturgical custom best safeguards the truly God-centered form of worship.
“376. What is the most common form of man-centered worship today? Drastic liturgical innovations and abuses, by which one introduces into the worship of the Church something contrary to her traditional doctrine or custom, e.g., a Protestant and banquet-style celebration of the Mass as in a closed circle, dances, show performances, tokens of secular organizations or pagan religions, etc.
“377. Why are such innovations reprehensible within Catholic worship? Even if they contain no objective falsehood, such innovations undermine the constant Tradition of the Church, and violate the sacred rites themselves: ‘He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered it.’”49
Schneider proposes the short-lived sixteenth century breviary reform of Quignonez as an explanatory precedent for the idea of a pope issuing “a deficient liturgical form.”50 But this is a very equivocal precedent indeed, with his criticisms of the Novus Ordo being completely different in kind to those of which Quignonez’ breviary received.51
In any case, it is not for us to accept or refute the relevance of such a precedent as Quignonez here, and the point is not whether Lefebvre, Gélineau, Ottaviani, Bacci or Schneider are correct in their analyses of the Novus Ordo rites. We can completely prescind from the validity of all critiques of the reformed liturgy for the purpose of this essay.
This is because the point at hand is the same as that with canonisations: those who are condemning what they claim to be universal disciplines (on intrinsic grounds, rather on the basis of opportuneness, etc.) are denying the grounds for the UPA doctrine itself—namely the grounds for the secondary object of infallibility—as well as the grounds for the Church’s role as Van Noort’s “trustworthy teacher of the Christian religion and of the Christian way of life.”
Those who state that the universal disciplines of the Church can be dangerous and harmful have, by that very fact, surrendered the right to insist that others accept their interpretation of the UPA doctrine and its application to Francis and his recent predecessors.
Francis’ own universal disciplines
So far, we have not considered whether Francis himself has been responsible for any harmful, dangerous or non-Catholic laws.
However, while the liturgical reforms were proposed by Paul VI, Francis has also engaged his own responsibility through his consent to them throughout his pontificate. He has also furthered these reforms, through the restrictions of the motu proprio Traditionis Custodes.52
Some of the same Francis-defenders have critiqued of the post-conciliar liturgical reforms have referred to Traditionis Custodes as “null and void,” a “scandal and a form of clerical abuse,” and many have openly rejected its legitimacy.
Aside from directly liturgical matters, many advocates of the UPA doctrine’s applicability to Francis have raised concerns about other (putatively) universal disciplinary laws, on the similar grounds of their being dangerous, evil or non-Catholic. In addition to new grounds for decrees of marriage nullity, regulations around communicatio in sacris (worshiping with non-Catholics) and other provisions of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, we could possibly add Amoris Laetitia, in that its “official interpretation” arguably presumes to establish a discipline for the universal Church, and used the Acta Apostolica Sedis to do so, even though no conventional legal instrument was involved.
We could also arguably add Fiducia Supplicans and some other acts of the DDF (formerly the Holy Office) which presume to establish a line of conduct for the universal Church. Although Francis seems to have only approved something like Fiducia Supplicans in a general way,53 he has nonetheless continued to support its provisions by his silence, in the face of great complaint and scandal.54 In fact, it is not unreasonable to think that silence in the face of this represents an increase in support on Francis’ part.
Some might also include the admission of women to the “instituted ministries” (quasi-minor orders) of Lector and Acolyte in the motu proprio Spiritus Domini (2021) which modified the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
But earlier in this piece, we saw that Van Noort defended the doctrine of disciplinary infallibility with reference to the nature and purpose of the Church as “a trustworthy teacher of the Christian way of life,” and the impossibility of this being true if she were liable to promulgate harmful laws, at variance with revelation, to the universal Church.55
This is at the heart of the question of UPA and the secondary object of infallibility as a whole: canonisations, universal disciplinary laws, and dogmatic facts are each infallible because of this nature and purpose of the Church, as expressed succinctly by Van Noort.
But the idea of a trustworthy Church is itself controversial today. Many do not believe that the Church is the trustworthy teacher of the Christian religion. They instead have adopted a kind of Anglicanisation, believing that the truth is found in the Church, alongside some extent of error, and that it is incumbent on all to assess everything which is ever taught, and to accept what is true and reject what is false.
Once again: those who deny that the Church is “a trustworthy teacher of the Christian religion and of the Christian way of life” have denied the major premise of the more fundamental argument; of which dogmatic facts are one example; and of which the UPA doctrine in its turn is only a further specific example of a dogmatic fact. As such, they simply have no standing to claim that Francis’ legitimacy is a dogmatic fact and infallible, due to the allegedly universal and peaceful adherence of the whole Church to him as the pope.
This argument may be possible for those who accept the new canonisations and the liturgical reform, and they should be dealt with in their turn.
But those who question the new canonisations or their infallibility in general, the legitimacy of the liturgical reform and universal ecclesiastical laws, and a whole raft of other issues, have no business standing on ceremony for the supposed dogmatic fact of Francis’ legitimacy.
Such persons are not entitled to reject or rethink two headings of the secondary object of infallibility, and then subsequently insist that we all accept a third—let alone that we must accept their private judgement of how this third is to be applied to Francis.
However, a Dominican writing in the early twentieth century has shown that there may be even more at stake here than it seems.
The contribution of Fr Marín-Sola OP to the debate
The Dominican theologian Fr Francisco Marín-Sola OP wrote the difficult-to-find work The Homogenous Evolution of Catholic Dogma. In this work, Marín-Sola argues the UPA doctrine, the canonisation of saints and the infallibility of universal laws are (among other things) each three instances of dogmatic fact, and are each infallible for the same reasons. While he acceptes the usual 4-6 headings under the secondary object of infallibility, he is critical of the classification:
“This sixfold classification seems to us to be extremely empirical since it arises from no intrinsic principle of classification. Nonetheless we accept it both because it is common enough among modem theologians, and because it contributes to clarity. It would appear to be more philosophical to classify the mediately revealed, and consequently, the secondary object of infallibility, into two: (a) mediately revealed teachings; (b) mediately revealed facts.”56
By the latter, he means dogmatic facts—under which he includes the canonisation of saints and the goodness of universal laws. In other words, Marín-Sola is saying that, aside from whether they are doctrinal judgments properly speaking, the propositions a) that this particular canonised person is a saint, and b) that this particular universal disciplinary law is good, moral, and in keeping with the Gospel both give rise to dogmatic facts.
First, Marín-Sola says the following, about a related matter57 to do with dogmatic facts and canonisations:
“Thus, even if modern theologians usually make a distinction between the case of dogmatic facts and the case of the canonization of the saints, nonetheless, the force of logic has led them to apply to the canonization of the saints a solution identical or similar to the one given by them to the problem of dogmatic facts.”58
In one place, he says explicitly that the canonisation of saints is itself “a particular instance of dogmatic fact,”59 and in another he speaks of “dogmatic facts, whereof the canonization of saints is only a particular case.”60
This is the whole tenor of Marín-Sola’s treatment of the canonization of saints, and it explains why the arguments for the infallibility of canonisations are substantially the same as his arguments around dogmatic facts.
Second, we have alrady seen that Marín-Sola refers to the goodness (infallibility) of universal laws as another instance of a dogmatic fact; elsewhere, he explicitly states that what is said about dogmatic facts also applies to such laws:
“Everything that has been said in this section about dogmatic facts applies equally to such facts as whether this law, discipline or custom of the universal Church, or this Rule or these Constitutions of this religious order are morally right (the fact in question is the fact of their morality, not of their timeliness or prudence), or to any other truly dogmatic fact, to wit, one that is necessarily connected with the divine deposit or necessary for its preservation, explication or application, and has been infallibly defined or approved by the Church.
“The morality of such a fact is not only of ecclesiastical, but of divine, faith.”61 (First italics added)
In short, Marín-Sola shows that the UPA doctrine, and the infallibility of the canonisation of saints and of universal disciplinary laws essentially all give rise to the various dogmatic facts. This illustrates the close alignment of these matters, how they stand or fall together, and why someone who denies the latter two cannot insist on the first.
Further, the point of the theological note to be given to the various propositions should be concerning. If the sainthood of a canonised person, and the goodness of a universal and disciplinary law are of divine faith (de fide), then its denial would lead to very serious consequences.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude, however, by affirming that a universally and peacefully accepted claimant is indeed the pope; that the legitimacy of such a one is indeed a dogmatic fact, and infallible for all the reasons discussed by Van Noort; and that canonisations and universal disciplinary laws are similarly infallible for the same reasons.
There are only two ways that one can accept all these truths together.
The first way is to deny the facts. It is to claim (most improbably) that neither Francis does indeed enjoy the peaceful and universal adherence of the Church as pope; that there are no problems with the new canonisations, which are indeed infallible; and that the reformed disciplines of the recent decades and of Francis’ reign were indeed all good, and in keeping with the Catholic faith.
This is the way of denial, of denying what is before our “lying eyes,” of denying the known truth, of denying the religion of our grandparents, and of joining the so-called “popesplainers.”
This is the second way is accepting all these propositions about the secondary object of infallibility and dogmatic facts. It is to admit the truth before our eyes: that Francis does not enjoy universal and peaceful adherence as the pope.
While it may appear to be the case that Francis and his recent predecessors were universally accepted as pope, we need to recognise that appearances can be deceiving, to understand what “universal and peaceful adherence” really means (and what it does not mean), and to have our certainties in order. As Archbishop Lefebvre said:
“While we are certain that the faith the Church has taught for 20 centuries cannot contain error, we are much further from absolute certitude that the pope is truly pope.” (NB: This text is explained in the footnote.)62
These traditionalist Francis-defenders must either give up their use of the UPA defence for Francis and his recent predecessors, or give up their critiques of the post-conciliar canonisations, liturgy and laws. But they cannot give up the latter, because they are true and certain; therefore they must give up the former.
Admitting that Francis does not enjoy the universal peaceful adherence of the Church does not mean that he is not the pope; although it does remove one of the principal barriers towards considering an extended vacancy as a solution to some aspects of the current crisis in the Church.
Admitting this fact opens the way to truth and joy; of finally being able to embrace the full Catholic doctrine on the secondary object of infallibility, as well as everything else taught in traditional ecclesiology; of recognising real problems with the new canonisations and disciplines, without needing to invent contorted theories for ourselves.
However, once someone consciously rejects the infallibility of one heading of the secondary object of infallibility, he may as well reject them all; because he is implicitly rejecting the arguments upon which all the others are built.
It makes no sense, for those who oppose the doctrine, discipline and worship of the Conciliar-Synodal Church as harmful and deleterious to the faith, to insist that the UPA doctrine means that Francis must be a legitimate pope, because otherwise (they say) the Church would have fallen into danger, or into errors against the faith, or even have defected.
They have already explicitly said that the Church has fallen into danger and errors against the faith—through false canonisations, harmful and non-Catholic liturgy and disciplinary laws, and the entire Vatican II revolution which they reject as another religion.
By insisting that a claimant like Francis is a true pope, such men are already implicitly saying that the Church has defected. The same applies most especially to Paul VI, as well as to the intervening claimants.
By contrast, denying or doubting that a claimant like Francis could be the true pope is the central way by which we can have the joy of understanding how Christ’s promises to his one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church—the Roman Catholic Church—continue to be fulfilled in our era.
“You now indeed have sorrow: but I will see you again and your heart shall rejoice.
“And your joy no man shall take from you.” (John 16.22)
Further Reading:
Matthew McCusker: Why ‘universal and peaceful acceptance’ doesn’t prove Francis is pope
Matthew McCusker: Is there ‘universal peaceful acceptance’ of Francis as pope?
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Schneider writes:
“There is no authority to declare or consider an elected and generally accepted Pope as an invalid Pope. The constant practice of the Church makes it evident that even in the case of an invalid election this invalid election will be de facto healed through the general acceptance of the new elected by the overwhelming majority of the cardinals and bishops.”
https://onepeterfive.com/bishop-athanasius-schneider-on-the-validity-of-pope-francis/
To be clear, as an abstract statement of principle, this is correct: it is its application to Francis and his recent predecessors which is problematic.
Mgr G. Van Noort, Dogmatic Theology Volume II: Christ’s Church, n. 89. 6th edition, 1957, trans. Castelot & Murphy, Newman Press, Maryland 1957.
Ibid. Another way of establishing this is by showing that a dogmatic fact is a particular fact whose infallibility or even revealed status is contained within the universal, in the sense that the particular proposition “Socrates was born in original sin” is contained within the universal proposition “All men are born in original sin.” This opens the route for arguing that dogmatic facts can be de fide. This is outside the scope of this piece, but here is a brief explanation of the general principle, from Fr Marín-Sola:
There is not the least difference between defining the truth of this conclusion or fact, and defining the morality of this Rule or Constitutions, this law or discipline, this practice or custom. Just as the Church can define as of divine faith that “This council is infallible” inasmuch as it is only a particular instance or application of the revealed universal, “Every ecumenical council is infallible,” so too she can define as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith that “This law, or custom, or Rule, etc., is morally right” inasmuch as here we have only a case of the particular application of the revealed universal, “Every law, or custom, or Rule, etc. in conformity with the morality of the revealed deposit, is morally right.”
The divine faith due to such a particular proposition does not derive from the Church’s authority or infallibility but from its being included in the revealed universal or revealed deposit. The Church’s authority or infallibility does not effect such inclusion, it only makes us know that inclusion infallibly. It does not intervene as the formal motive, but as the condition or the application of the formal motive, which is none other than divine revelation. It is, therefore, a case of divine faith, not of ecclesiastical faith or of human faith. (n. 277)
He continues in the footnote n. 71:
“Just as the proposition ‘every man is mortal’ and the proposition ‘this man is mortal’ are of faith in the same manner, so also the proposition ‘the morality of the laws of the pope is in every instance good’ and the proposition ‘the morality of this law is good’ are of faith in the same manner.” (John of St. Thomas, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, d.3, a.3, n.10)
Those who think that to hold as of divine faith the truth of every new defined dogmatic fact, or the morality of every new Church law or of every new Rule for religious infallibly approved by the pope, is equivalent to multiplying new dogmas in a prodigious and unheard-of manner, have failed to take note of the fact that such a dogmatic novelty is not a novelty in doctrine but simply a new application of the same one and unchangeable doctrine, and that such a dogmatic novelty can be effected not only by the Holy Father, but that it can be, and is in fact, effected every day by any father. Merely by procreating a new child, every father gives us a new dogma: the dogma that this new child—of whom, we can be sure, the Apostles were not thinking—was redeemed by Christ, etc., etc.
"But all such novelty reduces simply to a particular application of what the Apostles had already taught us in universal form. What any father does by the act of procreation, the pope does by the act of definition. We omit many other proofs of this same truth, with which we have already dealt. (239, 248-252)
Franciso Marín-Sola, The Homogenous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, n. 277. Trans. Antonio T. Piñon, Santo Thomas University Press, Manila, Philippines, 1988.
Revised Outline, Cn 9—Draft Canons of Vatican I. Quoted in Joachim Salaverri SJ, ‘On the Church of Christ’ Summa Theologiae Sacrae IB, Keep the Faith, 2015
Ibid. n. 87
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. n. 89
Although we address this further on in this essay, it should be noted here that while he basically accepts this list, Fr Francisco Marín-Sola OP provides an alternative way of considering them which seems to be of great value.
227. THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. - According to modem theologians, the material object of ecclesiastical faith comprises all the truths that are revealed only in a mediate or virtual manner. In other words, all those truths that notwithstanding their not being formally or immediately contained in the revealed deposit, are nonetheless necessarily connected with that deposit, or are necessary for its conservation. It comprises, in accordance with the classification made by contemporary theologians, six things: (a) theological conclusions, properly speaking; (b) propositions condemned with a censure inferior to that of heresy; (c) the universal laws of the Church, as regards their morality; (d) the definitive approval of the rule and constitutions of religious orders, likewise as regards their morality; (e) dogmatic facts; (f) the canonization of saints.
This sixfold classification seems to us to be extremely empirical since it arises from no intrinsic principle of classification. Nonetheless we accept it both because it is common enough among modem theologians, and because it contributes to clarity. It would appear to be more philosophical to classify the mediately revealed, and consequently, the secondary object of infallibility, into two: (a) mediately revealed teachings; (b) mediately revealed facts. However, for our present purpose one or the other classification makes little difference, provided that everything that is mediately revealed, or everything that is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit, or everything that is necessary for its conservation, be included.
Franciso Marín-Sola, The Homogenous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, n. 277. Trans. Antonio T. Piñon, Santo Thomas University Press, Manila, Philippines, 1988.
Like many critics of the new canonisations, Schneider also claims (in the same place) that the issue “has not been settled conclusively,” and that some “serious theologians have strong reasons” for holding that canonisations are fallible. In fact, the very reasons for thinking that the Church is infallible in her judgment of dogmatic facts in general, and the UPA doctrine in particular, apply with at least equal force to canonizations.
Schneider, Credo Part 1, n. 676
Ibid.
Salaverri writes, in reference to the whole secondary object of infallibility:
“715. It is proved with a general argument. What the purpose of the infallible Magisterium demands, and the infallible Church claims for herself—that truly belongs to the Church. But the purpose of the infallible Magisterium demands and the infallible Church claims for herself infallibility concerning truths connected with revealed truths, which we explained in the state of the question. Therefore infallibility concerning truths connected with revealed truths belongs to the Church. […]
“The major, b) What the infallible Church claims for herself really belongs to her, because in virtue of infallibility the Church necessarily must know and therefore does know the truths to which her infallibility extends, for otherwise the infallibility of the Church would be a power without a definite object concerning which it could be exercised, and therefore it could never be put into act: this is repugnant.”
In the section following, Salaverri sets out the ways in which the Church has claimed infallibility for herself in dogmatic facts, the canonisation of saints and universal disciplinary decrees. (nn. 721, 723, 725)
Although we must insist that the language and nature of all decrees of canonisation sufficiently demonstrate their infallibility, some Popes have explicitly claimed this infallibility in doing so. Anton M. Holzer sets out a number of magisterial texts showing the popes claiming infallibility for acts of canonisation. The popes cited include:
Pope Sixtus IV “preceded the usual formula in the bull ‘Superna caelesti’ at the canonization of St. Bonaventure: ‘...trusting that God will not allow us to err in this canonization...’ (He reigned 1471-1484.)
Pope Clement VII stated that his predecessor Hadrian had canonised St Atnoninus “Our predecessor Hadrian, considering that God would not permit an error on his part in the same canonization” (1523).
Pope Sixtus V stated at the canonization of St Didacus that the Roman Pontiff “could not err or be deceived in his canonization. And this is to be believed not only with pious, but with necessary and very firm faith.” At the same canonization, he again claimed infallibility in this action (1588).
Pope Pius XI canonised St André-Hubert Fournet, clearly claiming infallibility for his act: “Having again and even more fervently implored the light from above, We, as the supreme teacher of the Catholic Church, we have delivered the infallible judgment with the following words…” (1933). He also canonised St Maria Micaela Desmaisieres of the Blessed Sacrament, stating, that “We have solemnly proclaimed from the cathedra of the divine Peter, as supreme teacher of the whole Church of Christ, the infallible judgment in the following words…” (1934)
Pope Pius XII canonised St Gemma Galgani and several other saints with the same terminology (e.g., 1941, 1947, 1949).
In addition, Holzer points to the words of Popes Celestine III (1198) and Clement VI (1342-52) as indicative of their belief in the infallibility of these acts. We should also note in passing that it is not credible to suggest that only these acts which mention infallibility are to be understood as such; on the contrary, they could not be indicated as such unless the act itself was already infallible, and what they say explicitly is implied of all canonisations in general. Holzer states that it is not possible for a pope to not implicitly claim infallibility in such an act, due to the nature of the act itself, and adds: “For if the matter belongs in principle to the indirect object of infallibility, then the Magisterium, in the case of definitive judgments, which are also binding for the whole Church, eo ipso, even without having to formulate this explicitly, necessarily and therefore always lays claim to infallibility and is therefore eo ipso truly infallible.”
M. Holzer, The Infallibility of the Church and the Pope in Canonizations (August 2008). Translated by a friend of The WM Review, taken from Antimodernist.org
In addition, Marín-Sola has a lengthy discussion of this issue.
Holzer concludes as follows:
“How could a Catholic ever be sure that a doctrinal judgment is subject to infallibility if the Church or the popes could deceive the faithful even when expressly claiming their infallibility in definitive (and even solemn) doctrinal judgments that are binding for the whole Church and would not be prevented by the Holy Spirit from claiming infallibility for a matter where—in the opinion of a single theologian!—she cannot. Even if the Church has not yet announced an explicit definition that it is fundamentally infallible in canonization judgments, infallibility is at least explicitly claimed and co-defined here for individual canonizations and thus implicitly also for all canonizations in general, and thus also the demand for unconditional absolute approval or acceptance of the holiness of the person concerned.
“The few quotations cited are thus sufficient to prove clearly and sufficiently clearly that, according to the explicit judgment of these canonizing popes, a canonization itself claims infallibility by right and in principle and is therefore also de facto entitled to it. Every Catholic is bound by this judgment if he does not want to deny the Church the ability to know what she is capable and entitled to do in the exercise of her supreme magisterium and when she enjoys the assistance of the Holy Spirit. The Catholic who would doubt or deny this would eo ipso make the privilege of the infallibility of the teaching and pastoral office a meaningless empty word without concrete and practical value and thus illusory and void.
“Of course, the Magisterium cannot be blamed for the fact that some theologians and theological textbooks lag behind reality and do not necessarily reflect the latest state of theological knowledge. The only theologian currently known to us who has taken the canonization judgments of the last popes into account is Joaquin Salaverri SJ, who states in his treatise on the Church—very cautiously, of course—that the infallibility of the Church and popes is at least theologically certain today according to all theologians and that it can be described as implicitly defined after Pius XI and Pius XII, although Salaverri does not, of course, explain why this can and must not be said.”
In fact, aside from any explicit teaching on the matter, the Church makes clear by her actions and other implicit and tacit teaching that canonizations, declarations of dogmatic facts and the Church’s universal and peaceful acceptance of a man as pope are all infallible, and for the same reasons, which stand or fall together.
Ibid. n. 94.
Joachim Salaverri points out that that Benedict XIV, prior to his election, held this of “different views of the matter”:
“If it is not heretical, still it is temerarious, bringing scandal to the whole Church,... smacking of heresy... affirming an erroneous proposition...wo, will say this about anyone who dares to assert that the Pontiff erred in this or that Canonization, that this or that Saint canonized by him is not to be honored with the worship of dulia.” (Salaverri n. 726)
Pope Pius XI believed that his canonizations were infallible, saying during their decrees:
We, as the supreme Teacher of the Catholic Church, pronounce an infallible judgment with these words.
We, from the Chair of Blessed Peter, as the supreme Teacher of the whole Church of Christ, solemnly proclaim with these words an infallible judgement. [In Salaverri, n. 32]
Salaverri shows that there were at least another two other instances of such language. Cf. also one of Francis’ decrees:
For the honour of the Blessed Trinity, the exaltation of the Catholic faith and the increase of the Christian life, by the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and our own, after due deliberation and frequent prayer for divine assistance, and having sought the counsel of many of our brother Bishops, we declare and define Blessed John XXIII and John Paul II be Saints and we enrol them among the Saints, decreeing that they are to be venerated as such by the whole Church. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.
Although Francis does not use the word “infallible,” it is well known that the language used here is such as to entail the assistance of infallibility. A similar form was also used for the canonization of Paul VI.
http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/libretti/2014/20140427-libretto-canonizzazione.pdf
http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/libretti/2018/20181014-libretto-canonizzazione.pdf
Salaveri n. 726
Cf. the discussion of Marín-Sola throughout. Cf. also the footnotes regard Anton M. Holzer, above.
Van Noort n. 91
Ibid. n. 94
Ibid. n. 92
Card. Billot, De Ecclesia Christi, Rome, 1927, volume I, p. 477
Fr Sixto Cartechini SJ, De Valore Notarum Theologicarum. Translated from a longer Italian version, compared with and adjusted in light of the Latin version. Latin from the Tradibooks, 2010 edition, p 25.
Denzinger n. 954
Pius XII, Encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi 1943 n. 67.
Gregory XVI, Quo graviora, in Papal Teachings, The Church (Solesmes) n. 173
Schneider, Part 1, n. 91
I say “implies” because the below, from Bishop Schneider, is true in relation to commands (as opposed to laws) and for non-universal laws; and it is also true in relation to an impossible hypothetical scenario, similar to St Paul’s mention of an “Angel from heaven” preaching a new Gospel. However, the implication seems clear, and is false.
“What should we do when an ecclesiastical law is manifestly harmful? Any law or command of an ecclesiastical superior — even the pope — that undermines or evidently harms the clarity or integrity of the Church’s constant law of faith (lex credendi), morals (lex vivendi), or liturgy (lex orandi) must not be obeyed.”
Part 2, n. 48.
Part 2, n. 45
For example, Can. 844 of the 1983 Code states:
§3. Catholic ministers administer the sacraments of penance, Eucharist, and anointing of the sick licitly to members of Eastern Churches which do not have full communion with the Catholic Church if they seek such on their own accord and are properly disposed. This is also valid for members of other Churches which in the judgment of the Apostolic See are in the same condition in regard to the sacraments as these Eastern Churches.
§4. If the danger of death is present or if, in the judgment of the diocesan bishop or conference of bishops, some other grave necessity urges it, Catholic ministers administer these same sacraments licitly also to other Christians not having full communion with the Catholic Church, who cannot approach a minister of their own community and who seek such on their own accord, provided that they manifest Catholic faith in respect to these sacraments and are properly disposed.
Against this, Schneider writes in Part 3 of Credo:
371. May the Eucharist be administered to Protestants or the Orthodox? No. As the sacrament of unity (see 1 Cor 10:17), the Eucharist “is properly the sacrament of those who are in full communion with the Church.” It may not be given to those who deny any truth of the Church’s faith or her unity by formally adhering to any heretical or schismatic community. “It is the duty of all who heard Jesus Christ, if they wished for eternal salvation, not merely to accept His doctrine as a whole, but to assent with their entire mind to all and every point of it, since it is unlawful to withhold faith from God even in regard to one single point.”
Part 1, n. 703, Part 3, n. 768.
Part 1, n. 703
As an example of a law that could be good in itself, but inopportune in the circumstances, we could imagine the hypothetical situation of the Church universally permitting Communion under both kinds (e.g., permitting the Chalice to the laity) during the Reformation. This was actually permitted in certain places at the time, but it was deemed to be inopportune for various reasons. In due course, the Church rescinded such permissions.
Some have attempted to evade the force of this problem by claiming that the infallibility of universal disciplinary laws only applies to those which are imposed upon the whole world as obligations; and, they say, the fact that Paul VI never abrogated the traditional liturgy means that the reformed rites were never truly obligatory.
But this is absurd, as can be seen if we replace “the reformed rites” with instead “football-themed rites,” “disco rites” or even “Black Mass rites” to be used alongside the traditional rites; or if we were to imagine a rite and set of norms around regulating polygamy alongside matrimony, or professional burglary alongside confession.
No-one would accept that such abominations could be explained away with reference to whether or not they were not made obligatory on all Christians—who were still (in theory) allowed to worship as Catholics traditionally worship, and to marry only one spouse.
Fr Joseph Gélineau, a consultor for the Consilium, said:
“We must say it plainly: the Roman rite as we knew it exists no more. It has gone. Some walls of the structure have fallen, others have been altered; we can look at it as a ruin or as the partial foundation of a new building.”
Fr Joseph Gélineau, The Mass Today and Tomorrow, translated by Dinah Livingstone, Darton Longman & Todd, London 1976.P 11.
Alfredo Ottaviani, Antonio Bacci, et al: The Ottaviani Intervention: A Brief Critical Study of the New Order of Mass. Trans. Rev Christopher Danel. Angelus Press, Kansas City MO, 2015. Pp 17-18, 48.
Archbishop Lefebvre, Open Letter to Confused Catholics, p. 29
Schneider, Part I. n. 48
Schneider, Part III, n. 371.
Schneider, Part I, n. 680
Schneider, Part II
Schneider, Part III, n. 768
Cf. Pierre Batiffol, History of the Roman Breviary, pp 182-191. Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1912.
Some defenders of Francis have alleged that, as he has been beneficent towards the SSPX and has not attempted to suppress the traditional rites of the Eastern Catholic Churches, he cannot be said to be attacking tradition or the faith itself.
Such a defence is a sophism almost too absurd to merit a response. It should be clear to anyone who thinks about the matter that someone opposed to the Catholic faith is not obliged to carry out a war on all fronts at once; similarly, it should be clear that the traditional Roman rites are being attacked precisely because they enshrine the traditional Catholic religion, which Francis and others wish to “update.”
“In forma communi.”
From such a category, I would exclude the rejection of capital punishment in the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Although this change says what the appropriate line of conduct is, this seems rather to be an act of teaching, rather than governing or ruling, and thus is outside of the scope of this section.
It is addressed by Matthew McCusker in his essay on UPA, papal teaching and the rule of faith.
Van Noort. n. 94
Marín-Sola n. 277
Namely, the legitimacy of the concept of “ecclesiastical faith.”
Ibid. n. 280
Marín-Sola n. 279.
Marín-Sola n. 281
Marín-Sola n. 277.
Lefebvre, Le Figaro, August 4, 1976.
However, we must understand what is meant here correctly. If Marín-Sola and others are write in saying that the legitimacy of a canonically elected pope who has been universally and peacefully accepted by the whole Church is de fide, then the “certitude that the pope is the pope” is absolute certitude, and certitude of the faith.
Matthew McCusker seems to provide the correct way to understand Lefebvre’s comments:
“A surface reading of the texts of these theologians might lead a reader to suppose that once a man can be shown to have received universal and peaceful adherence at some time following his election, his claim to the papacy cannot be challenged for any reason.
“However, a deeper reading shows this to be inconsistent with the wider doctrine of these authors. This is because many of the theologians who propose the theory of UPA also hold that a public heretic cannot be pope, and that, if a true pope were to fall into public heresy, he would cease to be the pope. As Louis Cardinal Billot, one of the theologians whose explanation of UPA is regularly cited puts it, “the question is whether it is possible that a person duly elected and once and for all elevated to the pontificate can at some time or other stop being active in the pontificate.”
“As explained in my previous article, theologians are divided on the question of whether a true pope can fall into public heresy. […]
“Billot holds that UPA is an infallible sign that a man is truly the pope, but Billot also holds that if a true pope were to fall into public heresy, he would automatically lose office. Therefore, it would seem clear that UPA is something that can be lost.
“The Church may universally and peacefully adhere to a man as pope, and this is an infallible sign that he is truly the pope. But should that man cease to be pope, such as by falling into public heresy, the Church will, as a result of this public action of the pontiff, withdraw her universal and peaceful adherence from him. How this withdrawal is manifested will become clearer later in this article.
“Here it can be noted that it is clearly inadmissible to use the theory of universal and public adherence, as proposed by theologians such as Billot, in such a way as to deprive the universal Church of the ability of recognizing that a true pope has fallen into public heresy, and of withdrawing her adherence to him. To do so goes beyond the intentions of the theologians who propose it.”
From Why ‘universal and peaceful acceptance’ doesn’t prove Francis is pope
"While it may appear to be the case that Francis and his recent predecessors were universally accepted as pope, we need to recognise that appearances can be deceiving, to understand what “universal and peaceful adherence” really means (and what it does not mean), and to have our certainties in order."
The above statement is what causes people like Peter Kwasniewski to bend over backwards to defend the "visibility" of the Church by saying that the Pope has to be the Pope, even if he is a manifest heretic. But what good is a visible Church if it leads the faithful astray. It would be more like a "honey trap" for the devil, which ironically, the Novus Ordo is.
The prophecies concerning an eclipsed church should make it clear that the visibility of the Catholic Church can be somewhat wanting at times, or in the End Times.
Pax et bonum +
An article with many interesting points in it.
However, I think you should take up the challenge represented in this book:
https://www.amazon.com/Are-Canonizations-Infallible-Revisiting-Disputed/dp/1989905641
The case against the infallibility of canonizations is much stronger than you let on here.
The same would be true for the purported infallibility of universal disciplinary decisions, as Thomas Pink has well analyzed, here for instance:
https://thelampmagazine.com/blog/papal-authority-and-the-limits-of-official-theology